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Abstract 
 
I propose a research program on the pursuit of enrollments from desired student 
populations.  Non-prestigious institutions grow enrollments because excess enrollment 
capacity undermines organizational survival.  Prestigious institutions maintain selective 
enrollments because prestige depends on the academic profile of undergraduate 
enrollments.  Both types of institutions have an incentive to expand master‟s degree 
programs.  For non-prestigious institutions, master‟s degree programs increase total 
enrollments while diversifying customer base.  For prestigious institutions, revenues from 
master‟s degrees subsidize the pursuit of prestige in undergraduate education. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the adoption and production of master‟s degrees.  I derive 
hypotheses from human capital theory, resource dependence theory, and literature on the 
pursuit of prestige.  I test hypotheses on a panel of institutions from 1975 to 2009.   I find 
that the production of master‟s degrees increases in response to declines in alternative 
revenues (e.g., endowment).  Liberal arts colleges respond to declines in their core 
constituency of freshmen enrollments by adopting interdisciplinary, professional master‟s 
degrees (e.g., business) but not technical degree programs requiring significant 
prerequisites (e.g., engineering). 
Chapter 4 investigates “mission drift” in liberal arts colleges.  I define mission 
drift as the abandonment of the liberal arts college “template” in favor of the 
comprehensive university template.  I argue that liberal arts colleges become universities 
xvi 
 
to increase enrollments and diversify their customer base.  Becoming a university is 
defined as deleting the word “college” and adding “university” to the organizational 
name.  I develop a framework to study the causes of becoming a university by drawing 
on market, institutional, and social network factors.  I test hypotheses on a panel of all 
liberal arts colleges from 1975 to 2009.   
I find that the probability of becoming a university increases when socially 
proximate institutions have previously become universities.  Strong non-tuition revenues 
and strong market position decrease the probability of becoming a university, while 
declines in freshmen enrollments and prior adoption of professional master‟s degrees 
increase the probability. The results for Chapters 3 and 4 complement one another: liberal 
arts colleges adopt master‟s degrees to grow enrollments and diversify customer base 
(Chapter 3); liberal arts colleges become universities to expand master‟s degree 
production (Chapter 4). 
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Chapter 1 :  
Introduction 
This introductory chapter argues that the pursuit of enrollments from desired 
student populations is an important impetus for organizational change in postsecondary 
education.  Section one develops this argument by reviewing historical literature which 
argues that the institutionalization of the modern American university was largely the 
result of organizational changes designed to generate enrollments amidst weak student 
demand (Collins, 1979; Veysey, 1965).  Analyses of different institutional types, in more 
recent epochs, also view concerns about enrollments as a primary cause of organizational 
change (Brint & Karabel, 1989; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996).   Drawing from these empirical 
studies and on contemporary descriptive statistics, I propose a research program about 
organizational change motivated by the pursuit of enrollments. 
Section two argues that the field of organizational studies is particularly suited to 
the study organizational change in postsecondary education.  Critics have argued that 
theories imported from other disciplines often fail to provide insights about the unique 
problems of higher education (Peterson, 1985).  In recent years, however, the field of 
organizational studies has transitioned from a focus on paradigm-driven research to a 
focus on problem driven-research (Davis & Marquis, 2005).  Problem-driven research 
uses theory to develop insights about cases.  In problem-driven research, the concept of 
the “organizational field” helps researchers pay close attention to the unique context of 
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the empirical case, thereby enabling scholars of organizations to develop important 
insights about higher education. 
Finally, section three sketches the organizational field relevant to a research 
program on the pursuit of enrollments by postsecondary institutions.  After describing the 
field, I motivate two empirical studies within this research program.  Chapter 2 discusses 
the data used in these empirical studies.  Chapter 3 analyzes the adoption and production 
of master‟s degrees. Chapter 4 analyzes the causes and effects of mission drift in liberal 
arts colleges.  Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the results of Chapters 3 and 4 and 
discusses implications for research and practice.     
 
A History of Organizational Change and Enrollments  
Emergence of the Modern University 
 This section places the pursuit of enrollments in historical perspective.   In 
particular, I discuss the emergence of the modern American university as an effort by 
institutional leaders to generate sufficient enrollments for organizational survival.  
Veysey (1965) traces the birth of the American university to the aftermath of the 
Civil War, a dismal period for higher education.  Colleges relied predominantly on tuition 
funding, but declining enrollments were forcing many colleges to close their doors 
(Brown, 1995).  In the aftermath of Jacksonian populism, the public viewed higher 
education as an institution for propertied elite. The professions had become increasingly 
estranged from colleges; lawyers and doctors were produced through apprenticeship and 
for-profit training institutions (Larson, 1977). The period of industrial capitalism had 
begun, but the business community generally deemed college as unnecessary, and worse, 
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as harmful; steel magnate Andrew Carnegie said, “„the future captain of industry is hotly 
engaged in the school of experience, obtaining the very knowledge required for his future 
triumphs….College education is fatal to success in that domain‟” (Veysey, 1965, pp. 13-
14). 
Set against these adverse market conditions, Veysey (1965) describes the 
emergence of the modern American university as the “institutionalization project” 
(DiMaggio, 1988) of elite college presidents.  The nascent concept of the American 
university was based on the German university, representing ideals of academic freedom, 
rigorous research, and the objectivity of modern science.  Veysey (1965) writes that, 
“during the early years of the American university movement, until about 1890, academic 
efforts burgeoned largely in spite of the public….It was observed, for instance, that Johns 
Hopkins [University] „came into existence unasked for and uncared for; and so must first 
create a demand and then supply it‟” (p. 16).  The institutional entrepreneurs engaged in a 
multi-pronged strategy to incite demand for the American university. 
Recasting higher education as preparation for the “real world.”  Knowing 
that the modern research university would appear too esoteric, college leaders began 
marketing higher education as preparation for the “real world.”   Even as industrial 
capitalism began to flourish, college enrollments had stagnated because upwardly mobile 
young men were choosing to enter the world of commerce immediately rather than attend 
college first.  Public sentiment was that “the boy who went directly from the public 
school to the countinghouse had a four-year start on the college man, and never lost his 
advantage” (Wyllie, 1952, p. 297).   
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In response, Veysey (1965) writes, college leaders engaged in a prolonged public 
relations campaign aimed at convincing business leaders and prospective students that 
college prepares men for successful careers in commerce: 
The entire university movement, declared President David Starr Jordan of 
Stanford, „is toward reality and practicality.‟ No separation should exist between 
the scholar and the man; knowledge should be judged by its „ability to harmonize 
the forces of life.‟ Useless learning, like riddles, was to be adjudged diverting but 
unimportant. „The college years are no longer conceived of as a period set apart 
from life,” argued a professor at New York University in 1890. „The college has 
ceased to be a cloister and has become a workshop.‟ (Veysey, 1965, p. 61) 
 
Curricular reform matched this rhetoric of practicality (Bastedo, 2005).  
Nineteenth century enrollments stagnated in part because of student dissatisfaction with 
the curriculum, which was described as tedious and irrelevant (Thelin, 2004).  The 
elective system was first instituted in 1850 by Brown University.  Enrollments at Brown 
increased by 40% as a result (Bastedo, 2005).  Veysey (1965) argues that “once any one 
respectable institution moved in a new direction, others found themselves under a 
powerful compulsion to follow suit. The changes, if they meant anything, were bound to 
attract more students. Colleges which lagged behind…had to face the threat of eventual 
starvation” (p. 11).  By 1900 the prescribed colonial curriculum of Latin, Greek, logic, 
grammar and rhetoric was being replaced by the modern day system of majors and 
electives.   
Annexing the professions.  Universities increased both status and enrollments by 
annexing the education of professionals (Collins, 1979; Larson, 1977). During the 
nineteenth century, training for medicine, law, and engineering usually occurred via 
apprenticeship or trade school. Careers in medicine and law were relatively prestigious, 
presenting a problem for the university; individuals could attain high status without 
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attending higher education (the same was true for careers in business).  It should not be 
surprising then, that demand for the baccalaureate was low.  University based 
professional training, exemplified by the Johns Hopkins Medical School, presented a 
solution to this problem: 
Following the pioneering example of the Johns Hopkins University in 1876, the 
modern American university brought professional schools into its structure and 
organized them with sequencing and connection with academic units. Over time 
this meant that some universities also added entrance requirements – for example, 
one had to have completed two years of undergraduate study before being 
admitted to professional school. The Johns Hopkins University set a high standard 
when it required medical school applicants to have completed a bachelor‟s degree. 
The result was a sequential curriculum, a hierarchy of instruction and certification 
whose capstone was the Ph.D. (Thelin, 2004, p. 129) 
 
By bringing professional schools within the university, the university could increase 
enrollments by making the baccalaureate a prerequisite for entrance into the professional 
school. 
Credentials become currency for social mobility.  Elite college presidents 
created the modern American university at a time when enrollment decline was causing 
many colleges to close.  College leaders developed several strategies to incite demand for 
the university: marketing college as preparation for the real world, reforming the 
curricula to be more practical, and annexing the professions.  Additional strategies, not 
discussed for reasons of scope, included widening the pipeline of K-12 students (Reese, 
2005) and convincing industrialists that higher education was worthy destination for 
charitable donations (Thelin, 2004).  These strategies worked.  Total enrollments grew 
from 52,000 in 1870, to 116,000 in 1880, to 157,00 in 1890, to 238,00 in 1900, to 598,00 
in 1920, and to 1,101,000 in 1930 (NCES, 2011, Table 196). 
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Why did these strategies work? According to the credentialism literature, higher 
education enrollments increased because educational credentials had become 
institutionalized as the currency for social mobility (Brown, 1995; Collins, 1979; Larson, 
1977).  Once the university annexed the training of professionals, individuals desiring to 
become lawyers or doctors were forced to first earn a baccalaureate degree.  After 
convincing corporate managers of the utility of college trained labor (Brown, 1995), the 
baccalaureate also became requisite for careers in business: 
Another factor contributing to the new enthusiasm for higher learning after 1900 
was the widespread recognition that opportunities were less plentiful than in the 
years immediately following the Civil War….As competition for top positions 
became more severe, employers raised standards of qualification. Gradually 
college degrees became prerequisite to placement and promotion on the 
managerial level. (Wyllie, 1952, p. 299) 
 
 In this summary of the history of higher education, I argue that changes in 
organizational behavior were motivated by the goal of growing enrollments.  Early 
American colleges and universities were almost entirely tuition dependent.  Declining 
enrollments threatened organizational survival.  Colleges responded by dramatically 
changing their curricula, by targeting a new customer base – the future business man – 
and by adding graduate training.   
Enrollments in Contemporary Higher Education 
Analyses of more recent epochs also argue that organizational change in higher 
education is motivated by enrollments.  For example, Brint and Karabel (1989) argue that 
community colleges originally focused on the “academic mission” of lower-level (i.e. 
freshman and sophomore) undergraduate coursework.  However, community college 
enrollments related to the academic mission declined once universities realized they 
could increase tuition-related revenue by no longer diverting students to community 
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colleges for lower-level coursework.  In response, community colleges invented the 
“vocational mission” to generate the enrollments necessary for survival (Brint & Karabel, 
1989).   
Recent changes in the external environment have compelled contemporary public 
universities to change behaviors in pursuit of more enrollments.  The mid-twentieth 
century ushered in a “golden age” (Thelin, 2004) of higher education, in which the 
enrollment capacity of public higher education increased dramatically and public 
institutions could usually count on generous state appropriations.  Since the 1980s, 
however, many public institutions have experienced declining or increasingly volatile 
state appropriations (Doyle & Delaney, 2009).  As state appropriations become uncertain, 
public institutions increasingly generate revenue from tuition (Wellman & AIR, 2009). 
Three changes in the external environment also caused enrollment problems in 
liberal arts colleges: first, a decline in the traditional college age population (NCES, 
2011, Table 15); second, growing enrollment capacity of public institutions; and, third, a 
change in student preferences towards practical curricula (Turner & Bowen, 1990).  
Kraatz and Zajac (1996) show that, in response to these adverse market conditions, 
liberal arts colleges adopted professional baccalaureate degrees to generate enrollments.   
 I argue that enrollment anxiety increasingly dominates contemporary 
organizational decision-making.   Figure 1.1 shows revenue trends for institutions 
classified by the 1976 Carnegie Classification as research, doctoral, comprehensive, 
liberal arts, or associates institutions.
1
  Figure 1.1(a) shows that median state revenues 
have declined dramatically as a proportion of total current revenues for public 
institutions.  The declining proportion is partly due to declining state appropriations, but 
                                                 
1
 Author‟s calculations. All figures are based on 2010 dollars. 
8 
 
mostly due to increases in total revenues.  Clearly, public institutions increasingly seek 
revenue growth from sources other than state revenues.   
Figure 1.1(b) shows that median gross tuition (including tuition discounts) has 
increased as a percentage of total revenues for both public institutions and private 
institutions.  Note that the total revenues of private institutions are very sensitive to the 
stock market.  Figure 1.1(c) shows median net tuition revenue as a percentage of total 
current revenues.  The median private institution generally generates at least 50% of its 
total current revenue from tuition.  Over time, net tuition revenue has increased as a 
percentage of total revenue for public institutions as well. Furthermore, government 
appropriations for public institutions are largely based on enrollments, implying that 
enrollment related revenue represents the majority of revenue for most public institutions. 
Finally, Figure 1.1(d) shows that median net tuition revenue has increased dramatically 
since 1987.   
The trends in Figure 1.1 imply that both public and private institutions are 
becoming more entrepreneurial in generating enrollment related revenues.  The history of 
higher education implies that institutions are willing to dramatically change their 
curriculum and their target clientele when revenues become scarce (Brint & Karabel, 
1989; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Veysey, 1965).  While, prestigious institutions generate the 
majority of their revenue from research, donations, and investments, most institutions 
rely predominantly on enrollment related funding.  Overall, these trends suggest a 
research program focusing on organizational behavior in pursuit of enrollment related 
revenues. 
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Generating enrollments from desired students.  The research focus on 
enrollments can be broadened by recognizing that organizations care not only about 
enrollment growth, but also about generating enrollments from desired student 
populations.  Winston (1999) argues that institutions pursue prestige by competing with 
one another for students with the strongest academic profile because organizational 
prestige is largely dependent on the academic profile of enrolled students.   
Scholars have argued that whereas selective institutions use institutional financial 
aid (e.g., “merit scholarships”) to compete with peer institutions for the most desirable 
institutions (McPherson & Schapiro, 1998; Winston, 1999), non-selective institutions use 
institutional financial aid (e.g., tuition discounting) to attract enrollments sufficient for 
organizational survival (Jones, 2001; Lapovsky, 2001).  More recent scholarship, 
however, finds that non-selective institutions increasingly use institutional financial aid to 
raise the academic profile of enrolled students (Doyle, 2010; Kraatz, Ventresca, & Deng, 
2010).  For example, Toma‟s (2009) study of 38 Atlanta-based institutions finds that 
institutions across the prestige continuum attempt to “get to the next level” of prestige.  
Even community colleges increasingly desire to be “colleges of choice” for students 
considering four-year institutions rather than “colleges of last resort” for student 
populations that diminish reputational profile (e.g., welfare recipients, former prisoners, 
etc.) (Alfred, Shults, Jaquette, & Strickland, 2009). 
A research program. Given the historical literature on enrollment growth 
(Veysey, 1965) and the more contemporary literature on growing enrollments from 
desired student populations (Doyle, 2010), I propose a general research program focusing 
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on how postsecondary institutions change their behavior to generate enrollments from 
desirable student populations.   
The research program will generate individual research papers by considering 
three issues that are salient to organizational decision-making.  First, what kind of 
students do institutions desire?  Non-selective institutions struggling for survival are not 
picky; any student that generates enrollment funding will do (Lapovsky, 2001).  
However, non-selective institutions may seek to diversify their resource base by 
attracting older students, part-time students, and graduate students.   
Moving along the prestige continuum institutions become more selective about 
attracting particular students, those that generate the most revenue and those that raise 
academic profile (Winston, 1999).  Public institutions may lose money on in-state 
students due to low tuition ceilings for in-state students (Hearn & McLendon, 2009).  
Therefore, public institutions may attempt to increase net revenue by recruiting out-of-
state students, for whom no tuition ceiling exists (Curs, 2010).  Furthermore, students 
willing to pay out-of-state tuition often have higher academic profiles than in-state 
students, thereby contributing to organizational prestige.  Similarly, both private and 
public institutions may attempt to raise enrollment revenue and academic prestige by 
recruiting international students. 
The research program generates empirical scholarship, second, by considering the 
ways organizations change their behavior to generate enrollments from desirable 
students.  Kraatz and Zajac (1996) focus on changes in academic curricula.  Brint and 
Karabel analyze change in organizational mission (Brint & Karabel, 1989).  Doyle (2010) 
analyzes changes in institutional financial aid.  Winston (1999) discusses the construction 
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of new facilities.  Organizations may also “bring the mountain to Mohammed” by 
building campuses in areas with strong market bases, including the construction of 
campuses abroad.  Organizations can develop online curricula to attract students outside 
of local catchment areas.  The expansion of summer programs, in both academic and 
extracurricular activities, generates enrollments during months of excess enrollment 
capacity.  Finally, postsecondary institutions – especially for-profit institutions – may 
attempt to diminish the amount of work required per credit hour, thereby encouraging 
students to take higher course-loads. 
Third, the research program assumes that institutions with different characteristics 
have varying ability to attract desired students.  For example, prestigious institutions have 
a stronger ability to attract students with a strong academic profile because students 
maximize career and social mobility by attending the most prestigious institutions 
possible (Frank & Cook, 1995).  All non-selective universities may desire to expand 
professional master‟s degree enrollments, but organizations in dense metropolitan areas 
have access to a strong customer base. 
To summarize, the research program on the pursuit of enrollments from desired 
students can generate individual research papers by considering (a) what students are 
desirable for what institutions, (b) how do institutions change their behavior to attract 
these desired students, and (c) what organizational characteristics provide a competitive 
advantage in attracting desired students.  The research program would result in a 
collection of individual papers, each analyzing a particular behavioral change.  However, 
each individual paper would contribute to an overall understanding of organizational 
behavior in postsecondary education.   
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Organizational Studies 
 I argue that organizational studies can make unique contributions to a research 
program on the pursuit of enrollments by institutions.  Whereas the field of micro-
organizational studies often focuses on interactions between people inside organizations, 
I focus on the field of macro-organizational studies, which typically uses organizations as 
the unit of analysis.  Macro-organizational is interdisciplinary field, but draws primarily 
from sociology (Scott & Davis, 2006).  Higher education researchers often use 
frameworks from economics to study institutional behavior (Cheslock & Gianneschi, 
2008; Curs & Dar, 2010; McPherson & Schapiro, 1993).  Like economics, many 
literatures within organizational studies view actors as goal-oriented “maximizers.”  
However, I will argue that organizational studies can develop unique insights about 
postsecondary organizational behavior by viewing organizational behavior in relationship 
to the behavior of other relevant actors.   
Theories of Higher Education Organizations 
 Peterson (1985) reviews the state of organizational theory in the field of higher 
education research.  Peterson (1985) laments the trend towards “fragmentation,” in which 
researchers borrow theories from other disciplines, based on other contexts,  
It is ironic that in postsecondary education, which many argue is unique,… so 
much reliance is placed on borrowing models. (p. 6)…..We need to emphasize 
further theory "development" to find better ways to understand postsecondary 
education's uniqueness…. There is also a need to encourage theory and research 
"synthesis" to clarify the theories and constructs, to examine more critically the 
applicability of the borrowed models, and to see what has been learned 
conceptually. (p. 11) 
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These criticisms of organizational research in higher education remain relevant today; by 
attempting to fit messy higher education cases into neat organizational theories, scholars 
often fail to develop insights about the case.  However, whereas Peterson (1985) 
advocates the development of home-grown theories of higher education, I argue that 
recent developments in organizational studies are particularly suited to making 
contributions to the field of higher education research. 
Recent Changes in Organizational Studies  
 The last decade of organizational studies has witnessed a decline in paradigm 
driven research and an increase in problem driven research based on the “organizational 
field” (Davis & Marquis, 2005).  In paradigm driven work, scholars use cases to 
adjudicate between competing theoretical perspectives (e.g., Kraatz & Zajac, 1996) or to 
identify the properties of a theory (e.g., DiMaggio, 1991; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001).  
In problem driven work, scholars use theory to develop insights about a real world 
problem (e.g., Sanders & Tuschke, 2007), but the mechanisms that have causal power in 
the empirical case do not necessarily exert the same force in other contexts (McAdam, 
Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). 
 The decline of paradigm driven work. Organizational theory was dominated by 
paradigm driven work from the 1970s – which saw the birth of resource dependence 
theory, new institutional theory, organizational ecology, and transaction cost economics – 
until the end of the 20
th
 Century.   
In paradigm driven work, the goal of adjudicating between alternative theories – 
the “horse race” – can be problematic.  First, pitting two theoretical perspectives is 
difficult when both perspectives predict the same response.  For example both resource 
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dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and institutional theory (Edelman, 1992) predict 
symbolic adoption.  Second, pitting two theoretical perspectives is problematic when the 
perspectives explain different phenomena (Davis, 2010).  For example transaction cost 
economics explains make-or-buy decisions (Williamson, 1987) whereas population 
ecology explains why organizations find it difficult to change (Hannan & Freeman, 
1984).  Third, theoretical perspectives become internally inconsistent as they grow to 
encompass more problems, for example when neo-institutional theory began to 
incorporate agency (DiMaggio, 1988). Internal inconsistency makes it difficult to develop 
a single hypothesis that represents an entire theoretical perspective in the horse race 
against another perspective. 
 A more common goal of paradigm-driven research is to identify scope conditions 
within a single theoretical tradition (e.g., Meyer & Scott, 1983) or to propose extensions 
to a single theoretical tradition (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988).  Here, the specific research 
context – the empirical case – is valued for its contribution to general theory.  However, 
this approach to paradigm-driven research is also problematic because it often turns out 
that supposedly universalistic theories provide good predictions only in certain empirical 
contexts (Davis, 2010).  For example, resource dependence theory predicts that 
corporations will diversify in order to minimize dependence on any single customer or 
supplier (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In the 1980s, however, diversification became 
undesirable as conglomerate corporations became targets for hostile takeovers (Davis, 
Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994).  The lesson learned is that theories are only predictive in 
certain contexts, but context changes over time and from one organizational population to 
another. 
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 Mechanisms in problem-driven work.  Problem-driven work takes context 
seriously by building hypotheses from mechanisms (Bastedo, forthcoming).  A 
mechanism explains why two variables have a causal relationship (Hedström & 
Swedberg, 1998).  For example, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) describe a diversification 
mechanism; focal organizations relying on a single customer (variable A) will attempt to 
find alternative customers (variable B) because reliance on a single customer enables that 
customer to exert control over the focal organization.   
Mechanisms that have causal power in one empirical context do not have causal 
power in another context because mechanisms depend on the presence or absence of 
other necessary conditions.  For example, the threat of hostile takeovers in the 1980s 
(Davis, et al., 1994) created a context unsuitable for the diversification mechanism in 
corporate America.   
Mechanisms are typically smaller than theories, in that mechanisms typically 
posit a simple relationship.  Therefore, Mechanisms provide an intermediary level of 
prediction between pure story-telling and grand theorizing (Davis & Marquis, 2005). 
Whereas entire theories typically do not fit all the aspects of an empirical case, 
mechanism based theorizing makes predictions about organizational behavior by 
identifying mechanisms linking specific actors to one another. 
 The organizational field and problem driven work.  Problem-driven work also 
takes context seriously by designing research around the “organizational field.”  The field 
consists of actors – focal organizations, key suppliers, customers, and regulators – 
relevant to a real world problem (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; McAdam, et al., 2001).  
Actors in the field are maximizers, but their behavior is not atomistic; the field 
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encourages researchers to consider the relationships between different actors in the field.  
As such, the field is conducive to mechanism-based theorizing, which identifies simple 
mechanisms linking the behavior of one actor to the behavior of another.  Finally, 
scholarship based on the field often views changes in the external environment – for 
example technological changes, or demographic changes – as particularly important 
causes of organizational change (Davis, 2005).  Once the researcher sketches the 
organizational field relevant to a particular problem, organizational behavior is the 
contingent result of goal-oriented actors interacting with one another and reacting to 
changes in the external environment. 
Having discussed recent changes in organizational studies, I revisit the argument 
(Peterson, 1985) that higher education researchers should develop their own theories 
rather than borrow theories from other disciplines.  This argument was salient when the 
field of organizational studies was dominated by paradigm-driven research.  However, I 
argue that problem-driven research designs – which sketch the unique organizational 
field and posit mechanisms linking specific actors to one another – can develop insights 
about practice.  By using theories from organizational studies to develop insights about 
higher education cases, higher education researchers (a) draw on well-developed 
literatures supported by robust empirical evidence and (b) become connected with 
scholars from different fields.  In contrast, by developing home-grown theories to study 
higher education cases, the field of higher education research becomes an isolated island.   
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Sketching the Organizational Field of Higher Education 
 I began this chapter reviewing the history of American higher education to 
develop a research program on the pursuit of enrollments by institutions.  Next, I traced 
recent changes in the field of organizational studies, arguing that problem-driven research 
based on the organizational field can develop important insights about institutional 
behavior.  In this section I sketch the organizational field relevant to the research program 
on the pursuit of enrollments.  I conclude the chapter by motivating the two specific 
empirical studies presented in the dissertation. 
What Are Institutions Attempting to Maximize 
 Pursuit of resources. Sketching the organizational field begins by selecting the 
focal actors of interest and identifying what these actors are trying to maximize.  The 
focal actors of interest are postsecondary institutions.  I argue that institutions seek to 
maximize resources and prestige.  The discussion of resources draws from resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Survival is the most basic goal of any 
organization and all organizations require a stable flow of resources from the external 
environment in order to survive (Parsons, 1956).  Focal organizations also seek a 
diversified resource base; reliance on a single resource provider allows that resource 
provider to control the focal organization and also places the focal organization in a 
position of vulnerability should that exchange relationship dissolve (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  Drawing on these ideas, I argue that institutions will attempt to diversify their 
revenue streams.  
 Prestigious universities can generate strong revenues from tuition, donations, 
investments, and research (Wellman & AIR, 2009).  Prestigious liberal arts colleges can 
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generate strong revenues from tuition, donations, and investments.  Non-prestigious 
institutions predominantly depend primarily on enrollment related revenues, specifically 
tuition or government appropriations that follow enrollments.  Although non-prestigious 
institutions face challenges raising non-tuition revenues, they can diversify their student 
enrollments by adopting new academic programs, new degree-levels (e.g., master‟s 
degrees), new attendance patterns (e.g., night courses), and new modes of instruction 
(e.g., online education). 
 Pursuit of Prestige.  Bowen (1980) describes universities as organizations that 
make as much money as they can and spend all the money they make on becoming more 
prestigious.  Prestige depends significantly on the academic profile of enrolled students 
(Bowman & Bastedo, 2009).  Therefore, Winston (1999) argues colleges pursue prestige 
by competing with one another for the best students.  Institutions compete for desirable 
students by spending more on each student than they charge in tuition; they offer a 
subsidy.  That subsidy is comprised of non-tuition revenues, for example donation and 
investment revenues.  Institutions with the largest sources of non-tuition revenue have the 
highest subsidies and are more successful in competing for the most desirable students, 
leading to subsequent increases in prestige.   
The discussion of resources and prestige shows that these two pursuits cannot be 
studied in isolation.  The pursuit of national prestige requires abnormally strong 
resources.  Further, nationally prestigious institutions have superior resource-generating 
capabilities relative to non-prestigious institutions.   
However, the pursuit of enrollments differs between prestigious and non-
prestigious institutions.  Prestigious institutions generate the majority of their revenue 
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from non-tuition activities.  They are selective about admissions because the goal of 
admissions is to raise the academic profile of enrolled students, thereby increasing 
prestige (Bowman & Bastedo, 2009).  Non-prestigious institutions generate the majority 
of their revenue from tuition-related activities, but experience weak student demand; the 
goal of admissions is to enroll as many students as possible (Jones, 2001). 
Actors in the Field 
Many actors in the field of higher education are relevant to the pursuit of desired 
enrollments.  My discussion focuses on students, governments, other postsecondary 
institutions, and external changes to the field. 
Students. Students are the core customers for postsecondary institutions.  
Students attempt to maximize social and career mobility (Labaree, 1997).  Competition 
for social mobility increases when the number of desirable opportunities declines relative 
to the number of aspirants (Blau, 1994).  Colleges and universities are the primary 
beneficiaries of a system in which social mobility depends on the acquisition of 
educational credentials (Collins, 1979).  However, not all colleges and universities 
benefit equally from this system.  Prestigious institutions enjoy robust student demand 
because credentials from prestigious institutions send strong “signals” (Spence, 1973) in 
labor and social markets.   
Hershbein (2010) finds that as the proportion of baccalaureate degree holders has 
increased, so too has the “signaling effect” on wages for bachelor‟s degrees from 
prestigious institutions.  Similarly, Hoxby (1997, 2009) argues that the growth in 
undergraduate tuition at selective institutions can be explained by the increasing returns 
to selective education.  Selective institutions also enjoy strong demand for graduate 
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programs, especially from graduates of less selective baccalaureate institutions seeking to 
“upgrade their alma mater” (New York Times, 2009).  In contrast, less selective 
institutions cannot charge high tuition prices and must engage in aggressive discounting 
to overcome excess enrollment capacity (Lapovsky, 2001).  The discussion of students 
shows why institutions focus so much energy on becoming more prestigious; prestigious 
institutions enjoy robust demand even while charging high prices whereas non-
prestigious institutions scramble to generate sufficient enrollments to cover fixed costs.   
Other colleges and universities. The segmented nature of competition in higher 
education suggests that the behavior of postsecondary institutions is affected by the 
behavior of other postsecondary institutions.  On one hand, institutions are likely to be 
very sensitive to behavioral changes by rival institutions (Burt, 1987).  For example, the 
rapid adoption of no-loan tuition policies by elite colleges and universities can be viewed 
as competitive mimicry (McLendon, Flores, & Park, 2010).  On the other hand, the 
presence of more prestigious institutions constrains the behavior of less prestigious 
institutions; less prestigious institutions are forced to survive by engaging behaviors that 
more prestigious institutions avoid for fear of undermining their brand image (Podolny, 
1993).   
For example, the University of Minnesota has a successful master‟s in public 
health program (MPH), which graduated 111 students in 2010.
2
  The Twin Cities campus 
of Argosy University adopted an MPH program in 2010.  Whereas the University of 
Minnesota program may seek to raise its academic profile to compete with nationally 
prestigious MPH programs, Argosy will likely avoid direct competition with University 
of Minnesota by focusing on night school for working adults. 
                                                 
2
 Author‟s calculations. 
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A particular strength of organizational studies is showing how relationships 
between organizations affect organizational behavior.  These relationships are often 
quantified as social network ties – tangible communication links connecting different 
organizations (Kraatz, 1998; Mizruchi, 1992) – and/or as competitive relationships in 
which the organizations do not interact directly but affect one another through their 
mutual pursuit of a common customer base (Burt, 1992; Greve, 1996). 
A robust organizational studies literature categorizes different kinds of 
relationships between organizations – e.g., strong ties versus weak ties, cohesion versus 
structural equivalence – and posits mechanisms suggesting the effects of these 
relationships (Mizruchi, 1994; Strang & Soule, 1998).  Therefore, one advantage 
problem-driven research based on organizational studies literatures is the body of 
knowledge about how to theorize and measure the relationships between organizations 
(Kilduff & Brass, 2010). 
Governments.  Governments affect the behavior of colleges and universities 
primarily through funding and through regulation.  Two important sources of federal 
funding are Title IV federal funding to students and federal research funds administered 
through a variety of agencies.  From the perspective of colleges and universities, Title IV 
grants and loans both work like voucher programs; the money follows students wherever 
the student chooses to enroll.  Therefore, the higher education system becomes more 
“market-like” to the extent that government funding is allocated directly to students and 
less market-like to the extent that funding is allocated directly to institutions via 
appropriations (Harbour & Jaquette, 2007).  Over time, maximum loan amounts have 
increased and graduate students and affluent households have become eligible for 
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subsidized loans(Hearn, 1998).  These changes increase student access to capital and may 
provide institutions with an incentive to increase tuition prices and adopt more graduate 
programs. 
 States primarily fund public institutions through appropriations.  Over the past 
several decades, state appropriations have stagnated (Kane, Orszag, & Gunter, 2003) and 
have become increasingly volatile (Doyle & Delaney, 2009).  Drawing on resource 
dependence theory, the decline or increasing volatility of a major funding source compels 
public institutions to become increasingly entrepreneurial about generating additional 
tuition revenues.  One approach is to increase out-of-state students (Curs, 2010).  Another 
approach is to adopt academic programs that generate high tuition revenues.  State 
regulating agencies often place limits on the percent of out-of-state students (Richardson, 
Bracco, Callan, & Finney, 1999), set ceilings on tuition prices for in-state students 
(Richardson, et al., 1999), and strictly regulate academic program adoption in order to 
minimize “unnecessary duplication” across institutions (Barak, 2007).  However, some 
states (e.g., Colorado) are offering institutions more autonomy about pricing and 
academic program creation in exchange for less state appropriations (Breneman, 2004; 
Hearn & McLendon, 2009). 
 External environment. Though not an actor per se, changes in the external 
environment have profound effects on organizations (Davis, 2005).  Demographic 
changes affect demand for higher education (Mayhew, 1979).  For example, the 
population of “traditional” college freshman – defined as ages 18 and 19 – declined from 
a peak of 8.7 million in 1977 to a low of 6.9 million in 1992 before increasing again 
(NCES, 2010, Table 15).  Population decline negatively affected undergraduate 
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enrollments, especially for non-selective institutions, compelling colleges and universities 
to pursue adult students. 
 Advances in technology create both opportunities and threats for postsecondary 
institutions.  In particular, the internet engenders dramatic improvements to distance 
education, allowing even non-selective institutions to compete for geographically 
disperse clientele.  In contrast to “brick and mortar” education (Breneman, 2001), online 
education has strong economies of scale.  Therefore, just as advances in rail travel, 
communications, and refrigeration enabled corporations to compete on a national scale 
(Chandler, 1977), online education contributes to increased market share for corporate 
for-profit providers and specialized curriculum designers that compete in national and 
global markets. 
Empirical Studies 
 The adoption and production of master’s degrees. Having outlined the relevant 
organizational field, I motivate two empirical studies within the research program on the 
pursuit of enrollments from desired students.   
Chapter 3 analyzes the adoption and production of master‟s degrees.  The annual 
production of master‟s degrees increased from 290,000 in 1987 to 670,000 in 2009.  I 
trace the increase in student demand for master‟s degrees to changes in the supply and 
demand for college-educated labor (Pappano, 2011).  The proportion of 25-29 year-olds 
with a baccalaureate degree increased from 26% in 1980, to 32% in 2000, to 35% in 2009 
(NCES, 2010).  By contrast, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006) states that only 20% of 
jobs “required” (according to job-skill requirements) at least a baccalaureate degree in 
2004 and projects that 21% jobs will require at least a baccalaureate degree in 2014.   
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Holding the number of opportunities constant, as general educational achievement 
rises, there are fewer positions for qualified candidates, leading to more competition for 
available opportunities (Blau, 1994; Boudon, 1974).  Paradoxically, as the growth of 
college-educated labor outpaces the growth of jobs requiring a college education, 
individuals have an incentive to obtain master‟s degrees in order to gain distinction from 
the growing proportion of baccalaureate degree holders.  Therefore, postsecondary 
institutions can capitalize on the scarcity of job opportunities by adopting master‟s degree 
programs designed to provide a competitive advantage relative to baccalaureate degree 
holders. 
I argue that master‟s degrees represent a potential solution to enrollment problems 
at both non-prestigious and prestigious institutions.  Non-prestigious institutions 
generally have excess capacity and undiversified revenue streams (Jones, 2001); master‟s 
degrees represent an opportunity to grow enrollments and an opportunity to lessen the 
reliance on undergraduate students as the sole source of funding.  For prestigious 
institutions, master‟s degrees can subsidize the pursuit of prestige.  Prestigious 
institutions may be reluctant to grow undergraduate enrollments because enrollment 
expansion may hurt academic profile.  However, prestigious institutions can expand 
master‟s degree production with relative impunity because the academic profile of 
master‟s degree students has a smaller effect on the prestige of the overall institution. 
 No studies to date have analyzed the expansion of master‟s degrees from an 
organizational behavior perspective.  Using a paradigm-driven research design, I derive 
testable hypotheses from three theoretical perspectives.  Human capital theory argues that 
institutions adopt degrees demanded by the labor market.  Resource dependence theory 
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argues that institutions adopt degrees to generate revenues when “traditional” revenues 
decline.  Research on the pursuit of prestige argues that institutions will maximize 
revenue from master‟s degrees in order to subsidize the pursuit of prestige.  I test these 
hypotheses on a panel dataset of all accredited colleges and universities from 1975 to 
2009. 
 Mission drift in liberal arts colleges.  Chapter 4 analyzes the causes and effects 
of mission drift in the population of liberal arts colleges.  I adopt a problem-based 
research design, developing a cohesive conceptual framework by integrating several 
literatures within institutional theory.  An organizational template is the set of rules that 
defines permissible and prohibited behaviors for organizations of a particular type 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).  The liberal arts college template defines a liberal arts 
college as an organization that enrolls no more than 1,800 students and focuses 
exclusively on undergraduate liberal arts education for full-time, residential, “traditional” 
college-age students (Breneman, 1990).  The comprehensive university template, by 
contrast, places no limits on enrollment growth, the adoption of graduate programs, or the 
recruitment of part-time and adult students.  I define mission drift as a change in 
organizational template. 
Liberal arts colleges primarily depend on tuition revenue to survive.  In the 1970s 
and 1980s, changes in the external environment – population decline, changes in student 
preferences, and increasing enrollment capacity at public institutions – negatively 
affected the enrollments of colleges adhering to the liberal arts template.  I argue that 
many liberal arts colleges became comprehensive universities in response to these 
environmental changes.  I argue that dropping the word “college” and adding the word 
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“university” to the organizational name (e.g., Lesley College becomes Lesley University) 
symbolizes the adoption of the comprehensive university template.  I develop a 
conceptual framework to study the adoption of the comprehensive university template, 
drawing on market factors, institutional factors, and social network factors.  I test 
hypotheses about the causes and effects of becoming a university on a panel dataset of all 
liberal arts colleges from 1975 to 2009. 
Analyses of academic program adoption in Chapter 3 and mission drift in Chapter 
4 pose intense panel data requirements.  Chapter 2 describes the creation of a panel 
dataset that follows all colleges and universities from 1969 to 2010, using data from the 
Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) and the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS).  The length of the panel allows researchers to analyze 
change over time in attributes that scholars often treat as fixed – e.g., whether the 
institution is a comprehensive university or a research university.  I use this panel dataset 
to test hypotheses in Chapters 3 and 4.  In the future, I hope that this panel dataset 
becomes a valuable resource for other researchers studying postsecondary institutional 
behavior. 
 Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings from Chapters 3 and 4, and 
synthesizes the results to resolve apparent contradictions, especially with respect to the 
pursuit of prestige versus the pursuit of enrollment growth.  I discuss implications for 
future research on postsecondary institutional behavior, arguing that problem-driven 
research (Chapter 4) is more likely to develop valuable insights about organizational 
change than paradigm-driven research (Chapter 3).  I also discuss implications for 
practice and for policy.  The results imply that administrators attempting to maximize 
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resources and prestige should be aggressive in adopting an entrepreneurial curriculum.  
However, the pursuit of individually rational goals by organizations does not necessarily 
contribute to societal goals.  Therefore, policies that seek to align the incentives of 
individual organizations with the goals of policy will be more successful than policies 
that ignore the self-interest of organizations.   
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Figure 
Figure 1.1 Median revenues, 1976 Carnegie Classification excluding specialized 
institutions 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
(d) Median net tuition revenue ($ millions)
Private
Public
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
(c) Median net tuition as % of total current revenue
Private
Public
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
(b) Gross tuition as % of total current revenue
private
public
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
8
(a) Median state funding as % of total current revenue
Res/Doct
Comprehensive
Community Col
29 
 
References 
Alfred, R. L., Shults, C., Jaquette, O., & Strickland, S. (2009). Community colleges on 
the horizon: Challenge, choice, or abundance? American Council on Education 
Series on Higher Education. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education. 
Barak, R. J. (2007). Thirty years of academic review and approval by state postsecondary 
coordinating and governing boards. Boulder, CO: State Higher Education 
Executive Officers. 
Bastedo, M. N. (2005). Curriculum in higher education. In P. G. Altbach, R. O. Berdahl 
& P. J. Gumport (Eds.), American higher education in the twenty-first century: 
Social, political, and economic challenges. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Bastedo, M. N. (forthcoming). Building theories of higher education organizations: using 
stick social mechanisms to understand and improve educational work. In M. N. 
Bastedo (Ed.), The Organization of Higher Education: Managing Colleges for a 
New Era. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Blau, P. M. (1994). Structural Contexts of Opportunities. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Boudon, R. (1974). Education, opportunity, and social inequality: changing prospects in 
Western society. New York: Wiley. 
Bowen, H. R. (1980). The costs of higher education: How much do colleges and 
universities spend per student and how much should they spend? (1st ed.). San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Bowman, N. A., & Bastedo, M. N. (2009). Getting on the front page: organizational 
reputation, status signals, and the impact of U.S. News and World Report on 
student decisions. Research in Higher Education, 50(5), 415-436. 
Breneman, D. W. (1990). Are we losing our liberal arts colleges? American Association 
of Higher Education Bulletin, 43, 3-6. 
Breneman, D. W. (2001). An essay on college costs. In A. F. Cunningham, J. V. 
Wellman, M. E. Clinedinst, J. P. Merisotis & C. D. Carroll (Eds.), Study of 
college costs and prices, 1988-89 to 1997-98, volume 2: Commissioned papers 
(pp. 12-20). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, NCES. 
Breneman, D. W. (2004). Are the states and public higher education striking a new 
bargain? (No. 04-02). Washington, D.C.: Association of Governing Boards of 
Universities and Colleges. 
Brint, S. G., & Karabel, J. (1989). The diverted dream: community colleges and the 
promise of educational opportunity in America, 1900-1985. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Brown, D. K. (1995). Degrees of control: A sociology of educational expansion and 
occupational credentialism. New York: Teachers College Press. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2006). Occupational projections and training data, 2006-07 
Edition. Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Burt, R. S. (1987). Social contagion and innovation: Cohesion versus structural 
equivalence. American Journal of Sociology, 92(6), 1287-1335. 
Burt, R. S. (1992). Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
30 
 
Chandler, A. D. (1977). The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business. New York: Belknap Press. 
Cheslock, J. J., & Gianneschi, M. (2008). Replacing state appropriations with alternative 
revenue sources: the case of voluntary support. Journal of Higher Education, 
79(2), 208-+. 
Collins, R. (1979). The Credential society: An historical sociology of education and 
stratification. New York: Academic Press. 
Curs, B. R. (2010). What can financial aid buy? The effects of financial aid packages on 
the enrollment decisions of applicants to a large public university. University of 
Missouri working paper. 
Curs, B. R., & Dar, L. (2010). Does state financial aid affect institutional aid? An 
analysis of the role of state policy on postsecondary institutional pricing 
strategies. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Education 
Finance Association, Richmond, VA. 
Davis, G. F. (2005). Firms and environments. In N. J. Smelser & R. Swedberg (Eds.), 
The handbook of economic sociology (pp. 478-502). New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
Davis, G. F. (2010). Do theories of organizations progress? Organizational Research 
Methods, 13(4), 690-709. 
Davis, G. F., Diekmann, K., & Tinsley, C. (1994). The Decline and Fall of the 
Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational 
Form. American Sociological Review, 59(4), 547-570. 
Davis, G. F., & Marquis, C. (2005). Prospects for organization theory in the early twenty-
first century: Institutional fields and mechanisms. Organization Science, 16(4), 
332-343. 
DiMaggio, P. J. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. Zucker (Ed.), 
Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and environment (pp. 3-21). 
Cambridge, MA: Ballanger Publishing Company. 
DiMaggio, P. J. (1991). Constructing an organizational field as a professional project: 
U.S. art museums, 1920-1940. In P. J. DiMaggio & W. W. Powell (Eds.), The 
new institutionalism in organizational analysis (pp. 267-292). Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American 
Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160. 
Doyle, W. R. (2010). Changes in institutional aid, 1992-2003: The evolving role of merit 
aid. Research in Higher Education, 51(8), 789-810. 
Doyle, W. R., & Delaney, J. A. (2009). State spending on higher education: testing the 
balance wheel over time. Paper presented at the 2009 American Educational 
Research Association Conference, Sand Diego, CA.  
Edelman, L. B. (1992). Legal ambiguity and symbolic structures: Organizational 
mediation of civil-rights law. American Journal of Sociology, 97(6), 1531-1576. 
Frank, R. H., & Cook, P. J. (1995). The winner-take-all society: how more and more 
Americans compete for ever fewer and bigger prizes, encouraging economic 
waste, income inequality, and an impoverished cultural life. New York: Free 
Press. 
31 
 
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R. (1996). Understanding radical organizational change: 
Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism. Academy of Management 
Review, 21(4), 1022-1054. 
Greve, H. R. (1996). Patterns of competition: The diffusion of a market position in radio 
broadcasting. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(1), 29-60. 
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1984). Structural inertia and organizational change. 
[Article]. American Sociological Review, 49(2), 149-164. 
Harbour, C. P., & Jaquette, O. (2007). Advancing an equity agenda at the community 
college in an age of privatization, performance accountability, and marketization. 
Equity & Excellence in Education, 40(3), 197-207. 
Hearn, J. C. (1998). The growing loan orientation in federal financial aid policy: A 
historical perspective. In R. Fossey & M. Bateman (Eds.), Condemning students 
to debt: College loans and public policy (pp. 47-75). New York: Teachers College 
Press. 
Hearn, J. C., & McLendon, M. K. (2009). Viewing recent US governance reform whole: 
"decentralization" in a distinctive context. In J. Huisman (Ed.), International 
perspectives on the governance of higher education: Alternative frameworks for 
coordination. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Hedström, P., & Swedberg, R. (1998). Social mechanisms : an analytical approach to 
social theory. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hershbein, B. (2010). Worker signals among new college graduates: The role of 
selectivity and GPA. University of Michigan. 
Hoxby, C. M. (1997). How the changing market structure of U.S. higher education 
explains college tuition (No. Working Paper 6323). Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Hoxby, C. M. (2009). The Changing Selectivity of American Colleges. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 23(4), 95-118. 
Jones, D. P. (2001). Cost analysis and the formulation of public policy. In A. F. 
Cunningham, J. V. Wellman, M. E. Clinedinst, J. P. Merisotis & C. D. Carroll 
(Eds.), Study of college costs and prices, 1988-89 to 1997-98, volume 2: 
Commissioned papers (pp. 45-55). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Education, NCES. 
Kane, T. J., Orszag, P. R., & Gunter, D. L. (2003). State fiscal constraints and higher 
education spending: the role of medicaid and the business cycle. Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institute. 
Kilduff, M., & Brass, D. J. (2010). Organizational Social Network Research: Core Ideas 
and Key Debates. Academy of Management Annals, 4, 317-357. 
Kraatz, M. S. (1998). Learning by association? Interorganizational networks and 
adaptation to environmental change. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 621-
643. 
Kraatz, M. S., Ventresca, M. J., & Deng, L. N. (2010). Precarious values and mundane 
innovations: enrollment management in American liberal arts colleges. Academy 
of Management Journal, 53(6), 1521-1545. 
Kraatz, M. S., & Zajac, E. J. (1996). Exploring the limits of the new institutionalism: The 
causes and consequences of illegitimate organizational change. American 
Sociological Review, 61(5), 812-836. 
32 
 
Labaree, D. F. (1997). How to succeed in school without really learning: the credentials 
race in American education. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
Lapovsky, L. (2001). Institutional financial health: Tuition discounting and enrollment 
management. In A. F. Cunningham, J. V. Wellman, M. E. Clinedinst, J. P. 
Merisotis & C. D. Carroll (Eds.), Study of college costs and prices, 1988-89 to 
1997-98, volume 2: Commissioned papers. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Education, NCES. 
Larson, M. S. (1977). The rise of professionalism: a sociological analysis. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Mayhew, L. B. (1979). Surviving the eighties: strategies and procedures for solving 
fiscal and enrollment problems (1st ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. G., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
McLendon, M. K., Flores, S. M., & Park, T. J. (2010). Not just the Ivies: The adoption of 
"no-loan" programs at public colleges and universities in the U.S. Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research 
Association.  
McPherson, M. S., & Schapiro, M. O. (1993). The effect of government financing on the 
behavior of colleges and universities. In M. S. McPherson, M. O. Schapiro & G. 
C. Winston (Eds.), Paying the piper : productivity, incentives, and financing in 
U.S. higher education (pp. 235-250). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
McPherson, M. S., & Schapiro, M. O. (1998). The student aid game. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Meyer, J. W., & Scott, R. W. (1983). Institutional and technical sources of organizational 
structure: Explaining the structure or educational organizations. In J. W. Meyer & 
R. W. Scott (Eds.), Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality (pp. 45-
67). Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Mizruchi, M. S. (1992). The Structure of Corporate Political Action: Interfirm Relations 
and Their Consequences. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Mizruchi, M. S. (1994). Social network analysis: Recent achievements and current 
controversies. Acta Sociologica, 37(4), 329-343. 
NCES. (2010). Digest of education statistics, 2009. Washington, DC: National Center for 
Education Statistics. 
NCES. (2011). Digest of education statistics, 2010. Washington, DC: National Center for 
Education Statistics. 
New York Times. (2009, June 30). What is a master's degree worth? New York Times. 
Retrieved from http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/what-is-a-
masters-degree-worth/?em 
Pappano, L. (2011, July 22). The Master's as the New Bachelor's. New York Times.  
Parsons, T. (1956). Suggestions for a sociological approach to the theory of of 
organizations, part I. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1(1), 63-85. 
Peterson, M. W. (1985). Emerging developments in postsecondary organization theory 
and research: fragmentation or integration. Educational Researcher, 14(3), 5-12. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row. 
33 
 
Phillips, D. J., & Zuckerman, E. W. (2001). Middle-status conformity: Theoretical 
restatement and empirical demonstration in two markets. American Journal of 
Sociology, 107(2), 379-429. 
Podolny, J. M. (1993). A Status-based Model of Market Competition. American Journal 
of Sociology, 98, 829-872. 
Reese, W. J. (2005). America's public schools: From the common school to "No Child 
Left Behind". Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University. 
Richardson, R. C., Bracco, K. R., Callan, P. M., & Finney, J. E. (1999). Designing state 
higher education systems for a new century. Washington, D.C.: American Council 
on Education/Oryx Press. 
Sanders, W. G., & Tuschke, A. (2007). The adoption of institutionally contested 
organizational practices: The emergence of stock option pay in Germany. 
Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 33-56. 
Scott, W. R., & Davis, G. F. (2006). Organizations and organizing: Rational, natural, 
and open systems perspectives: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Spence, A. M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 
355-374. 
Strang, D., & Soule, S. A. (1998). Diffusion in organizations and social movements: 
From hybrid corn to poison pills. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 265-290. 
Thelin, J. R. (2004). A history of American higher education. Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Toma, J. D. (2009). Positioning for prestige in higher education: Case studies of 
strategies at four public institutions toward "getting to the next level". 
Turner, S. E., & Bowen, W. G. (1990). The flight from the arts and sciences: trends in 
dgrees conferred. Science, 250(4980), 517-521. 
Veysey, L. R. (1965). The emergence of the American university. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Wellman, J. V., & AIR. (2009). Trends in college spending where does the money come 
from? Where does it go?pp. 43 p.). Available from 
http://www.deltacostproject.org/resources/pdf/trends_in_spending-report.pdf 
Williamson, O. E. (1987). Contractual Man The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (pp. 
43-63). New York: The Free Press. 
Winston, G. C. (1999). Subsidies, hierarchy and peers: the awkward economics of higher 
education. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(1), 13-36. 
Wyllie, I. G. (1952). The businessman looks at the higher learning. Journal of Higher 
Education, 23(6), 295-300+344. 
 
 34 
 
Chapter 2 :  
Data 
 This paper describes the creation of a panel dataset of all accredited 
postsecondary institutions from 1969 to present, incorporating data from the Higher 
Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) for the years 1969 through 1986 and 
data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) for the years 
1987 to the present.  I refer to this panel dataset as the HEGIS/IPEDS panel.  The 
HEGIS/IPEDS panel is the basis for the empirical analyses presented in Chapters 3 and 4 
and will be used in future research projects. 
HEGIS and IPEDS are the core sources of organization-level data on U.S. 
colleges and universities.  The HEGIS survey consists of survey components on Finance, 
Fall Enrollment, Institutional Characteristics, Completions, State Migration, Libraries, 
and Faculty/Staff.  The IPEDS survey consists of survey components on Institutional 
Characteristics, Fall Enrollment, 12-month Enrollment, Completions, Graduation Rates, 
Student Financial Aid, Instructional Staff/Salaries, and Fall Staff.   
In the future, the HEGIS/IPEDS panel will be publicly released for use by other 
researchers.  The HEGIS/IPEDS panel will be useful for researchers because raw HEGIS 
and IPEDS data require substantial manipulation prior to analyses.  Some researchers 
may use the HEGIS/IPEDS panel to conduct research on organizational behavior.  Others 
may use it to merge organization-level variables to student-level data.  Although other 
public use datasets exist, they are inappropriate for certain research questions.   
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 The goal of this chapter is to introduce researchers to concepts that must be 
understood prior to using HEGIS and IPEDS data.  Section one describes potential uses 
of a longitudinal dataset that combines HEGIS and IPEDS data and also discusses 
strengths and limitations of existing public-use datasets.  Section two provides an 
overview of HEGIS and IPEDS sampling procedures.  Section three discusses how 
HEGIS and IPEDS record data from different organizational forms (e.g., systems, main 
campuses, and branch campuses).  In particular, I focus on the “parent-child” relationship 
– when data for a “child” campus are reported with a “parent” campus – which poses the 
greatest challenge to creating the HEGIS/IPEDS panel.  Section four discusses the 
individual survey components (e.g., Fall Enrollment, Finance), with a focus on core 
concepts and variable availability over time.  Section five discusses limitations and future 
work. 
 
Contributions and Existing Public Use Datasets 
Potential Uses of the HEGIS/IPEDS Panel 
 The HEGIS/IPEDS panel can be used by researchers analyzing organizations as 
the unit of analysis.  Research on organizational behavior typically requires panel data in 
order to analyze how and why behavior changes over time (Davis, 2010).  For many 
researchers, the requisite time-investment in programming and understanding the 
idiosyncrasies of the raw HEGIS and IPEDS data create a significant obstacle to 
conducting panel data analyses.  Therefore, the public release of the HEGIS/IPEDS panel 
may encourage research on postsecondary organizations by incurring some of these fixed 
costs.   
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Scholars of organizations can study many topics using the HEGIS/IPEDS panel.  
Most immediately, the HEGIS/IPEDS panel was created to analyze the adoption and 
production of master‟s degrees, in Chapter 3, and to analyze mission drift by liberal arts 
colleges, in Chapter 4. Other potential studies using the data include, but are not limited 
to: 
 The production of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
degrees (GAO, 2005) 
 The diffusion of particular degree programs (Kraatz, 1998; Rojas, 2003)   
 The recruitment of out-of-state students in response to declines in state funding 
 The effect of changes in student loan policies on tuition prices (McPherson & 
Schapiro, 1993) 
 Institutional closures and mergers 
 The growing market share of for-profit education 
 Changing age-composition and attendance-status in postsecondary education 
 Changing revenue composition and expenditure composition in postsecondary 
education 
 The growing use of adjunct professors 
 Change over time in institutional aid to students (e.g., discounting) 
 The adoption of responsibility centered management systems by institutions 
 The effect of a change in rankings on the number of applications and enrollment 
yield. 
Most quantitative studies in the field of higher education use students as the unit 
of analysis.  The HEGIS/IPEDS panel can provide organization-level measures for 
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student-level analyses.  For example, measures of in-state and out-of-state tuition or 
average SAT/ACT scores can be merged to administrative data from state data systems, 
to institutional data, or to NCES longitudinal survey data such as NLS72, HS&B, NELS, 
or ELS.     
Strengths and Limitations of Existing Public-Use Datasets 
 Several public-use panel datasets of higher education institutions exist: the Delta 
Cost Project; Colleges & Universities 2000 Database by Steven Brint; and the NSF 
WebCASPAR system.   
The Delta Cost Project (DCP) has created a panel dataset of all postsecondary 
education institutions from 1987 to present using IPEDS data.  Data from the DCP panel 
are high quality, have excellent documentation, and can be downloaded for free.  The 
DCP panel has important strengths relative to the HEGIS/IPEDS panel.  Principally, DCP 
creates measures from all survey components of IPEDS.  Although additional survey 
components will be added over time , the current HEGIS/IPEDS panel includes only 
Finance (revenue only), Fall Enrollment, Institutional Characteristics (IC), and 
Completions. 
The HEGIS/IPEDS panel has two advantages over to the DCP panel.  First, the 
DCP panel covers the period 1987 to present whereas the HEGIS/IPEDS panel covers 
1969 to present.  Researchers may desire the longer panel for certain topics (e.g., 
academic program adoption).  Second, DCP treatment of the parent-child relationship can 
undermine analyses.  A parent-child relationship occurs when a university reports data at 
a multi-campus or system level, rather than the campus level.  For example, the 
University of Texas (UT) campuses report assets at the system level.  The DCP panel 
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collapses all UT campuses (e.g., UT Austin, UT San Antonio) into a single organization.  
The same is true the University of Missouri, the University of Massachusetts, and other 
public universities.   
Grouping many campuses into a single observation can undermine research.  For 
example, consider research on whether out-of-state enrollment increase in response to 
declines in state funding.  The analysis should differentiate between flagship and non-
flagship campuses, since non-flagship campuses may be unable to attract out-of-state 
students. The HEGIS/IPEDS panel aggregates multi-campus institutions less often than 
the DCP panel, making it more appropriate for certain research questions.  
A second public-use resource, NSF‟s WebCASPAR system allows users to 
download Completions Survey data from the HEGIS and IPEDS Completions 
Component for all years from 1966 to present.  In isolation, these degree data are useful 
only for descriptive statistics.  In contrast, the HEGIS/IPEDS includes measures from the 
Completions Component and from other survey components.  A third public-use resource 
is the Colleges & Universities 2000 Database by Steven Brint.
3
  This public-use dataset 
covers the years 1970 through 2005 and incorporates data from HEGIS, IPEDS, Census 
data and other sources.  However, the data are available at five-year intervals and only for 
383 institutions. 
After reviewing extant public use datasets, the HEGIS-IPEDS panel can make a 
contribution to the research community.  The DCP panel is the best existing public-use 
dataset.  DCP data are used by academic researchers, institutional researchers, and non-
researchers.  By contrast, the HEGIS/IPEDS panel is targeted at scholars and will be 
                                                 
3
 http://www.higher-ed2000.ucr.edu/databases.html  
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especially useful when research questions require data prior to 1987 or require alternative 
solutions to the parent-child data problem.    
Although the remainder of the chapter focuses on changes over time in the 
HEGIS and IPEDS surveys, I comment briefly on the creation of the HEGIS/IPEDS 
panel.  A separate dataset of analyses variables is created from each survey component 
(e.g., Completions, Institutional Characteristics).  These datasets are merged together by 
organization-id and year to create the HEGIS/IPEDS panel.  I have developed user-
defined statistical programs that create measures for multiple years of data.  Therefore, 
newly released IPEDS data can be incorporated into the HEGIS/IPEDS panel and 
existing variables can be modified for all years without significant programming.  
Though input datasets have varying data structures, the final organization of 
HEGIS/IPEDS panel is one observation per organization-year.   
 
HEGIS and IPEDS Sampling 
 The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) conducted HEGIS from 
1966-1986 and IPEDS from 1987 to present.  This section provides an overview of the 
HEGIS and IPEDS sampling.  Decisions about what institutions are included in the 
sample depend on key concepts (e.g., what is an “institution of higher education”).  
Therefore, this section pays particular attention to change over time in these concepts.   
Table 2.2 shows the number of institutions in the HEGIS/IPEDS universe, using 
data from the IC Component.  All institutions included in HEGIS were included in 
IPEDS, but IPEDS also includes institutions not included in HEGIS.  The number of 
institutions increased from 3,714 in 1985-86, the last year of HEGIS, to 12,917 in 1986-
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87, the first year of IPEDS.  Over time the number of institutions included in IPEDS has 
decreased, mostly due to changes in sampling rules rather than a decline in the overall 
population of institutions. 
 Eligibility for Title IV financial aid programs has been an important determinant 
of which institutions are included in HEGIS and IPEDS samples.  Both HEGIS and 
IPEDS are products of the NCES, which was created as part of the 1965 Higher 
Education Act (HEA) (Hyatt & Dickmeyer, 1980, p. 7).  Title IV of HEA covers the 
administration of federal student financial aid programs, for example Pell Grants and 
low-interest student loans.  A “Title IV institution” means that students attending the 
institution are eligible for Title IV financial aid programs (NCES, 2011).   
 Accreditation is the core concept that determined inclusion in the HEGIS 
universe.  “Institution-level accreditation” covers the entire organization.4  An “institution 
of higher education”, a legacy concept used by NCES, is defined as an organization 
accredited at the institution level by an accrediting agency recognized by the Secretary of 
the U.S. Department of Education (NCES, 2011).  All institutions of higher education are 
eligible for Title IV federal financial aid programs.  All institutions of higher education 
were required to complete all HEGIS survey components.  Table 2.2 shows that the 
number of institutions of higher education increased from about 2,800 in 1969 to 3,700 in 
1986. 
In 1987 IPEDS replaced not only HEGIS, but the Survey of Non-Collegiate 
Postsecondary Institutions (SNPI), and the Vocational Education Data System (VEDS).  
IPEDS includes all HEGIS institutions.  IPEDS also includes institutions excluded from 
                                                 
4
 Program-level accreditation accredits a particular academic program, for example when the Commission 
on Collegiate Nursing Education accredits a bachelor‟s of science in nursing program within an institution 
(Council for Higher Education Accreditation, 2002). 
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HEGIS.  Whereas accreditation determined inclusion in HEGIS, accreditation is a 
characteristic about which data are collected in IPEDS (Cohen, 1990). 
Beginning in 1987, the core concepts determining inclusion in IPEDS were 
“postsecondary institutions” and “sector.”  Postsecondary institutions are organizations 
having the provision of postsecondary education as their primary mission or one of their 
primary missions (Cohen, 1990).  In turn, “postsecondary education” is defined as the 
provision of formal instructional programs whose curriculum is designed primarily for 
students who have completed the requirements for a high school diploma or its 
equivalent.  This includes programs whose purpose is academic, vocational, and 
continuing education, but excludes a-vocational and adult basic education programs.   
Postsecondary institutions are categorized into nine sectors according the highest 
level of degree warded and institutional control.  Table 2.3 shows frequencies of 
academic-year by sector for the IPEDS universe from 1987 to 2010. The nine sectors are 
as follows: 
- Baccalaureate degree or higher 
- (1) Public 
- (2) Private, not-for-profit 
- (3) Private, for-profit 
- Two-year degree or higher, but less than baccalaureate degree 
- (4) Public 
- (5) Private, not-for-profit 
- (6) Private, for-profit 
- Less than two-year degree 
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- (7) Public 
- (8) Private, not-for-profit 
- (9) Private, for-profit 
In the early years of IPEDS, sector determined inclusion in the IPEDS universe 
and also which IPEDS survey components each institution had to complete.  Initial 
IPEDS survey components included IC, Finance, Completions, Fall Enrollment, 
Instructional Staff & Salaries, and Fall Staff.   All postsecondary institutions (i.e. all 
institutions in sectors 1-9) were required to complete the IC Component (Cohen, 1990).  
Postsecondary institutions in sectors 1-7 were required to complete all survey 
components.  A probability sample of institutions in sector 8 (less than two-year, private 
not for profit) and sector 9 (less than two-year, private for profit) were also required to 
complete all survey components.  
Cohen (1990) describes a two-stage process for choosing which sector 8 and 
sector 9 institutions must complete all IPEDS survey components.  First, a “HEGIS 
institution” is an institution that fulfilled the requirements for inclusion in the HEGIS 
survey, specifically those institutions accredited by an accrediting agency recognized by 
the secretary of the U.S. Department of Education.  All HEGIS institutions were required 
to complete all IPEDS survey components, regardless of sector.  Based on data from the 
1987-88 Fall Enrollment Component, there were two HEGIS institutions in sector 8 and 
20 HEGIS institutions in sector 9 (Cohen, 1990).  Second, in 1987-88 NCES set the 
sample size of non-HEGIS sector 8 and sector 9 institutions required to complete all 
survey components at 1,200, out of approximately 6,200 sector 8 and sector 9 institutions 
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in the IPEDS universe (Cohen, 1990).  Institutions were selected using probability 
sampling, with the probability of selection positively related to total enrollments. 
The set of institutions required to complete each IPEDS survey component has 
changed over time.  Since 1992, IPEDS has focused on institutions participating in Title 
IV federal financial assistance programs.  Section 490 of the Higher Education 
Amendments of 1992 (P.L. 102-325) made IPEDS mandatory for institutions that 
participate in any Title IV program (NCES, 2005).  Table 2.4, taken from NCES (1995), 
shows what institutions were required to complete each IPEDS survey components from 
1992 to 2000.  Note that different Fall Enrollment components were required for four-
year institutions (EF1) versus less-than four-year institutions (EF2) and that different 
Finance Survey Components were required for public institutions (F1) and private 
institutions (F1A). 
IPEDS was redesigned in 2000 (NCES, 1999).  One dramatic change was the 
replacement of paper-based surveys with web-based surveys that included built-in checks 
to increase accuracy.  Redesign reaffirmed Title IV institutions as the focus of IPEDS.  
The IPEDS redesign acknowledged four kinds of institutions: 
A. Degree and other award granting Title IV postsecondary education 
institutions (i.e. whose primary mission is to provide postsecondary 
education) that are open to the general public 
B. Degree and other award granting non-Title IV postsecondary education 
institutions that are open to the general public 
C. Title IV institutions whose primary mission is not to provide 
postsecondary education, but that offer postsecondary education programs 
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to the general public (e.g., high schools that offer postsecondary education 
courses)  
D. All other institutions, including (1) postsecondary education institutions 
whose programs are not open to the general public; and (2) non-Title IV 
institutions whose primary mission is not postsecondary education but 
includes postsecondary education programs 
The IPEDS redesign recommended that type A institutions would be required to 
complete all IPEDS survey components (NCES, 1999).  Type B and C institutions would 
be required to provide “minimal data,” including  (1) the directory information such as 
name, address, and accreditation status and (2) basic institutional characteristics such as 
enrollment by race and ethnicity, number of awards by program, and tuition and fees 
(NCES, 1999).  IPEDS data would not be required of type D institutions.  Beginning in 
1997, the IC Survey Component includes an indicator of eligibility for Title IV programs.  
Table 2.5 shows a tabulation of academic-year and Title IV eligibility using data from the 
IC Survey Component.  Note that the number of institutions included in the IC Survey 
Component that are ineligible for Title IV funding declines dramatically from 2,733 in 
2001 to 165 in 2002. 
In summary, although the rules for sample inclusion have changed over time, a 
particular set of institutions are present in all years.  Institutions that are (1) accredited by 
an agency recognized by the secretary of the U.S. Department of education and (2) are 
eligible for Title IV federal funding are required to complete all survey components in all 
HEGIS years and all IPEDS years.  Institutions that are (1) eligible for Title IV federal 
funding and (2) are in sectors 1-7 (1= 4-yr public; 2= 4-yr private, not-for-profit; 3= 4yr 
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private, for-profit; 4=2-yr public; 5=2yr private, not-for-profit; 6=2yr private, for-profit; 
7= less-than-2yr public) are required to complete all survey components in all IPEDS 
years.  Depending on the year, institutions not fulfilling these criteria do not complete any 
survey components or complete only a subset of survey components. 
 
Organizational Form and the Parent-Child Relationship 
Postsecondary education institutions may be organized as standalone institutions, 
as multi-campus institutions with a main campus and one or more branch campuses, as a 
system of standalone institutions and multi-campus institutions, or as another 
organizational form.  The organizational form of a postsecondary education institution 
affects how organizations record data in HEGIS and IPEDS survey components.  For 
example, a main campus may separately record data for the main campus and each of its 
branch institutions.  Alternatively, a main campus may aggregate data from branch 
campuses, reporting the cumulative data from all campuses as if these data belonged to a 
single institution.  In this section I, first, provide an overview of how HEGIS and IPEDS 
treat different organizational forms.  Second, I discuss the parent child relationship and 
on alternative solutions to problems posed by the parent-child relationship. 
Treatment of Organizational Form in HEGIS and IPEDS  
HEGIS survey components define five organizational forms: institutional 
systems; single campus institutions; multi-campus institutions; main-campuses; and 
branch campuses (U.S. Dept. of Education & NCES, 1976).  These organizational forms 
are not mutually exclusive from one another.  For example, a multi-campus institution 
can have a main campus and branch campuses or several multi-campus institutions may 
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exist within a single institutional system.  The organizational forms are defined below 
(U.S. Dept. of Education & NCES, 1976, p. 46) and Appendix A identifies what 
organizational forms were present in what survey components during the HEGIS years: 
 INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM. A complex of two or more institutions of higher 
education, each separately organized or independently complete, under the control 
of supervision of a single administrative body. 
 MULTI-CAMPUS INSTITUTION. An organization bearing a resemblance to an 
institutional system, but unequivocally designated as a single institution with 
either of two organizational structures: (1) an institution having two or more 
campuses responsible to a central administration (which central administration 
may or may not be located on one of the administratively equal campuses) or (2) 
an institution having a main campus with one or more branch campuses attached 
to it. 
 MAIN CAMPUS. In those institutions comprised of a main campus and one or 
more branch campuses, the main campus (sometimes called the parent institution) 
is usually the location of the core, primary, or most comprehensive program. 
Unless the institution-wide or central administrative office for such institutions is 
reported to be at a different location, the main campus is also the location of the 
central administrative office. 
 BRANCH CAMPUS. A campus of an institution of higher education which is 
organized on a relatively permanent basis (i.e., has a relatively permanent 
administration), which offers an organized program or programs of work of at 
least 2 years (as opposed to courses), and which is located in a community 
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different from that in which its parent institution is located. To be considered in a 
community different from that of the parent institution, a branch shall be located 
beyond a reasonable commuting distance from the main campus of the parent 
institution. 
During the HEGIS years, each separately accredited institution with its own 
institutional ID code – whether it is a single campus institution or a branch campus within 
a multi-campus institution – was responsible for completing HEGIS survey components.  
The data for each non-separately accredited institution/branch/campus were reported with 
a “parent” institution.5   Therefore, “parent” institutions are defined as institutions that 
report data for themselves and at least one other institution, branch, or campus.  A 
“parent-child relationship” identifies the parent institution and the child institution(s).   
Difficulties arise when a parent-child relationship exists for one survey 
component (e.g., Finance) but not for another survey component (e.g., Fall Enrollment).  
For example, consider a multi-campus institution with one main campus and three branch 
campuses.  The Fall Enrollment data may have four observations per year.  The Finance 
data may have one observation per-year if Finance data for the three branch campuses are 
reported with the parent.  In such cases, the Finance data and Fall Enrollment data cannot 
be merged without first devising a solution to the “parent-child problem.”   
Important differences exist between HEGIS and IPEDS in terms of reporting data 
from branch campuses.  During HEGIS years, data were reported separately for a branch 
                                                 
5
 The formal language for this rule is as follows: “Please note that each institution, branch, campus, or other 
entity separately certified by the accreditation and institutional eligibility unit of the U.S. Office of 
Education, with its own FICE code, and listed separately in the Education Director of Higher Education, 
should be reported on a separate survey form and not included or combined with any other such certified 
unit.  Branches, campuses, and other organizational entities not separately certified should be included with 
the appropriate institution or branch report” (U.S. Dept. of Education & NCES, 1976, p. 46) 
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campus if that branch campus was accredited at the institution level by an agency 
recognized by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education.
6
  Under IPEDS, data 
are reported separately for each entity that offers at least one complete program of study, 
regardless of whether that institution is separately accredited (U.S. Dept. of Education & 
NCES, 1987).  Therefore, relative to HEGIS, IPEDS has many more branch campuses 
that are required to report data separately from main campuses than HEGIS.  Separately 
reporting branch campuses in IPEDS are less likely to operate as standalone institutions 
than separately reporting branch campuses in HEGIS and are more likely to report data 
with their parent institutions because data reporting capabilities often do not exist at the 
branch campus level.  For these reasons, problems related to the parent-child relationship 
appear more often in IPEDS data than in HEGIS data. 
Related to concerns about organizational form, is the issue of distinguishing 
organizational death from campuses that no longer report at the child level.  During the 
transition from HEGIS to IPEDS, each organization with a FICE code – the institutional 
ID during the HEGIS years – was assigned a UNITID – the institutional ID during 
IPEDS years.  For each organization that possessed a FICE but no UNITID, I 
investigated why that institution did not have a UNITID.  Three common reasons existed: 
(1) the organization died; (2) the organization merged with another organization; and (3) 
the organization was a campus that once reported its own data, but at some point began 
reporting data with the parent institution.  I treat mergers as organizational deaths, in that 
the organization was “eaten” by another organization and no longer exists.  I treat 
                                                 
6
 These separately accredited branch campuses had their own FICE codes and were legally authorized to 
offer at least a 1-year program of study creditable toward a degree or other formal award. 
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organizations that ceased to report their own data as child-institutions, subject to the 
“parent-child solutions” I discuss in the next section. 
Parent Child Relationship 
 Overview of the problem.  The parent-child relationship represents the most 
difficult challenge to creating a panel dataset from multiple components of the HEGIS 
and IPEDS surveys.  This section, first, provides an overview of the parent-child 
relationship, second, describe data patterns of the parent-child relationship by survey 
component, and, third, describe alternative solutions to the problems posed by the parent-
child relationship.   
 A parent-child relationship occurs when the data for two or more campuses, each 
with their own institutional ID, are reported at a single campus or system office.  Parent-
child relationships differ across survey components, occurring most often in the Finance 
Component.  For example, Rutgers University has campuses in New Brunswick (the 
flagship campus), Camden, and Newark.  Each campus has its own institutional ID code.  
Each campus separately reports data on Fall Enrollment, IC, and Completions.  However, 
the Finance data for the New Brunswick campus includes Finance data for all campuses 
combined whereas the Camden and Newark campuses do not report Finance data at all. 
In other examples of a parent-child relationship, the Finance data may be reported at the 
system office rather than at a flagship campus, as is the case with the Kentucky 
Community and Technical College System.   
Parent-child relationships are not necessarily constant over time.  For example, 
endowment revenues at University of California campuses (e.g., UC-Berkeley, UCLA) 
were reported at the system level for some years but at the campus level in other years.  
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The parent-child relationships are not necessarily constant within survey components.  In 
the Finance Component, for example, revenues may be reported at the child-level but net 
assets may be reported at the parent-level. 
 The parent-child relationship poses problems for the creation of panel datasets 
that combines data from multiple survey components over time.   When an institution 
reports certain measures at the multi-campus or system level, the campus-level has 
missing data for those measures.  Consider the case of Rutgers University.  For each year, 
the Newark campus has measures of Fall Enrollment and Completions, but no Finance 
measures.  By contrast the New Brunswick campus contains measures of revenues, 
expenditures, and assets that are the aggregate of all campuses in the system.   
 Solutions to the parent-child problem.  Two solutions exist for the problems 
posed by the parent-child relationship, though these solutions each introduce additional 
problems.  “Collapsing” solutions collapse child data into parents.  In the Rutgers 
University example, a collapsing solution aggregates the Fall Enrollment, Completions, 
and Finance measures from the New Brunswick, Newark, and Camden campuses into a 
single observation encompassing all campuses of Rutgers University.  This solution 
solves the problem of missing observations for survey components reported at the parent 
level.  However, we now have only one observation-per-year for all of Rutgers 
University, even though there may be important differences between each individual 
campus.   
 An alternative, the “allocation” solution, allocates data reported at the parent-level 
to the different child-campuses.  In the case of Rutgers University, Fall Enrollment and 
Completions measures would remain untouched, but Finance data would be allocated to 
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each campus based on some rule.  The benefit of the allocation solution is that all 
organizations with their own institutional ID are retained in the final panel dataset.  The 
drawback of the allocation solution is that the “rule” determining allocations from parents 
to children may be inaccurate.  
 The operationalization of solutions to problems posed by the parent-child 
relationship depends on data patterns of the parent-child relationship.  Appendix B shows 
data patterns of the parent-child relationship over time and across survey components.  
Although data patterns of the parent-child relationship are quite esoteric, they have 
important effects on the creation of the HEGIS/IPEDS panel.   
 Collapsing solutions.  Collapsing solutions collapse all child data into parents.  
For example, consider a parent institution connected to three child institutions.  The child 
institutions report Completions and Fall Enrollment data but Finance data are reported at 
the parent level.  For each year, the collapsing solution would create an observation that 
is the sum of all four input observations (one parent and three children) and would delete 
the four input observations.   
 Although several alternative collapsing solutions exist, they share important 
commonalities.  The most general rule is that any institution that has ever been a child in 
any year for any survey component should be collapsed into parents for all years and for 
all surveys.  From experience, child observations occur most frequently in the Finance 
Component, less frequently in the Completions Component, and very rarely in the Fall 
Enrollment Component.  Child observations in the IC Component are irrelevant because 
the IC Component predominantly contains indicator variables (e.g., religious affiliation) 
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rather than variables that must be aggregated across institutions (e.g., revenue from 
auxiliary enterprises).  
Step one in a collapsing solution is to create a list of institutions that have ever 
been children in any survey component (see Appendix B for parent-child data patterns).   
Parent-child lists are created separately for each survey component.  Each parent-child 
list contains two variables: the ID of the child and the ID of the parent.  The master 
parent-child list is created by appending the parent-child lists from each survey 
component and deleting duplicate observations.  Each child should have one parent only.  
In such cases where the parent changes over time for a child, the analyst must manually 
decide which parent to retain.   
Step two is to merge the master parent-child list by child ID to the data from a 
particular survey component.  Step three is, for those observations that merged from the 
parent-child list, to replace institutional ID with the parent institutional ID from the 
parent-child list.  Step 4 is to sort by year and institutional ID.  Those institutions that 
contain data from both parent institutions and child institutions will have multiple 
observations per year.  Step five is to create sum variables.  For example, the sum 
variable for tuition revenue is the sum of tuition revenue for all observations with the 
same combination of institutional ID and year.  Step five is repeated for each variable.  
The majority of observations are neither parent institutions nor child institutions. These 
observations will only have one observation per institution-year and therefore the original 
variable measure will be the same as the sum variable.  Step six is to keep only the last 
observation per each combination of institutional ID and year.   
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Steps two through six are repeated for each survey component except for 
institutional characteristics.  Finally, step seven is to merge variables from each survey 
component together to make the analysis dataset.  Institutional characteristics data should 
be merged last, keeping only those observations in the master dataset or those that merge 
with IC data.  Therefore, the institutional characteristics retained are implicitly those of 
the parent, not the child. 
The DCP parent-child solution is identical to the general solution described 
above; institutions that reported data together on any IPEDS survey for any year 
beginning in 1987 have been grouped together for all years.  The DCP parent-child 
solution has 222 parent institutions linked to 593 child institutions.  For each year of the 
panel, these 815 institutions (593+222) are collapsed into 222 observations.  About 71% 
of these 815 institutions are public, reflecting the tendency for public institutions to have 
multi-campus institutions with centralized data reporting.  Aggregating so many 
institutions masks important differences between campuses.  Table 2.6 lists several multi-
campus institutions/systems that are aggregated by the DCP parent-child solution, 
including all University of Illinois campuses (e.g., Urbana Champaign, Springfield) 
collapsed into University of Illinois Chicago, and all 23 Penn State campuses (e.g., 
Brandywine, Beaver, Harrisburg, Greater Allegheny, College of Medicine, etc.) collapsed 
into the Penn State-University Park campus.   
I create an alternative collapsing solution that results in fewer collapsed 
institutions than the DCP solution.  Explaining the differences between my solution and 
the DCP solution requires some background information.  In theory, the collapsing 
solution collapses institutions that have ever been a child in any year for any survey 
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component.  In practice, collapsing occurs because data from the Finance Component – 
as opposed to Completions, Fall Enrollment, etc. – are reported at the parent level.  
Within the Finance Component, child institutions usually report partial data (see 
Appendix Table 2.1): revenues and expenditures are often reported at the child level; and 
net assets or plant, property, and equipment are reported at the parent level. 
My solution is based on the idea that child institutions reporting partial data are 
not necessarily collapsed into parent institutions.  Specifically, the following institutions 
are collapsed: institutions flagged as children that have zero or missing revenues; 
institutions flagged as children that have zero or missing degree completions (after 
summing all degree levels); and institutions flagged as children that have zero or missing 
total enrollments (after summing all degree levels and attendance patterns).  Practically 
speaking, the primary difference between my solution and the DCP solution is that I do 
not collapse institutions that report revenues at the child level but report assets at the 
parent level.   
The reason I do not collapse institutions reporting assets at the parent level is 
because, to date, the HEGIS/IPEDS panel has not yet incorporated asset measures. 
Including asset measures in the HEGIS/IPEDS would necessitate a collapsing solution 
more similar to the DCP solution.  Therefore, my collapsing solution is not technically 
superior to the DCP solution; rather, it benefits from using fewer data sources.   
Nevertheless, my solution results in fewer aggregations than the DCP solution.  
The DCP solution results in 222 parent institutions linked to 593 child institutions for a 
total of 815 institutions collapsed into 222 institutions.   My solution results in 183 parent 
institutions linked to 345 child solutions for a total of 528 institutions collapsed into 183 
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institutions.  In the DCP solution 71% of the 815 collapsed institutions are public. In my 
solution, 45% of the 528 collapsed institutions are public.  I do not collapse any of the 
institutions shown in Table 2.6, which are collapsed by the DCP solution.  Most public 
institutions I collapse are community colleges, which often report all finances at the 
district level.  
 Allocation solutions.  Rather than collapsing child institutions into parent 
institutions, allocation solutions allocate data reported at the parent level to child-
institutions.  Consider one parent institution connected to three child institutions.  Fall 
Enrollment, Completions, and the revenue and expenditure measures from the Finance 
Component are reported at the child level, but the asset measures from Finance 
Component are reported at the parent level.  The allocation solution would leave 
measures of Fall Enrollment, Completions, and revenues and expenditures untouched.  
Assets data would be allocated from parents to children based on some rule.  Whereas the 
collapsing solutions result in one observation per year, the allocation solution would 
result in four observations per year.  If a reasonable allocation rule is available, then an 
allocation solution is preferable to a collapsing solution because distinct institutions (e.g., 
UMass Boston and UMass Amherst) remain distinct observations.   
 The most critical step in an allocation solution is devising a rule to allocate data 
reported at the parent level to child institutions.   Selecting the appropriate allocation rule 
involves multiple considerations.  Should the allocation rule be constant across survey 
components (e.g., Completions vs. Finance)? Should the allocation rule be constant 
across variables within survey components (e.g., state appropriations revenue vs. tuition 
revenue)? Should the allocation rule be constant over time?   
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Selecting an allocation rule implicitly depends on whether an available variable 
can be used to allocate data.  For example, data on assets may be allocated from parents 
to children based on the percent of total enrollment (=enrollment at parent + enrollment 
at each child campus) in each child campus.  Clearly, using an existing variable to 
allocate parent data leads to potentially inaccurate measures.  For example, the true value 
of assets per student is likely higher at a main campus (e.g., University of Washington, 
Seattle) compared to branch campuses (e.g., University of Washington, Tacoma).  
Therefore, using enrollment data to allocate asset data across parents and children may 
understate the true value of assets in the main campus.   
 Selecting an allocation rule also depends on data patterns of the parent child 
relationship across survey components.  Practically speaking, Fall Enrollment data almost 
always exist at the child level.  Completions data are usually reported at the child level, 
but may be reported at the parent level in particular years (see Appendix Table 2.4).  The 
same is true for revenues and expenditures within the Finance Component (see Appendix 
Table 2.3).  Asset data, however, are often reported at the parent level for all years of data 
for a particular institution.  
Given the realities of these data patterns, several alternative allocation rules exist. 
Each rule has strengths and weaknesses.  The first allocation rule is based on the 
proportion of overall enrollments. The advantage of this rule is availability of the 
measure over time.  The rule would result in allocation proportions that are constant 
across survey components within a year but would vary over time.  The disadvantage is 
that enrollments can be a poor proxy for both Finance and Completion data.   
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An alternative rule is, for a particular measure, to allocate parent data to children 
based on proportions from previous/subsequent years of that measure.  For example, 
Completions data are usually reported at the child level in most years but there are 
particular years (e.g., 1995; see Appendix Table 2.4) when completions are often reported 
at the parent level.  If the University of Washington, Tacoma conferred 20 of all 100 
baccalaureate degrees in physics at the University of Washington in 1994, then the rule 
would allocate 20% of all 110 physics baccalaureate degrees in physics in 1995, when the 
data are reported at the parent level.  The advantages of this allocation rule are that the 
rule varies from measure to measure, and is likely to be very accurate relative to 
alternative rules.  The disadvantage is that this rule can only be used if a measure is 
reported at the child level at least once.  Asset data, in particular, are often never reported 
at the child level. 
A third allocation rule is based on parent-child allocation factor variables, which 
are available in the response status part of the IC Survey Component.  Separate allocation 
factor variable exists for each survey component.  This approach has several advantages.  
First, the institution, rather than the analyst, determines the allocation factors, potentially 
resulting in more accurate allocations.  Second, the allocation factors are allowed to differ 
from survey component to survey component and over time.  The primary disadvantage 
is that the allocation factors are only available beginning in 2004.  Applying these 
allocation factors to previous years may lead to distortions when some institutions have 
grown more rapidly than others, especially given the length of the HEGIS/IPEDS panel.  
Note that DCP offers a panel dataset from the years 2004-2008 that uses an allocation 
solution rather than a collapsing solution. 
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Although the HEGIS/IPEDS panel does not yet employ an allocation solution, I 
will experiment with alternative allocation rules in the summer of 2012.  My allocation 
solution will likely be based on combination of different allocation rules.  For example, 
when available, the allocation rule for each measure would use proportions from 
previous/subsequent measures.  When previous/subsequent measures are unavailable, the 
allocation rule could be based on total enrollments or allocation factor variables. 
One attractive approach is to implement multiple allocation solutions and test 
which solution performs most closely to the “truth.”  For example, imagine that campuses 
in the University of California (e.g., UC Berkeley, UCLA, etc.) report asset data at the 
campus level but campuses in the University of Texas report asset data at the system 
level.  Therefore, the “true” allocation of assets is known for University of California 
campuses but not for the University of Texas campuses.  To test the efficacy of each 
allocation solution, I would first aggregate all asset measures for the UC campus to the 
system level.  Second, I would allocate the system-level measures to individual campuses 
using several different allocation solutions (e.g., FTE enrollments, IPEDS allocation 
factors, etc.).  Third, I would compare how each allocation solution compares to the true 
allocation of assets across UC campuses.  The results of this test would inform which 
allocation solution is applied to campuses where the true allocation is unknown.  This 
approach to the parent child solution may also provide useful information for the 
construction of allocation factors by NCES. 
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HEGIS/IPEDS Survey Components 
 This section discusses the variables available in specific HEGIS and IPEDS 
survey components over time.  I discuss the Fall Enrollment Component (which includes 
enrollment by age, and state migration), the IC Component, the Completions Component, 
and the Finance Component (with a focus on revenues).  Rather than discuss the 
construction of each individual variable, I take a forest-level approach; for each 
component, I focus on when key variables become available, consistency of variables 
over time, and important concepts (e.g., change over time in accounting standards).  In 
the future I will create a separate codebook that discusses the construction of specific 
variables. 
Fall Enrollment 
Although HEGIS began in 1966, 1969 is the first year data are available for most 
survey components, as data from earlier years have been lost or damaged.  Fall 
Enrollment data are first available for the fall of 1968.  Data from the fall of 1968 are part 
of the 1968-69 academic year, which I refer to as 1969 in the HEGIS/IPEDS panel.  The 
Fall Enrollment Component contains three different sets of variables relevant to the 
HEGIS/IPEDS panel: Fall Enrollment by gender and ethnicity; Fall Enrollment by state 
migration; and Fall Enrollment by age.   
Table 2.7 shows Fall Enrollment variable availability over time by level of study, 
attendance status, gender, and ethnicity.  For example, in 1969 total undergraduate 
enrollments are available.  The three columns on the right indicate that in 1969 separate 
undergraduate enrollment variables are available by attendance status (full-time vs. part-
time), and gender (men vs. women), but not for ethnicity.  Graduate enrollment (master‟s 
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degrees and PhD programs) and first-professional enrollment (e.g., dentistry, law) 
variables become available in 1970.  These variables are available by attendance status 
and gender.  Undergraduate freshman enrollment variables become available beginning 
in 1974. 
Although not shown in Table 2.7, additional variables have been created from 
these raw input variables.  For example, total undergraduate headcount is the sum of full-
time undergraduate men, part-time undergraduate men, full-time undergraduate women, 
and part-time undergraduate women.  Measures of full-time equivalent (FTE) enrollment 
can be created using some assumptions (e.g., 1 part-time student equals 1/3 a full-time 
student).  Adding across degree-levels (e.g., undergrad + graduate + first-professional) 
yields measures of total headcount and total FTE students. 
Fall enrollment measures are available by ethnicity beginning in 1977.  From 
1977 through 2008 the racial categories are: White; Black; Hispanic; Asian or Pacific 
Islander; Native American or Alaskan Native; non-resident alien; and ethnicity unknown.  
With the inclusion of ethnicity, the raw measures of undergraduate enrollment are white 
full-time men, white part-time men, white full-time women, white part-time women, 
black full-time men, …., black part-time women, etc.  Similar measures are available for 
graduate and first professional students.  Note that ethnicity measures are unavailable in 
1978, 1986, 1988, and 1990.  A new set of ethnicity categories was phased in beginning 
in 2009: Hispanic or Latino; American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; Black or African 
American; Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander; White; two or more race; non-
resident alien; and race or ethnicity unknown.   
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Table 8 shows the availability of state residence data over time.  In general, these 
data indicate the number of freshmen from each state that are enrolled in a particular 
institution in a particular year.  These data are useful for research analyzing the trends 
towards a national market in higher education (e.g., Hoxby, 1997, 2009), the recruitment 
of out-of-state students by public institutions, or the growing proportion of international 
students.   
During HEGIS years, state residence was a separate survey component which was 
collected only in the years 1973, 1976, 1980, 1982, and 1985.  With the inception of 
IPEDS, state residence became a sub-component of Fall Enrollment.  IPEDS state 
residence data were collected in 1987, 1989, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999.  Since 2001 
state residence data have been collected in every year but survey response is optional for 
even-numbered years (e.g., 2002, 2004, 2006, etc.). 
Table 2.8 shows that for 1973, the first year of state residence data, the only 
variable available is whether entering freshman are in-state or out-of-state residents.  
Beginning in 1976, measures of the total number of freshman from each state become 
available and also the number of students from a foreign country.  For example, of the 
1,624 total freshman students at Harvard University in 1976, 119 were from California 
and 43 were from a foreign country.
7
  Measures of the number or percentage of in-state 
students can be created by coupling raw state residence variables with an indicator of 
institutional state location.  Beginning in 1985, separate measures of enrollment by state 
residence become available for students who graduated high-school within the last year 
became available.  For example, in 2009 there were 9,707 freshman students at Arizona 
                                                 
7
 Author‟s calculations. 
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State University and 9,199 of these students had graduated high school within the last 
year.  Of these 9,199 students, 6,366 were from Arizona and 784 were from California.   
State residence data, though powerful, have important limitations.  First, state 
residence data are unavailable in some years, undermining causal analyses of change over 
time.  Second, state residence data do not indicate the number of students coming from 
specific foreign countries (e.g., China, Turkey), except for certain protectorates (e.g., 
American Samoa, U.S. Virgin Islands).  Third, state residence data do not provide 
information about the academic programs studied by students from different states.  
Fourth, the state residence data are provided only for undergraduate freshman, but not 
data on graduate or first-professional students.   
Measures of enrollment by age, another sub-component of Fall Enrollment, are 
available in IPEDS but not in HEGIS.  These data are useful for studying the changing 
age-profile of students.  For example, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that colleges will 
attempt to increase adult enrollments in response to declines in the population of 
“traditional” college-age students.  Table 2.9 shows that enrollment by age measures are 
available in 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998.  Beginning in 2000, the measures are 
available in all years but are optional in odd years (e.g., 2001, 2003, etc.). Measures are 
available for the following age groups: LT 18; 18 to 19; 20 to 21; 22 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 
to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 49; 50 to 64; and GT 64.      
Enrollment-by-age the measures are available by level of study (undergraduate 
students, graduate students, and first-professional students), attendance status (full-time 
vs. part-time), and gender.  For example, at Harvard University in 1994 there were 1,451 
full-time men and 1,106 full-time women between 20 and 21 years-old in undergraduate 
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programs , there were 1,057 full-time men and 1,035 full-time women between 22 and 
24-years old in graduate programs , and there were 647 full-time men and 482 full-time 
women between 22 and 24 years-old in first-professional programs. 
Institutional Characteristics 
 I discuss three sets of variables from the IC Survey Component: (1) directory 
information (e.g., highest degree awarded, institutional control); (2) tuition and fees; and 
(3) admissions/selectivity variables.   
The HEGIS/IPEDS panel includes a modest number of directory information 
variables.  Data from the IC Survey Component are missing for the years 1966, 1967, 
1968, 1969, 1970, and 1972 (see Table 2.1).  During the HEGIS years, basic directory 
variables are available in the data files of all survey components.  Therefore, I create 
directory information variables for 1966, 1967, and 1968 using data from the 
Completions Component and create directory information variables for 1969, 1970, and 
1972 using data from the Fall Enrollment Component.    
This list of directory variables presently in the HEGIS/IPEDS panel includes: 
institutional name; level urbanization (e.g., institution located in city larger than 
1,000,000 people); highest degree offered; institutional control (public, private not-for-
profit, private for-profit); sector; zip code; minority serving institution; male only or 
female only; Land Grant institution; state; year institution established; religious 
affiliation; Title IV eligibility (available after 1997+); and whether institution is open to 
the public (available 2001+).  These variables are generally time-varying.  A much larger 
list of directory information variables are available but have not yet been included in the 
HEGIS/IPEDS panel. 
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Table 2.10 shows the available undergraduate and graduate tuition and fee 
measures, as well as available room and board measures.  Tuition and fee measures are 
derived from IC Survey Component data except for the years 1970 and 1971, when the 
the measures are derived from Finance Survey Component data.  Tuition and fee 
measures are unavailable for 1972.  
Measures of undergraduate tuition and fees and graduate tuition and fees are 
available beginning in 1970. Note that tuition and fees are a single variable.  Separate 
measures exist for in-state and out-of-state prices. By definition, in-state prices and out-
of-state prices are the same for private institutions.  Undergraduate in-district tuition and 
fees measures are available from 1987 onwards. In-district tuition and fee measures 
usually differ from in-state measures only for community colleges.  Graduate in-district 
tuition and fees are available from 1990 onwards.  Separate measures of tuition and 
separate measures of fees are available beginning in 2000. 
Measures of room charges and board charges are available beginning in 1970.  
For the years 1970 through 1986, the variable “dyspweek” identifies the number of days-
per-week covered by the board charge (e.g., five days per week or seven days per week).  
From 1987 to the present, the variable “mealswk” identifies the number of meals-per-
week covered by the board charge.   
Table 2.11 describes measures of first-professional tuition and fees, which are 
available beginning in 1987.  Measures are available for the following first-professional 
degree programs: chiropractic; dentistry; medicine; optometry; osteopathic medicine; 
pharmacy; podiatry; veterinary medicine, law, theology, and “other” first professional 
degree.  From 1987 through 1993, the combined tuition and fee measure does not indicate 
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whether it applies to in-state students or out-of-state students.  Beginning in 1994, 
separate measures of combined tuition and fees are available for in-state students and out-
of-state students.  Beginning in 2000, separate measures of tuition and separate measures 
of fees become available.  Note that tuition and fee measures for first-professional 
degrees were not collected in 2010, but will be collected again in 2011. 
I devised several rules to create consistent measures of tuition and fees.  First, I 
converted all price variables to 2010 dollars using the 2010 CPI.  Second, for private 
institutions I set prices for out-of-state, in-state, and in-district tuition/fees equal to one 
another.  Measures for public institutions adhere to the rule that in-district-price <= in-
state-price <= out-of-state price.  Imputation variables are available beginning in 1999.  I 
keep the raw imputation variables. 
Part C of the IC Survey Component discusses admissions requirements and 
services.  I use Part C to create measures of institutional selectivity.  In 1975, the IC 
Survey Component included the question “what is the usual minimum requirement for 
admissions to your institution as a regular student.”  Potential responses are: the ability to 
profit from attendance; high school graduation or recognized equivalent; high school 
graduation, plus an indication of superior academic aptitude (e.g. class standing, grades, 
curriculum, particular school, test scores, etc.); two year college graduation; four year 
college graduation.  Beginning with the inception of IPEDS in 1986-87, institutions were 
asked which specific standardized tests were required for admission (e.g., SAT, ACT).  
Also beginning in 1987, institutions were asked for the average class rank of the 
incoming freshman class.  Unfortunately, the class-rank question had many missing 
values, even at selective institutions, and was discontinued in 1991. 
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Tables 12 and 13 show that the IC Component began collecting a more useful set 
of admissions indicators in 2002.  These measures include how many men applied, how 
many women applied, how many men were admitted, how many women were admitted, 
how many men enrolled full-time, how many women enrolled full-time, how many men 
enrolled part-time, and how many women enrolled-part time (Table 2.12).  From these 
variables, analysts can create measures of percent admitted and yield – the percent of 
admitted students who enroll.  Table 2.13 shows the availability of SAT and ACT score 
measures.  These measures include the number and percent of first-time students who 
submitted SAT scores and ACT scores and the 25
th
 percentile score and 75
th
 percentile 
score of first-time enrolled students in the various components of the SAT (verbal, math, 
writing) and ACT (English, math). 
Degree Completions 
 Degree completions data from the Completions Survey Component have many 
applications.  Completions data are important for the emerging policy focus on 
institutional productivity (Massy, 2010; Wellman, 2010), for research on degree 
productivity in STEM fields (GAO, 2005), for research on ethnic and gendered 
segregation of degree attainment, and for research examining the relationship between 
degree production and the labor market demand for skills (Jaquette, 2010).  In this section 
I discuss change over time in degree classification systems, the organization of HEGIS 
and IPEDS Completions data, change over time in available measures of degree 
production, and finally the creation of degree adoption measures. 
 Degree classification systems.  Table 2.14 shows the change over time in the 
degree classification systems used by NCES.  From 1966 through 1970 the HEGIS 
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Completions Component used a system that is now commonly referred to as the “pre-
HEGIS” system (Huff, Chandler, & NCES, 1970).  The “HEGIS” degree classification 
system was used from 1971 through 1982.  The Classification of Instructional Programs 
(CIP) system was introduced in 1983.  The CIP has been revised periodically: the “1980 
CIP” was used from 1983-1986 (Malitz, 1981); the 1985 CIP was used from 1987-1991 
(Malitz, 1987); the 1990 CIP was used from 1992-2002 (Morgan, Hunt, & Carpenter, 
1991); the 2000 CIP was used from 2003-2010 (NCES, 2002); and the 2010 CIP was 
introduced in 2011 (NCES, 2010).  The underlying logic of the CIP has remained 
unchanged since its inception, but period revisions allow the CIP to incorporate newly 
emergent degree programs. 
 Huff, Chandler, and NCES (1970) provide information on both the Pre-HEGIS 
and HEGIS classification systems, as well as a cross-walk linking the two systems.  The 
Pre-HEGIS system contains approximately 210 unique degree codes and the HEGIS 
system contains approximately 400 unique degree codes.  In both systems the degrees are 
loosely organized by subject area (e.g., “Agricultural and Natural Resources” in the 
HEGIS system) but neither system has a true hierarchical organization.  One draw-back 
of both the HEGIS and pre-HEGIS is the poor coverage of sub-baccalaureate degree 
programs.  Instead, many sub-baccalaureate degree programs were covered by the 
separate “Handbook VI” degree classification system. 
 The CIP overcomes important flaws in the HEGIS system.  First, the CIP is a 
truly hierarchical classification system.  An individual degree program has a six-digit CIP 
code (e.g., 13.0406 is higher education administration). These individual degree 
programs are categorized within four-digit series (e.g., 13.04 is educational 
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administration) and then within two-digit series (e.g., 13 is education).  Therefore, 
researchers can create measures of degree production at the degree-level (i.e., 6-digit 
CIP), at the broader 4-digit CIP level, or at the broadest 2-digit level.  By contrast, the 
HEGIS degree classification system is not hierarchically organized except at the broadest 
levels (e.g., biological sciences).   
Second, the CIP covers all postsecondary education degree-levels.   Prior to the 
CIP, separate classification systems existed for “higher education” degrees (pre-HEGIS 
and HEGIs systems) and for sub-baccalaureate vocational degrees  (Handbook VI).  In 
theory, each 6-digit CIP degree (e.g., higher education administration=13.0406) could be 
awarded at any level (e.g., associate‟s degree).  Third, whereas the pre-HEGIS and 
HEGIS degree classification systems only contain degree names, the CIP has detailed 
descriptions for each degree code, leading to higher levels of accuracy when institutions 
classify degrees. 
Organization of completions data.  To create a panel of completions data I first 
I read in the raw completions data for each year from 1966 to 2010, creating a separate 
dataset for each year.  Second, I reshape the data from specific years, ensuring that each 
year of data follows the same organization.  Third, I use standardized cross-walks to 
merge 1980 CIP codes to the pre-HEGIS and HEGIS classification system, so that all 
years of data use a hierarchical classification system.  Fourth, I append each year of data 
to create a single dataset for all years.   
Table 2.15 uses hypothetical data to shows how the completions panel is 
organized, with one observation for each institution >> year >> award-level >> 6-digit 
CIP code.  I can create the completions panel at the 4-digit CIP code by summing the 
 69 
 
number of 6-digit degrees awarded within 4-digit CIP code.  In actuality, I create four 
different completions panels, each with a slightly different organization: 
1. One observation per institution >> year >> award-level >> 6-digit CIP 
code (e.g., 14.0903 Computer Software Engineering) 
2. One observation per institution >> year >> award-level >> 4-digit CIP 
code (e.g., 14.09 Computer Engineering, General) 
3. One observation per institution >> year >> award-level >> 2-digit CIP 
code (e.g., 14 Engineering) 
4. One observation per institution >> year >> award-level 
Comparing the organization of the HEGIS/IPEDS panel to the four completions 
panels, the HEGIS/IPEDS panel has a “wide” organization with one observation per 
organization-year and each of the four completions panels has a “long” organization, with 
multiple observations per organization-year.  Using each of the four panel datasets as 
inputs, I create output datasets with one observation per-organization-year.  For example, 
from panel #3 I create measures of the total number of bachelor‟s degrees awarded in 
business (CIP code=52) in each organization-year.  Finally, I merge these measures by 
organization-year to the HEGIS/IPEDS panel.   
I do not merge all possible variables from the four completions panels to the 
HEGIS/IPEDS panel because the resulting dataset would be many thousands of variables 
“wide.”  Therefore, the HEGIS/IPEDS panel contains an incomplete set of completions 
measures.  Researchers using the HEGIS/IPEDS panel may desire additional 
Completions measures.  Therefore, I will make the four input datasets available. 
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Available degree production variables.  Table 2.16 shows what specific degree 
production measures are available in what years.  Beginning in 1966, degree production 
measures are available for baccalaureate degrees, master‟s degrees, doctoral degrees, and 
first professional degrees (e.g., law).  Measures are also available for associate‟s degrees 
for the years 1966 through 1982, but only a portion of associate‟s degrees awarded by 
accredited institutions were included in the pre-HEGIS and HEGIS surveys.  Reliable 
measures of associate‟s degrees begin in 1983 with the inception of the 1980 CIP.  
Production measures for sub-baccalaureate degree programs of less than one year, and 
sub-baccalaureate degree programs greater than one year become available in 1984. 
Measures of sub-baccalaureate degrees greater than two years and post-baccalaureate 
certificate programs (e.g., a post-baccalaureate certificate in museum studies) become 
available in 1987.   
From 1966 through the present, separate degree production measures are available 
for men and women.  Measures of degree production by ethnicity become available in 
1976, but only for broad degree levels (e.g., all engineering degrees), not for specific 
degree programs (e.g., chemical engineering).   These broad-degree measures of degree 
production by ethnicity are available in the years 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1985, and 
1987. Beginning in 1989 these measures are available every year.  Beginning in 1995, 
degree production measures are available by ethnicity for both broad and specific 
degrees. From 1976 through 2007 the ethnicity categories are: White; Black; Hispanic; 
American Indian or Native Alaskan; Asian or Pacific Islander; and non-resident alien.  
New race categories become available beginning in 2008: American Indian or Alaska 
Native; Asian; Black or African American; Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander; 
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White; Hispanic or Latino; Two or more races. Data on the old race categories continue 
to be collected. 
 Degree adoption variables.  I define adoption as the first time a specific degree 
is awarded at a particular institution, lagged a certain number of years. For example, if 
the George Washington University first awards a master‟s degree in political 
communications in 1993, I assume that degree was adopted in 1991.  I create measures of 
adoption at the 6-digit CIP level (e.g., 52.2202 environmental health), the 4-digit CIP 
level (52.22 public health), and the 2-digit CIP level (e.g., 52 health).  Adoption measures 
can be crated for any degree level (e.g., associate, baccalaureate, master‟s, etc.).   
Revisions to degree classification systems pose challenges to the creation of 
adoption measures. For example, the 2000 CIP was implemented in 2003.  The CIP Code 
5.0131 – Tibetan Studies – was introduced in the 2000 CIP.  According to a simple 
definition of adoption, all institutions awarding a degree in Tibetan Studies in 2003 
would be defined as adopters because degree code 5.0131 is not observed in any 
institution prior to 2003.  These so-called adopters may have been awarding the same 
degree for many years under a different degree code prior to the implementation of the 
2000 CIP. 
I create rules to avoid instances of “false-positive” adoption.  One rule, for 
example, states that when a degree is new to a classification system, the degree cannot be 
adopted by an institution within two years of the inception of that classification system.  
For example, institutions that award degrees in Tibetan Studies in 2004 and 2004 cannot 
be adopters of Tibetan Studies.  However, an institution that awards a master‟s degree in 
Tibetan Studies for the first time in 2005 is as an adopter.   
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In general, I do not trust adoption measures at the 6-digit CIP level because there 
is wide variability in how the same 6-digit degrees are classified across institutions. I 
prefer adoption measures at the 2-digit or 4-digit CIP level.   For 4-digit (and 2-digit) 
adoption measures, I create a rule that a 4-digit degree cannot be adopted within two 
years of the inception of a revised degree classification system if all the 6-digit CIP codes 
within that 4-digit CIP code are new to the revised classification system. 
Finance 
Table 2.1 shows that Finance Component measures have been available since 
1969.  In 1973, NCES convened a working group to advise on changes to the Finance 
Component (AICPA, 1974; NCES, 1975).  These recommendations were incorporated 
into the HEGIS Finance Component beginning in 1975.  In 1997 the Finance Component 
was revised for private institutions, due to changes in accounting standards by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).  Beginning in 2002 the Finance 
Component was revised for public institutions, as new accounting standards by the 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) were phased in.   
In this section I describe change over time in the Finance Survey Component, 
with an emphasis on changes in accounting standards.  First, I describe accounting 
standards and the survey instrument from 1975 through 1996.  Second, I describe 1997 
changes in FASB accounting standards as they relate to the Finance Survey instrument.  
Finally, I identify the revenue variables available from 1969 to 2010, with an emphasis 
on whether variables are consistent across accounting standards.  At present, the 
HEGIS/IPEDS panel only incorporates revenue variables from the Finance Component.  
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In the future, I will incorporate additional Finance measures, including expenditures and 
net assets. 
 Accounting Standards in the old finance survey.  The Finance Component used 
from 1975 through 1996 (herein “the Old Finance Component”) had six parts: (A) current 
fund revenues; (B) current fund expenditures and mandatory transfers; (C) physical plant 
assets; (D) indebtedness on physical plant; (E) details of endowment assets; and (F) 
statement of changes in fund balances.   
The Old Finance Component was based on “fund group accounting,” in which 
resources are classified by purpose into separate fund groups.  A fund group is “an 
accounting entity with a self-balancing set of accounts” (AICPA, 1973, p. 5).  The 
“statement of changes in fund balances” (part F of the Old Finance Component) is the 
master table for parts A-E.  Table 2.17 recreates a copy of the statement of changes in 
fund balances used in the Old Finance Component.  The columns of Table 2.17 show five 
different fund groups: current; loan; endowment; annuity/life income; and plant.   
The first row of Table 2.17 shows additions.  Additions are monies added to a 
fund group during a reporting period (NCES, 1975).  For example, the amount of tuition 
revenue would be an addition to the current funds group.  However, total current funds 
additions are different than total current funds revenue.  To explain this difference, I 
introduce the concept of “accrual accounting.” 
In accrual accounting, revenues are reported only when they are earned, as 
opposed to “cash accounting” in which revenues are reported after payments have been 
received.  Under accrual accounting, revenues are categorized as one of two types: 
restricted and unrestricted.  Restricted revenues are not earned until “all of the terms of 
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the agreement under which they were given to the institution have been met and these 
terms are met only when the monies are expended in accordance with those restrictions” 
(NCES, 1975, p. 9).  Examples of restricted revenues are federal or private grants for the 
completion of a specific research project.  Unrestricted revenues do not require specific 
obligations to be met before they are earned.  Therefore, unrestricted revenues are earned 
as soon as they are received.  Typically, government appropriations and tuition revenue 
are counted as unrestricted revenues.  
To summarize, in accrual accounting, unrestricted revenues are earned as soon as 
they are received and restricted revenues are earned once those revenues are expended in 
accordance with designated funding restrictions.  Table 2.18 recreates Part A – current 
fund revenues – of the 1989 Finance Survey Component.  Column (1) refers to 
unrestricted revenues, column (2) refers to restricted revenues, and column (3) is the total 
of unrestricted and restricted revenues.  The rows in Table 2.18 (e.g., tuition and fees, 
state appropriations) represent the revenue variables available in the HEGIS/IPEDS 
panel. 
Having introduced several concepts, it is helpful to compare additions and 
revenues.  Unrestricted current funds additions are the same unrestricted current funds 
revenues.  Therefore, total unrestricted revenues (line 16, column 1 in Table 2.18) should 
equal unrestricted current fund additions (line 1, column 1 in Table 2.17).  However, total 
restricted revenues (line 16, column 2 in Table 2.18 differ from restricted current fund 
additions (line 1, column 2 in Table 2.17).  Specifically, restricted current funds additions 
includes restricted funds received during the reporting period, whether those funds were 
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expended or not.  In contrast, restricted funds revenues only include restricted funds 
which were expended during the reporting period.   
 FASB accounting standards.  A new Finance Component was created in 1997 in 
response to changes in FASB accounting standards (NCES, 2000).  The Old Finance 
Component contained the following parts: (A) current fund revenues; (B) current fund 
expenditures and mandatory transfers; (C) physical plant assets; (D) indebtedness on 
physical plant;  (E) details of endowment assets; and (F) statement of changes in fund 
balances. The FASB Component contains the following parts: (A) statement of financial 
position; (B) summary of change in net assets; (C) student grants; (D) revenues and 
investment return; (E) expenses by functional category; and (F) endowment assets.  I 
discuss broad changes between the Old Finance Component and the FASB Survey 
Component form.  In the subsequent section I discuss changes to specific variables.  
Although some finance measures are consistent across accounting standards, others are 
incomparable before and after the FASB changes.   
 Whereas the Old Finance Component mostly focuses on current funds, the FASB 
Finance Component focuses on both current and non-current funds (NCES, 2000).  For 
example, revenue amounts in the Old Finance Component focus on current revenues.  
Revenue amounts in the FASB Survey include all current and non-current revenues.  
Investment revenue is an example of a non-current revenue included in the FASB 
Finance Component but not the Old Finance Component.  Another major difference is 
that the FASB Finance Component has complete balance sheet information whereas the 
Old Finance Component only has selected balance sheet information. 
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 Whereas the Old Finance Component used the accrual accounting method, the 
FASB Finance Component uses the cash accounting method.  In the accrual accounting 
method, unrestricted revenues are recognized when they are received and restricted 
revenues are recognized when the funds have been expended.  In the cash accounting 
method, both unrestricted and restricted revenues are recognized as soon as they are 
received.  Therefore, there the FASB Finance Component makes no distinction between 
restricted and unrestricted revenues.  Analysts comparing revenue data before and after 
FASB accounting changes must add restricted and unrestricted revenues for data years 
using the Old Finance Component.   
Another change is that the Old Finance Component included transfers from one 
intra-organizational department to another intra-organizational department (NCES, 
2000).  For example, the catering costs for an alumni fund-raising event catered by the 
dining hall would be considered auxiliary revenue in the Old Finance Component.  The 
FASB Component only considers activities that increase or decrease net economic 
resources, not activities that shift resources within the organization. 
 Consistency of revenue measures over time. Many revenue measures are 
consistent before and after FASB accounting standards.  Table 2.19 shows the survey 
instrument for “revenues and investment return” (Part D) from the 2006 FASB Finance 
Component.  The instrument looks very similar to that of the Old Finance Component, 
shown in Table 2.18. Nevertheless, important differences exist, some of which cannot be 
overcome. 
 In the Old Finance Component, revenue from tuition and fees included 
allowances.  In the FASB Finance Component, tuition and fee revenues are net of 
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allowances.  An allowance is the difference between the stated tuition price and the 
amount actually paid by the student or the third-party payer on behalf of the student 
(NACUBO Accounting Principles Council, 1997).  For example, institutions often 
practice “tuition discounting” to increase enrollments (McPherson & Schapiro, 1999); the 
stated price is $25,000 but an individual student is charged only $20,000.  Most 
institutions offer merit scholarships; the stated price of tuition is $25,000 but an 
individual student is offered a $5,000 merit scholarship.  From the perspective of 
accounting principles, a tuition discount of $5,000 and an institutional merit scholarship 
of $5,000 are both allowances of $5,000.  In the Old Finance Component, the institution 
would record tuition and fee revenues of $25,000 and an allowance expenditure of 
$5,000. In the FASB Finance Component, the institution would record tuition and fee 
revenues of $20,000 and an institutional allowance of $5,000 in Part C, student grants.  
Analysts can add back allowances during FASB years to create a measure of 
gross tuition and fee revenue that is consistent with the Old Finance Component.  
Beginning in 1987, the Old Finance Component required institutions to record 
institutional allowances.  Therefore, for the years 1987 through 1996, analysts can create 
measures of tuition net of institutional allowances that are consistent with measures from 
the FASB survey years. 
 For several reasons, endowment/investment revenues are not comparable before 
and after accounting changes. First, in the Old Finance Component, the “endowment 
revenue” measure is defined as annual endowment spending.  In the FASB Finance 
Component, the most analogous measure – “investment revenue” – is the sum of (a) 
endowment spending and (b) investment return on short-term working cash pools (NCES, 
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2000).  Second, in the Old Finance Component institutions reported debt and equity 
investments at cost, meaning that changes in value were not recognized until after they 
were sold.  In the FASB Finance Component, institutions report debt and equity 
investments at market value.  Several additional factors further undermine comparison 
(NCES, 2000).  In general, and especially at institutions with large endowments, 
endowment/investment revenue increases dramatically after accounting changes in 1997.  
These changes cannot be explained by a strong stock market.  At Yale, for example, 
endowment/investment revenue increases from 147,152,992 in 1996 to 1,056,937,984 in 
1997.  At Harvard, endowment/investment revenue increases from 310,904,000 in 1996 
to 2,533,607,168 in 1997. 
 Another variable that is inconsistent before and after accounting changes is 
private gifts, grants, and contracts.  One reason for comparison difficulties is the change 
from accrual to cash accounting.  In accrual accounting, revenue from a private research 
grant is recognized once the revenue has been expended for the purpose of fulfilling grant 
requirements. Under cash accounting the private grant revenue is recognized when 
received.  However, in the long run the measures should be similar before and after the 
switch to cash accounting.  Second, the FASB standards require that contributions from 
affiliated entities be reported separately from other private gifts, grants, and contracts.  
Affiliated entities are fund raising foundations, booster clubs, and similar organizations 
created to support the institution (NCES, 2000).  This change can be easily handled by 
adding revenue from affiliated entities to revenue from private grants, gifts, and contracts 
during the FASB years.   
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Therefore, with some modifications the measure of revenue from private gifts, 
grants, and contracts should, in theory, be comparable before and after FASB accounting 
changes.  In practice, I find that post-FASB observations are much larger than the pre-
FASB observations, especially for institutions with large amounts of private gifts, grants, 
and contract revenues.  At Yale, for example, private gift, grant, and contract revenues 
increase from 104,446,480 in 1996 to 209,668,992 in 1998.  At Harvard, private gift, 
grant, and contract revenues increase from 158,276,992 in 1996 to 518,060,544 in 1998.  
The measure is often missing in 1997. 
 Tables 20 and 21 show the availability of revenue measures over time and the 
consistency of revenue measures before and after FASB accounting changes.  I do not 
show consistency before and after GASB accounting changes, which were phased in for 
public institutions beginning in 2002.  However, consistency before and after GASB 
accounting changes is similar to consistency before and after FASB accounting changes 
(NCES, 2009).  In Table 2.20, measures of government appropriations are available 
beginning in 1969 and are consistent before and after accounting changes.  Government 
grants and contracts are available beginning in 1975 and are consistent before and after 
FASB accounting changes.  Tuition variables are generally consistent before and after 
accounting changes, but only after making modifications to account for allowances.  The 
measure of tuition excluding institutional allowances is available beginning in 1987 and 
the measure of tuition excluding all allowances is available beginning in 1997. 
In Table 2.21, the measures of private gifts, grants, and contracts and 
endowment/investment revenue are inconsistent before and after FASB accounting 
changes.  Sales of educational activities and auxiliary enterprise revenues are modestly 
 80 
 
comparable (denoted by the letter Z).  Specifically, intra-organizational transfers are 
included as revenues in the Old Finance Component but not in FASB.  However, intra-
organizational transfers are usually a small proportion of total revenue in these 
categories.  Total current revenues are broadly comparable before and after accounting 
changes, but only after making adjustments for tuition allowances and after excluding 
both private grant revenue and endowment/investment revenue. 
 
Limitations and Future Work 
Limitations 
 The HEGIS/IPEDS panel has several immutable limitations.  First, the 
organization is the unit of analysis, rather than the academic sub-unit.  March and Simon 
(1958) note that organizations are often coalitions of competing interests.  A large 
organization, such as the University of Michigan, can be conceived as a collection of 
semi-autonomous organizations that includes a business school, a college of engineering, 
and a medical complex.  For certain research questions – for example, academic program 
adoption, private giving, and sub-unit response to changes in organizational budgeting 
systems – the academic sub-unit, rather than the organization, may be the preferred unit 
of analysis.  Unfortunately, neither HEGIS nor IPEDS collect data at the sub-unit level.   
 Second, the HEGIS/IPEDS panel cannot capture the increasingly “networked” 
nature of colleges and universities, except at a very crude level.  For example, revenues 
and expenditures from university spin-off organizations are not included in the 
HEGIS/IPEDS panel, though these organizations exist somewhere between 
organizational borders and the “external environment.”  Changes in curricula provide 
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another example.  Enrollments are increasingly driven by online courses, but the 
HEGIS/IPEDS panel does not capture the extent to which institutions purchase online 
curricula from external vendors.   In general, scholarship on organizations find that 
auxiliary enterprises and even core competencies are increasingly outsourced to specialist 
organizations (Davis, 2005), such that the organization becomes a network of contracts.  
Although higher education is experiencing similar changes (Mars & Rios-Aguilar, 2010; 
Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004), they are not easily identified in the HEGIS/IPEDS panel. 
 A third limitation is that key variables are unavailable in certain years.  For 
example, average standardized test scores of enrolled students provide an excellent 
measure of institutional selectivity.  However, this measure is unavailable until 2002.  
Fundamental changes in variable definitions over time also limit the utility of the 
HEGIS/IPEDS panel.  For example, measures of endowment revenue, private grant 
revenue, and (therefore) total revenue are incomparable before and after changes in 
FASB and GASB accounting standards. 
 A fourth limitation relates to the legality of providing HEGIS/IPEDS data to the 
public.  In contrast to NCES longitudinal surveys (e.g., NELS:88, ELS:2002) where 
individual identities are confidential, both HEGIS and IPEDS data can be downloaded by 
anyone and the identities of individual institutions are not confidential.  However, certain 
years of data – specifically early releases of data – can only be downloaded by users that 
are affiliated with an institution that reports IPEDS data.  Therefore, it may be that early 
release data are not included in the public release of the HEGIS/IPEDS panel.  In general, 
I will engage NCES in a discussion of legal issues about publicly releasing 
HEGIS/IPEDS data prior to the public release. 
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Future Work 
 Other limitations of the HEGIS/IPEDS panel can be overcome in future work.  
First, I will develop comprehensive explanations and solutions to issues arising from data 
collection efforts amidst different organizational forms (e.g., multi-campus institutions, 
multi-institution systems).  For example, the data for child organizations are sometimes 
reported at a parent institution (e.g., UT Austin) and sometimes at a district office (e.g., 
Los Angeles Community College District).  Understanding these data patterns is 
prerequisite to longitudinal analyses on, for example, community college finance.  
Additionally, I intend to create an allocation solution to the parent-child problem, such 
that organizations are never collapsed into multi-organization observations.   
 Second, I will conduct a more thorough investigation of changes over time in 
sampling and survey components.  The culmination of this investigation will be a set of 
tables illustrating the following: what organizational types are included in HEGIS and 
IPEDS samples over time; what survey components must be completed by each 
organizational type over time; what versions of each survey component must be filled out 
by each organizational type over time; and how does each survey component change over 
time.  Developing this expertise on sampling and survey components is a prerequisite 
step to longitudinal analyses of the for-profit sector, because many for-profit institutions 
fall into and out of the HEGIS and IPEDS universes over time .   
I will continue to add survey components to the HEGIS/IPEDS panel.  After 
additional training in accounting, I will add measures from the Finance Component, 
including measures of expenditures, plant assets, debt, endowment assets, and fund 
balances.  A separate chapter on accounting changes and HEGIS/IPEDS Finance 
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measures will accompany the completion of these measures.  Upon completing the 
Finance measures, I will create measures from other survey components, including 
Graduation Rates, Employee Salaries, Instructional Staff, and Student Financial Aid.   
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Tables 
 
Table 2.1 Availability of HEGIS/IPEDS survey components over time 
 
IC Fall Enrollment Completions Finance Migration 
1966 
  
X 
  1967 
  
X 
  1968 
  
X 
  1969 
 
X X X 
 1970 
 
X X X 
 1971 X X X X 
 1972 
 
X X X 
 1973 X X X X X 
1974 X X X X 
 1975 X X X X 
 1976 X X X X X 
1977 X X X X 
 1978 X X X X 
 1979 X X X X 
 1980 X X X X X 
1981 X X X X 
 1982 X X X X X 
1983 X X X X 
 1984 X X X X 
 1985 X X X X X 
1986 X X X X 
 1987 X X X X 
 1988 X X X X 
 1989 X X X X 
 1990 X X X X 
 1991 X X X X 
 1992 X X X X 
 1993 X X X X 
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1994 X X X X 
 1995 X X X X 
 1996 X X X X 
 1997 X X X X 
 1998 X X X X 
 1999 X X X X 
 2000 X X X X 
 2001 X X X X 
 2002 X X X X 
 2003 X X X X 
 2004 X X X X 
 2005 X X X X 
 2006 X X X X 
 2007 X X X X 
 2008 X X X X 
 2009 X X X X 
 2010 X X X X 
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Table 2.2 Number of institutions in the IC survey by year 
 
Frequency 
1969 2,775 
1970 2,814 
1971 2,843 
1972 2,893 
1973 2,945 
1974 3,015 
1975 3,038 
1976 3,055 
1977 3,068 
1978 3,127 
1979 3,170 
1980 3,188 
1981 3,264 
1982 3,294 
1983 3,327 
1984 3,330 
1985 3,734 
1986 3,714 
1987 12,917 
1988 12,438 
1989 11,727 
1990 10,919 
1991 10,287 
1992 10,264 
1993 10,886 
1994 10,651 
1995 10,508 
1996 10,216 
1997 10,095 
1998 9,896 
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Frequency 
1999 9,744 
2000 9,496 
2001 9,513 
2002 6,896 
2003 6,823 
2004 6,875 
2005 6,804 
2006 6,844 
2007 6,891 
2008 6,902 
2009 7,034 
2010 7,126 
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Table 2.3 Frequency of academic year by sector, 1987 to present 
 Admin BA or higher Two-year Less than two-year  
  Unit  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
1987 170 641 1,960 144 1,267 923 892 533 563 5,769 12,862 
1988 154 641 1,945 120 1,262 849 852 380 516 5,717 12,436 
1989 141 633 1,907 112 1,244 773 877 321 467 5,252 11,727 
1990 143 624 1,873 106 1,224 732 862 301 388 4,666 10,919 
1991 123 623 1,867 114 1,221 629 845 280 361 4,224 10,287 
1992 120 625 1,880 121 1,255 630 811 278 350 4,194 10,264 
1993 126 626 1,976 149 1,272 627 758 277 372 4,703 10,886 
1994 117 631 1,987 172 1,272 616 736 277 340 4,503 10,651 
1995 105 629 2,005 185 1,284 627 746 299 335 4,293 10,508 
1996 96 632 2,004 206 1,284 615 700 306 308 4,065 10,216 
1997 94 635 2,002 217 1,288 599 988 278 303 3,691 10,095 
1998 96 641 2,003 235 1,280 555 965 366 299 3,456 9,896 
1999 91 645 1,998 264 1,269 527 970 365 303 3,312 9,744 
2000 82 647 1,991 294 1,256 492 961 312 292 3,169 9,496 
2001 83 651 1,991 348 1,254 459 932 361 292 3,142 9,513 
2002 81 651 1,686 338 1,192 289 800 312 130 1,417 6,896 
2003 80 655 1,673 312 1,181 274 788 306 132 1,422 6,823 
2004 83 656 1,686 363 1,185 254 806 290 137 1,415 6,875 
2005 83 661 1,648 381 1,165 236 817 272 128 1,413 6,804 
2006 83 660 1,641 422 1,171 229 839 248 111 1,440 6,844 
2007 84 665 1,629 465 1,164 219 859 240 104 1,462 6,891 
2008 84 674 1,631 502 1,150 189 873 239 101 1,459 6,902 
2009 84 674 1,629 542 1,143 195 915 236 94 1,522 7,034 
2010 83 692 1,635 576 1,113 187 986 240 98 1,516 7,126 
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Table 2.4 What institutions are required to complete which IPEDS survey components 
 
BA or higher Two-year Less than two-year 
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  
 
Institutions eligible for Title IV programs accredited at the institutional level; 
Non-accredited institutions granting baccalaureate and higher degrees 
Institutional Characteristics (IC) IC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC 
Fall Enrollments (EF) EF1 EF1 EF1 EF2 EF2 EF2 EF2 EF2 EF2 
Completions (C) C C C C C C C C C 
Salaries (SA) SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA 
Finance (F) F1 F1A F1A F1 F1A F1A F1 F1A F1 
Fall Staff (S) S S S S S S S S S 
Libraries (L) L L L L L L L L L 
          
 
Institutions eligible for Title IV programs accredited at the program level 
Institutional Characteristics (IC) IC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC 
Consolidated Form (CN) CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN 
          
 
Institutions not eligible for Title IV 
Institutional Characteristics (IC) IC4 IC4 IC4 IC4 IC4 IC4 IC4 IC4 IC4 
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Table 2.5 Tabulation of academic year by Title IV eligibility 
 
Not eligible/ 
missing 
Eligible for 
Title IV 
Branch  
Campus 
Limited participation  
in Title IV (1999+) Total 
1997 3,186 6,712 197 0 10,095 
1998 3,060 6,647 189 0 9,896 
1999 3,010 6,550 130 54 9,744 
2000 2,863 6,460 116 57 9,496 
2001 2,733 6,613 116 51 9,513 
2002 165 6,567 126 38 6,896 
2003 171 6,503 105 44 6,823 
2004 152 6,553 132 38 6,875 
2005 138 6,509 127 30 6,804 
2006 101 6,593 124 26 6,844 
2007 108 6,637 120 26 6,891 
2008 93 6,568 217 24 6,902 
2009 154 6,652 211 17 7,034 
2010 111 6,787 207 21 7,126 
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Table 2.6 Examples of institutions collapsed under the DCP collapsing solution 
All University of Illinois campuses (e.g., Urbana Champaign, Springfield) collapsed into University of Illinois Chicago 
All Louisiana community and technical colleges collapsed into LA Technical College – Baton Rouge Campus 
All University of Maine campuses (e.g., Farmington, Augusta, Central Maine Community College) into University of Maine, 
Oreno Campus 
All University of Massachusetts campuses (e.g., Amherst, Dartmouth, Lowell, Medical Center, etc.) collapsed into UMass 
Boston 
All University of Missouri campuses (e.g., St. Louis, Kansas City, Science and Technology) collapsed into the University of 
Missouri-Columbia Campus 
All Rutgers University campuses (e.g., New Brunswick, Newark) collapsed into the Rutgers-Camden campus 
All City University of New York campuses (e.g., Baruch College, Hunter College, Queens College, LaGuardia Community 
College, Bronx Community College, Manhattan Community College) collapsed into CUNY-City College 
All 23 Penn State campuses (e.g., Brandywine, Beaver, Harrisburg, Greater Allegheny, College of Medicine, etc.) collapsed 
into the Penn State-University Park campus 
All University of Texas campuses (e.g., San Antonio, Dallas, Arlington, Tyler, Brownsville, Health Science Center) collapsed 
into the UT Austin campus. 
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Table 2.7 Fall enrollment by gender/ethnicity 
 Available Enrollment variables: Are Enrollment Variables Available by: 
 
Undergrad Undergrad-freshmen Graduate First-professional Attendance (FT vs. PT)? Gender? By ethnicity? 
1969 X 
   
X X 
 1970 X 
 
X X X X 
 1971 X 
 
X X X X 
 1972 X 
 
X X X X 
 1973 X 
 
X X X X 
 1974 X X X X X X 
 1975 X X X X X X 
 1976 X X X X X X 
 1977 X X X X X X X
1978 X X X X X X 
 1979 X X X X X X X
1980 X X X X X X X 
1981 X X X X X X X 
1982 X X X X X X X 
1983 X X X X X X X 
1984 X X X X X X X 
1985 X X X X X X X 
1986 X X X X X X 
 1987 X X X X X X X
1988 X X X X X X 
 1989 X X X X X X X
1990 X X X X X X 
 1991 X X X X X X X
1992 X X X X X X X 
1993 X X X X X X X 
1994 X X X X X X X 
1995 X X X X X X X 
1996 X X X X X X X 
1997 X X X X X X X 
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 Available Enrollment variables: Are Enrollment Variables Available by: 
 
Undergrad Undergrad-freshmen Graduate First-professional Attendance (FT vs. PT)? Gender? By ethnicity? 
1998 X X X X X X X 
1999 X X X X X X X 
2000 X X X X X X X 
2001 X X X X X X X 
2002 X X X X X X X 
2003 X X X X X X X 
2004 X X X X X X X 
2005 X X X X X X X 
2006 X X X X X X X 
2007 X X X X X X X 
2008 X X X X X X X 
2009 X X X X X X X 
2010 X X X X X X X 
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Table 2.8 State Migration/Residence 
 Availability of Data Availability of Specific Variables 
 
Avail? Mandatory? 
State of Residence  
(freshmen, all) 
State of Residence   
(freshmen, recent HS grad) 
In-state  
(freshmen, all) 
In-state  
(freshmen, recent HS grad) 
1973 X X 
  
X 
 1974 
      1975 
      1976 X X X
 
X
 1977 
      1978 
      1979 
      1980 X X X
 
X
 1981 
      1982 X X X
 
X
 1983 
      1984 
      1985 X X X X X X
1986 
      1987 X X X X X X
1988 
      1989 X X X X X X
1990 
      1991 
      1992 
      1993 X X X X X X
1994 
      1995 X X X X X X
1996 
      1997 X X X X X X
1998 
      1999 X X X X X X
2000 
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 Availability of Data Availability of Specific Variables 
 
Avail? Mandatory? 
State of Residence  
(freshmen, all) 
State of Residence   
(freshmen, recent HS grad) 
In-state  
(freshmen, all) 
In-state  
(freshmen, recent HS grad) 
2001 X X X X X X 
2002 X 
 
X X X X 
2003 X X X X X X 
2004 X 
 
X X X X 
2005 X X X X X X 
2006 X 
 
X X X X 
2007 X X X X X X 
2008 X 
 
X X X X 
2009 X X X X X X 
2010 X 
 
X X X X 
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Table 2.9 Enrollment by age-group 
 Data Availability: Measures available by: 
 
Data 
Available? 
Data 
Mandatory? 
Level of Study 
(undergrad, grad, first-prof) 
Attendance 
(full-time, part-time) Gender 
1988 X X X X X 
1989 
  
   
1990 
  
   
1991 
  
   
1992 X X X X X 
1993 
  
   
1994 X X X X X 
1995 
  
   
1996 X X X X X 
1997 
  
   
1998 X X X X X 
1999 
  
   
2000 X X X X X 
2001 X 
 
X   
2002 X X X X X 
2003 X 
 
X   
2004 X X X X X 
2005 X 
 
X   
2006 X X X X X 
2007 X 
 
X   
2008 X X X X X 
2009 X 
 
X   
2010 X X X X X 
 
  
  
 
9
7
 
Table 2.10 Undergraduate tuition and fee variables, graduate tuition and fee variables, room and board variables 
  Tuition and Fees Key: t+f= tuition + fees; t= tuition; f=fees 
 
    
 Data Undergrad Tuition & Fees Graduate Tuition & Fees Room and Board 
 Source Out-state In-state In-dist Out-state In-state In-dist Room Board= days or meals-per-
week 
  t+f t f t+f t f t+f T f t+f t f t+f t f t+f t f  Boardamt Days Meals 
1970 Finance X   X      X   X      X X X  
1971 Finance X   X      X   X      X X X  
1972                        
1973 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1974 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1975 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1976 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1977 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1978 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1979 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1980 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1981 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1982 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1983 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1984 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1985 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1986 IC X   X      X   X      X X X  
1987 IC X   X   X   X   X      X X  X 
1988 IC X   X   X   X   X      X X  X 
1989 IC X   X   X   X   X      X X  X 
1990 IC X   X   X   X   X   X   X X  X 
1991 IC X   X   X   X   X   X   X X  X 
1992 IC X   X   X   X   X   X   X X  X 
1993 IC X   X   X   X   X   X   X X  X 
1994 IC X   X   X   X   X   X   X X  X 
1995 IC X   X   X   X   X   X   X X  X 
1996 IC X   X   X   X   X   X   X X  X 
1997 IC X   X   X   X   X   X   X X  X 
1998 IC X   X   X   X   X   X   X X  X 
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  Tuition and Fees Key: t+f= tuition + fees; t= tuition; f=fees 
 
    
 Data Undergrad Tuition & Fees Graduate Tuition & Fees Room and Board 
 Source Out-state In-state In-dist Out-state In-state In-dist Room Board= days or meals-per-
week 
  t+f t f t+f t f t+f T f t+f t f t+f t f t+f t f  Boardamt Days Meals 
1999 IC X   X   X   X   X   X   X X  X 
2000 IC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
2001 IC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
2002 IC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
2003 IC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
2004 IC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
2005 IC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
2006 IC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
2007 IC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
2008 IC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
2009 IC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
2010 IC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
 
  
  
 
9
9
 
Table 2.11 First professional tuition and fee variables 
 
In-state/out-state 
not designated In-state Out-State 
 
tuit+fees tuit+fees tuit fees tuit+fees tuit fees 
1987 X 
      1988 X 
      1989 X 
      1990 X 
      1991 X 
      1992 X 
      1993 X 
      1994 
 
X
  
X
  1995 
 
X 
  
X 
  1996 
 
X 
  
X 
  1997 
 
X 
  
X 
  1998 
 
X 
  
X 
  1999 
 
X 
  
X 
  2000 
 
X X X X X X
2001 
 
X X X X X X 
2002 
 
X X X X X X 
2003 
 
X X X X X X 
2004 
 
X X X X X X 
2005 
 
X X X X X X 
2006 
 
X X X X X X 
2007 
 
X X X X X X 
2008 
 
X X X X X X 
2009 
 
X X X X X X 
2010 
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Table 2.12 Admissions indicators 
 
# Applying #  Admitted # Enrolled (full-time) # Enrolled (part-time) 
 
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
2002 X X X X X X X X 
2003 X X X X X X X X 
2004 X X X X X X X X 
2005 X X X X X X X X 
2006 X X X X X X X X 
2007 X X X X X X X X 
2008 X X X X X X X X 
2009 X X X X X X X X 
2010 X X X X X X X X 
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Table 2.13 Test score admissions indicators 
 
# and % of students reporting: SAT scores ACT scores 
 
SAT scores ACT scores Math Verbal Writing Math English 
   
25th% 75th% 25th% 75th% 25th% 75th% 25th% 75th% 25th% 75th% 
2002 X X X X X X 
 
 X X X X 
2003 X X X X X X 
 
 X X X X 
2004 X X X X X X 
 
 X X X X 
2005 X X X X X X 
 
 X X X X 
2006 X X X X X X 
 
 X X X X 
2007 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2010 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
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Table 2.14 Change over time in degree classification systems 
System Duration 
Pre-HEGIS System 1966-1970 
HEGIS System 1971-1982 
1980 Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) 1983-1986 
1985 Classification of Instructional Programs 1987-1991 
1990 Classification of Instructional Programs 1992-2002 
2000 Classification of Instructional Programs 2003-2010 
2010 Classification of Instructional Programs 2011+ 
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Table 2.15 Sample organization of degree data, data organized at 6-digit CIP level 
Obs Institution Year Award-
level 
2-digit 
CIP 
Code 
4-digit 
CIP 
Code 
6-digit  
CIP 
code 
6-digit CIP name # of 
degrees  
awarded 
1 The George Washington 
University 
1997 BA 05 05.02 05.0201 African-American/Black 
Studies. 
27 
2 The George Washington 
University 
1997 BA 09 09.09 09.0904 Political Communication 53 
3 The George Washington 
University 
1997 MA 05 05.02 05.0201 African-American/Black 
Studies. 
12 
4 The George Washington 
University 
1997 MA 09 09.09 09.0904 Political Communication 28 
5 The George Washington 
University 
1997 PhD 05 05.02 05.0201 African-American/Black 
Studies. 
5 
6 The George Washington 
University 
1997 PhD 09 09.09 09.0904 Political Communication 7 
7 The George Washington 
University 
1998 BA 05 05.02 05.0201 African-American/Black 
Studies. 
32 
8 The George Washington 
University 
1998 BA 09 09.09 09.0904 Political Communication 61 
9 The George Washington 
University 
1998 MA 05 05.02 05.0201 African-American/Black 
Studies. 
14 
10 The George Washington 
University 
1998 MA 09 09.09 09.0904 Political Communication 39 
11 The George Washington 
University 
1998 PhD 05 05.02 05.0201 African-American/Black 
Studies. 
3 
12 The George Washington 
University 
1998 PhD 09 09.09 09.0904 Political Communication 5 
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Table 2.16 Degree production variables available over time 
 
Measures Available by Award-Level Measures available by: 
 
LT 1yr LT 2yr Assoc
a
 LT 4yr BA Post-BA MA PhD First Prof Gender Ethnicity? 
         
(e.g., Law) 
 
Broad degree codes All degree codes 
1966 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1967 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1968 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1969 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1970 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1971 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1972 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1973 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1974 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1975 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1976 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X X 
 1977 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X X 
 1978 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1979 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X X 
 1980 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1981 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X X 
 1982 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1983 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1984 X X X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1985 X X X 
 
X 
 
X X X X X 
 1986 X X X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
  1987 X X X X X X X X X X X 
 1988 X X X X X X X X X X 
  1989 X X X X X X X X X X X 
 1990 X X X X X X X X X X X 
 1991 X X X X X X X X X X X 
 1992 X X X X X X X X X X X 
 1993 X X X X X X X X X X X 
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Measures Available by Award-Level Measures available by: 
 
LT 1yr LT 2yr Assoc
a
 LT 4yr BA Post-BA MA PhD First Prof Gender Ethnicity? 
         
(e.g., Law) 
 
Broad degree codes All degree codes 
1994 X X X X X X X X X X X 
 1995 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
1996 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
1997 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
1998 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
1999 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2000 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2001 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2002 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2003 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2004 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2005 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2006 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2007 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2008 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2009 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2010 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
a
 Production measures for associate degrees are incomplete from 1966 through 1982, during which many sub-baccalaureate 
degree programs were covered by the separate “Handbook VI” degree classification system.  Reliable measures of associate‟s 
degrees begin in 1983 with the inception of the 1980 CIP. 
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Table 2.17 Sample Statement of Changes in Fund Balances, 1975-1996 
 Current funds (3) Loan 
funds 
(4) Endowment 
funds 
(5) Annuity/life 
income funds  
(6) Plant 
funds 
 (1) 
Unrestricted  
(2) 
Restricted 
    
(1) Additions       
(2) Deductions       
(3) Total transfers, in 
(out) 
      
(4) Net increase 
(decrease) 
      
(5) Beginning year 
fund balance 
      
(6) End year fund 
balance 
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Table 2.18 Part A – current fund revenues by source, recreated from the 1990 finance survey component instrument 
Row  (1) Unrestricted (2) Restricted (3) Total 
1 Tuition and fees    
 Government appropriations    
2 Federal    
3 Federal through state channels    
4 State    
5 Local    
 Government grants and contracts    
6 Federal    
7 State    
8 Local    
9 Private gifts, grants, and contracts    
10 Endowment income    
11 Sales and services of educational activities    
12 Auxiliary enterprises    
13 Hospitals    
14 Other sources    
15 Independent operations    
16 Total current funds revenues    
 
  
  
 
1
0
8
 
Table 2.19 Part D – revenues and investment return, recreated from 2006 finance survey instrument for private not-for-profit 
institutions 
Row Source of Funds Total Amount 
1 Tuition and fees 
(net of allowance reported in Part C, line 08) 
 
 Government Appropriations  
2 Federal appropriations  
3 State appropriations  
4 Local appropriations  
 Government Grants and Contracts  
5 Federal grants and contracts  
6 State grants and contracts  
7 Local grants and contracts  
 Private Gifts, Grants, and Contracts  
8 Private gifts, grants, and contracts  
9 Contributions from affiliated entities  
10 Investment return  
11 Sales and services of educational activities  
12 Sales and services of auxiliary enterprises 
(net of allowance reported in Part C, line 09) 
 
13 Hospital revenue  
14 Independent operations revenue  
15 Other revenue 
calculated value= [D16-(D01+…+D14)] 
 
16 Total revenues and investment return 
(copied from line B01) 
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Table 2.20 Availability of revenue measures over time, consistency before and after FASB accounting changes 
 
Tuition and Fees Govt appropriations Govt grants + contracts 
 
Gross (includes 
Allowances) 
No inst 
allowances No allowances Fed State Local Fed State Local 
Measure consistent before/after FASB? 
 
X X 
 
X X X X X X 
Measure Available? 
1969 X 
  
X X X 
   1970 X 
  
X X X 
   1971 X 
  
X X X 
   1972 X 
  
X X X 
   1973 X 
  
X X X 
   1974 X 
  
X X X 
   1975 X 
  
X X X X X X
1976 X 
  
X X X X X X 
1977 X 
  
X X X X X X 
1978 X 
  
X X X X X X 
1979 X 
  
X X X X X X 
1980 X 
  
X X X X X X 
1981 X 
  
X X X X X X 
1982 X 
  
X X X X X X 
1983 X 
  
X X X X X X 
1984 X 
  
X X X X X X 
1985 X 
  
X X X X X X 
1986 X 
  
X X X X X X 
1987 X X
 
X X X X X X 
1988 X X 
 
X X X X X X 
1989 X X 
 
X X X X X X 
1990 X X 
 
X X X X X X 
1991 X X 
 
X X X X X X 
1992 X X 
 
X X X X X X 
1993 X X 
 
X X X X X X 
  
 
1
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Tuition and Fees Govt appropriations Govt grants + contracts 
 
Gross (includes 
Allowances) 
No inst 
allowances No allowances Fed State Local Fed State Local 
1994 X X 
 
X X X X X X 
1995 X X 
 
X X X X X X 
1996 X X 
 
X X X X X X 
1997 X X X X X X X X X 
1998 X X X X X X X X X 
1999 X X X X X X X X X 
2000 X X X X X X X X X 
2001 X X X X X X X X X 
2002 X X X X X X X X X 
2003 X X X X X X X X X 
2004 X X X X X X X X X 
2005 X X X X X X X X X 
2006 X X X X X X X X X 
2007 X X X X X X X X X 
2008 X X X X X X X X X 
2009 X X X X X X X X X 
2010 X X X X X X X X X 
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Table 2.21 Availability of revenue measures over time, consistency before and after FASB accounting changes 
       Total Current Revenue 
 
Private grants,  
gifts, & contracts 
endow/ 
invest 
sales of educ 
activities 
Auxiliary Hospitals 
ind operations/ 
other rev 
w/  
Allowances 
No inst 
allowances 
No inst allow 
No priv grant 
No endow 
Measure consistent before/after FASB? 
 
  Z Z     Z 
Measure available? 
1969  X X X      
1970  X X X      
1971  X X X X     
1972  X X X X     
1973  X X X X     
1974  X X X X     
1975 X X X X X X X   
1976 X X X X X X X   
1977 X X X X X X X   
1978 X X X X X X X   
1979 X X X X X X X   
1980 X X X X X X X   
1981 X X X X X X X   
1982 X X X X X X X   
1983 X X X X X X X   
1984 X X X X X X X   
1985 X X X X X X X   
1986 X X X X X X X   
1987 X X X X X X X X X 
1988 X X X X X X X X X 
1989 X X X X X X X X X 
1990 X X X X X X X X X 
1991 X X X X X X X X X 
1992 X X X X X X X X X 
  
 
1
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       Total Current Revenue 
 
Private grants,  
gifts, & contracts 
endow/ 
invest 
sales of educ 
activities 
Auxiliary Hospitals 
ind operations/ 
other rev 
w/  
Allowances 
No inst 
allowances 
No inst allow 
No priv grant 
No endow 
1993 X X X X X X X X X 
1994 X X X X X X X X X 
1995 X X X X X X X X X 
1996 X X X X X X X X X 
1997 X X X X X X X X X 
1998 X X X X X X X X X 
1999 X X X X X X X X X 
2000 X X X X X X X X X 
2001 X X X X X X X X X 
2002 X X X X X X X X X 
2003 X X X X X X X X X 
2004 X X X X X X X X X 
2005 X X X X X X X X X 
2006 X X X X X X X X X 
2007 X X X X X X X X X 
2008 X X X X X X X X X 
2009 X X X X X X X X X 
2010 X X X X X X X X X 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Organizational Forms Present in HEGIS Survey Components 
Institutions were required to complete different HEGIS survey components 
depending on the category and sub-category of organizational form.  The categories and 
sub-categories of organizational form were as follows: 
 Individual institution 
 Multi-campus institution 
o All campuses (present only in data from IC Component) 
o central office (present only in data from IC Component) 
o Main campus (present in data from all survey components) 
o Branch campus (present in data from all survey components) 
 System 
o All campuses/institutions (present only in data from IC 
Component) 
o System office (present only in data from IC Component) 
o Individual institution (present in data from all survey components) 
o Main campus (present in data from all survey components) 
o Branch campus (present in data from all survey components) 
All of the above categories and sub-categories of organizational form are present 
in HEGIS IC data.  In the Finance, Completions, Fall Enrollment, and State Migration 
Survey Components data are reported only at the individual institution, main campus, or 
branch campus levels; data are not reported for the all campuses/institutions or 
central/system office levels.  Unfortunately, although HEGIS data indicate whether the 
  
114 
 
observation is part of an individual institution, main campus, or branch campus, the data 
do not provide indicators about the parent-child relationship. 
 
Appendix 2: Patterns of Parent-Child Relationships By Survey Component 
 Before introducing alternative solutions to problems posed by the parent-child 
relationship, I show data patterns of the parent child relationship over time for different 
survey components.  During IPEDS years, Parent-child patterns can be described using 
parent-child “flag” variables.  These flag variables exist for each survey component (e.g., 
Completions, Finance, Fall Enrollment).  They describe whether the institution is a 
parent, a child, or neither.  From 1987 through 2000 parent-child flags were included in 
the dataset of each individual survey component.  Beginning in 2001, parent-child flags 
for all survey components were included in the IC Survey Component.  It is important to 
note that HEGIS data do not include information on parent-child relationships.  This 
problem is not particularly crucial; if I know that an institution is a child during IPEDS 
years, I can define that institution as a child during HEGIS years as well. 
Appendix Table 2.1 shows the parent child relationships for the Finance Survey 
Component, using Finance Survey data (parent child indicators for the Finance Survey 
Component are also available on the IC data).  Column (1) shows institutions that are 
neither parents nor children or for whom the flag variable is missing.  Column (2) refers 
to parents, meaning that the institution shows finance data for multiple institutions. 
Column (3) refers to child institutions for the years 1987 through 1994.  Beginning in 
1995, the parent-child flag indicated whether an institution was a “child with no data” 
(Column 4), or a “child with some data” (Column 7).  A child with some data typically 
reports revenue and expenditure data but may report asset data at the parent level.  
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Beginning in 2001, child institutions were further disaggregated into those that reported 
their data to a parent institution (Columns 5, Column 8) and those that report their data to 
a system office (Column 6, Column 9).  Note that there are very few child institutions 
that do not report any data (Columns 4-6).  Parent child flags were unavailable in 2000. 
Appendix Table 2.2 shows parent child relationships for the Finance Component, 
using parent-child flags available in the IC data for the years 2001 through 2010.  In fact, 
I merge data from the IC Component to data from the Finance Component for the years 
2001 through 2010 to create Appendix Table 2.1.  Each parent institution (Appendix 
Table 2.2, Column 2) represents at least one child institution.  Note that frequencies for 
columns representing child institutions with some data (Columns 8-9) are very similar to 
those for Appendix Table 2.1.  However, Appendix Table 2.2 has many child institutions 
with no data (Columns 5-6) whereas Appendix Table 2.1 has very few such institutions.  
This is because child institutions with no data are not required to fill out the finance 
Component. 
Appendix Table 2.3 shows results for two variables I constructed.  First, Columns 
(1) and (2) show whether an institution is a child and has no revenue variables (defined as 
total current revenues are missing).  Children with no revenue variables are concentrated 
in the years 1987, 1988, and 1998.  Second, Columns (3) and (4) show whether an 
institution is ever a child with no revenue variables.  As described later in this section, I 
use this latter variable to create my parent-child solution. 
Appendix Table 2.4 shows-parent child relationships for the Completions 
Component during IPEDS years, using data from the Completions Component.  In 
contrast to finance data, child institutions with partial data do not exist.  There are very 
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few child institutions with no data. These are concentrated in 1995.  Appendix Table 2.5 
shows parent child indicators for the Completions Component, using data from the IC 
Component.  Note that in comparison to Appendix Table 2.4, Appendix Table 2.5 has 
more child institutions with no data because these institutions typically do not fill out the 
Completions Component.  Appendix Table 2.6, using data from the Completions 
Component, shows institutions that are children and have no degree data (Columns 1 and 
2) and institutions that were ever children with no degree data.
8
  Note that child 
institutions with no degree data are concentrated in 1995, when the number of institutions 
in the completion Component increased to 8,712 from 5,154 in 1994. 
Appendix Table 2.7 shows parent child relationships for the Fall Enrollment 
Component (which includes enrollment by gender and ethnicity, enrollment by age, and 
state migration) during IPEDS years, using data from the Fall Enrollment Component.  
Note that only instance of a child institution with no data occurs in in 2004.  Appendix 
Table 2.8 shows parent child relationships for the Fall Enrollment Component using data 
from the IC Component.  Child institutions with no data in Appendix Table 2.8 are not 
required to complete the Fall Enrollment Component and hence do not appear in 
Appendix Table 2.7 
                                                 
8
 I define “no degree data” as an institution that has total degrees of any kind equal missing or zero. 
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Appendix Table 2.1 Finance parent child relationships from Finance Survey (does not include for-profit institutions) 
 (1) 
NA/ 
Missing 
(2) 
Parent 
(3) 
Child 
(1987-
1994) 
(4) 
Child no 
data 
(1995-
2000) 
(5) 
Child no 
data 
Report w/ 
parent 
(2001+) 
(6) 
Child no 
data 
Report w/ 
system 
(2001+) 
(7) 
Child w/ 
some data 
(1995-
2000) 
(8) 
Child w/ 
some data 
Report w/ 
parent 
(2001+) 
(9) 
Child w/ 
some data 
Report w/ 
system 
(2001+) 
(10) 
Tot 
1987 3,293 77 234 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,604 
1988 3,313 75 238 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,626 
1989 3,216 77 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,409 
1990 3,284 61 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,408 
1991 3,376 61 209 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,646 
1992 3,372 69 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,512 
1993 3,353 110 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,542 
1994 3,370 115 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,581 
1995 3,308 135 0 0 0 0 130 0 0 3,573 
1996 3,019 125 0 0 0 0 132 0 0 3,276 
1997 2,953 131 0 0 0 0 173 0 0 3,257 
1998 2,940 139 0 117 0 0 177 0 0 3,373 
1999 2,830 130 0 2 0 0 179 0 0 3,141 
2000 4,038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,038 
2001 3,581 138 0 0 5 1 0 175 35 3,935 
2002 3,491 146 0 0 4 10 0 181 30 3,862 
2003 3,471 152 0 0 9 0 0 182 41 3,855 
2004 3,392 124 0 0 0 0 0 121 188 3,825 
2005 3,346 107 0 0 0 0 0 171 240 3,864 
2006 3,315 109 0 0 0 0 0 179 264 3,867 
2007 3,289 104 0 0 0 0 0 166 275 3,834 
2008 3,259 98 0 0 0 0 0 167 297 3,821 
2009 3,270 93 0 0 0 0 0 166 315 3,844 
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Appendix Table 2.2 Finance Parent Child Relations from IC Survey (does not include for-profit institutions, does not include 
system offices) 
 
(1) 
NA/ 
Missing 
(2) 
Parent 
(5) 
Child no data 
Report w/ parent 
(2001+) 
(6) 
Child no data 
Report w/ system 
(2001+) 
(8) 
Child w/ some data 
Report w/ parent 
(2001+) 
(9) 
Child w/ some data 
Report w/ system 
(2001+) 
(10) 
Tot 
2001 4,392 110 274 9 174 49 5,008 
2002 3,629 120 272 23 183 33 4,260 
2003 3,519 125 341 13 182 41 4,221 
2004 3,484 117 328 26 175 78 4,208 
2005 3,405 94 279 23 121 188 4,110 
2006 3,339 82 204 23 171 241 4,060 
2007 3,292 81 193 12 179 264 4,021 
2008 3,269 76 186 12 166 275 3,984 
2009 3,232 70 179 24 167 299 3,971 
2010 3,242 65 178 0 166 314 3,965 
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Appendix Table 2.3 Child with no revenue variables, ever a child with no revenue variables 
  
(1) 
Child-no-rev=0 
(2) 
Child-no-rev=1 
(3) 
Ever-child-no-rev=0 
(4) 
Ever-child-no-rev=1 
(5) 
Total  
1969 2,472 0 2,433 39 2,472 
1970 2,493 0 2,450 43 2,493 
1971 2,706 0 2,652 54 2,706 
1972 2,804 0 2,748 56 2,804 
1973 2,946 0 2,880 66 2,946 
1974 3,015 0 2,950 65 3,015 
1975 3,038 0 2,970 68 3,038 
1976 3,055 0 2,986 69 3,055 
1977 3,073 0 3,003 70 3,073 
1978 3,130 0 3,062 68 3,130 
1979 3,173 0 3,105 68 3,173 
1980 3,189 0 3,122 67 3,189 
1981 3,269 0 3,185 84 3,269 
1982 3,294 0 3,208 86 3,294 
1983 3,286 0 3,200 86 3,286 
1984 3,302 0 3,230 72 3,302 
1985 3,379 0 3,302 77 3,379 
1986 3,388 0 3,311 77 3,388 
1987 3,485 119 3,444 160 3,604 
1988 3,499 127 3,471 155 3,626 
1989 3,401 8 3,355 54 3,409 
1990 3,408 0 3,366 42 3,408 
1991 3,543 103 3,512 134 3,646 
1992 3,512 0 3,455 57 3,512 
1993 3,542 0 3,488 54 3,542 
1994 3,581 0 3,518 63 3,581 
1995 3,573 0 3,517 56 3,573 
1996 3,276 0 3,236 40 3,276 
1997 3,256 1 3,226 31 3,257 
  
 
1
2
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(1) 
Child-no-rev=0 
(2) 
Child-no-rev=1 
(3) 
Ever-child-no-rev=0 
(4) 
Ever-child-no-rev=1 
(5) 
Total  
1998 3,256 117 3,246 127 3,373 
1999 3,141 0 3,111 30 3,141 
2000 4,038 0 4,003 35 4,038 
2001 3,934 1 3,900 35 3,935 
2002 3,861 1 3,828 34 3,862 
2003 3,853 2 3,820 35 3,855 
2004 3,824 1 3,792 33 3,825 
2005 3,863 1 3,800 64 3,864 
2006 3,865 2 3,803 64 3,867 
2007 3,832 2 3,771 63 3,834 
2008 3,821 0 3,758 63 3,821 
2009 3,844 0 3,781 63 3,844 
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Appendix Table 2.4 Parent-child indicator for completions survey, from completions data 
 
(1)  
NA/Missing 
(2)  
Parent 
(3)  
Child w/ no data 
(4)  
Total 
1987 4,874 51 0 4,925 
1988 5,564 42 1 5,607 
1989 5,757 32 0 5,789 
1990 4,852 25 0 4,877 
1991 4,995 19 0 5,014 
1992 5,015 27 0 5,042 
1993 5,109 48 0 5,157 
1994 5,091 63 0 5,154 
1995 8,442 103 167 8,712 
1996 6,554 104 0 6,658 
1997 6,373 113 0 6,486 
1998 7,087 86 0 7,173 
1999 6,151 76 0 6,227 
2000 6,670 0 0 6,670 
2001 6,419 99 21 6,539 
2002 6,383 92 16 6,491 
2003 6,488 86 8 6,582 
2004 6,553 81 2 6,636 
2005 6,672 39 10 6,721 
2006 6,745 21 6 6,772 
2007 6,763 19 3 6,785 
2008 6,896 15 2 6,913 
2009 7,017 13 0 7,030 
2010 7,255 11 0 7,266 
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Appendix Table 2.5 Parent-child indicator for completions survey, from IC data 
 
(1)  
NA/Missing 
(2)  
Parent 
(3)  
Child w/ no data 
(4)  
Total 
2001 9,235 100 178 9,513 
2002 6,594 101 201 6,896 
2003 6,568 87 168 6,823 
2004 6,627 83 165 6,875 
2005 6,699 41 64 6,804 
2006 6,793 21 30 6,844 
2007 6,845 19 27 6,891 
2008 6,862 16 24 6,902 
2009 7,001 13 20 7,034 
2010 7,100 11 15 7,126 
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Appendix Table 2.6 Child with no degree variables, ever a child with no degree variables 
  
(1) 
Child-no-degree=0 
(2) 
Child-no-degree=1 
(3) 
Ever-child-no-degree=0 
(4) 
Ever-child-no-degree=1 
(5) 
Total  
1966 2,172 0 2,169 3 2,172 
1967 2,299 0 2,295 4 2,299 
1968 2,338 0 2,334 4 2,338 
1969 2,468 0 2,464 4 2,468 
1970 2,557 0 2,553 4 2,557 
1971 2,623 0 2,618 5 2,623 
1972 2,728 0 2,722 6 2,728 
1973 2,778 0 2,772 6 2,778 
1974 2,878 0 2,870 8 2,878 
1975 2,893 0 2,886 7 2,893 
1976 2,933 0 2,926 7 2,933 
1977 2,954 0 2,946 8 2,954 
1978 3,010 0 3,001 9 3,010 
1979 3,059 0 3,049 10 3,059 
1980 3,082 0 3,073 9 3,082 
1981 3,175 0 3,166 9 3,175 
1982 3,187 0 3,177 10 3,187 
1983 3,201 0 3,191 10 3,201 
1984 3,230 0 3,222 8 3,230 
1985 3,276 0 3,268 8 3,276 
1986 3,295 0 3,287 8 3,295 
1987 4,925 0 4,918 7 4,925 
1988 5,607 0 5,599 8 5,607 
1989 5,789 0 5,780 9 5,789 
1990 4,877 0 4,870 7 4,877 
1991 5,014 0 4,997 17 5,014 
1992 5,042 0 5,024 18 5,042 
1993 5,157 0 5,138 19 5,157 
1994 5,154 0 5,143 11 5,154 
  
 
1
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(1) 
Child-no-degree=0 
(2) 
Child-no-degree=1 
(3) 
Ever-child-no-degree=0 
(4) 
Ever-child-no-degree=1 
(5) 
Total  
1995 8,545 167 8,545 167 8,712 
1996 6,658 0 6,639 19 6,658 
1997 6,486 0 6,460 26 6,486 
1998 7,173 0 7,144 29 7,173 
1999 6,227 0 6,195 32 6,227 
2000 6,670 0 6,629 41 6,670 
2001 6,539 0 6,511 28 6,539 
2002 6,491 0 6,462 29 6,491 
2003 6,581 1 6,554 28 6,582 
2004 6,636 0 6,610 26 6,636 
2005 6,721 0 6,691 30 6,721 
2006 6,772 0 6,740 32 6,772 
2007 6,785 0 6,752 33 6,785 
2008 6,913 0 6,880 33 6,913 
2009 7,030 0 6,999 31 7,030 
2010 7,266 0 7,234 32 7,266 
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Appendix Table 2.7 Parent-child indicator for fall enrollments survey, from fall enrollments data 
 
(1)  
NA/Missing 
(2)  
Parent 
(3)  
Child 
w/ no 
data 
(4)  
Total 
1987 6,485 52 0 6,537 
1988 6,449 59 0 6,508 
1989 5,324 31 0 5,355 
1990 5,564 26 0 5,590 
1991 5,273 23 0 5,296 
1992 6,464 15 0 6,479 
1993 6,589 28 0 6,617 
1994 8,775 52 0 8,827 
1995 8,494 88 0 8,582 
1996 8,378 107 0 8,485 
1997 6,566 100 0 6,666 
1998 6,359 102 0 6,461 
1999 7,053 84 0 7,137 
2000 6,144 72 0 6,216 
2001 6,476 80 0 6,556 
2002 6,469 91 0 6,560 
2003 6,457 69 0 6,526 
2004 6,508 67 1 6,576 
2005 6,612 17 0 6,629 
2006 6,679 10 0 6,689 
2007 6,745 3 0 6,748 
2008 6,757 4 0 6,761 
2009 6,885 1 0 6,886 
2010 6,984 6 0 6,990 
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Appendix Table 2.8 Parent-child indicator for fall enrollments survey, from IC data 
 
(1)  
NA/Missing 
(2)  
Parent 
(3)  
Child 
w/ no 
data 
(4)  
Total 
2001 9,296 80 137 9,513 
2002 6,626 91 179 6,896 
2003 6,611 68 144 6,823 
2004 6,670 67 138 6,875 
2005 6,762 17 25 6,804 
2006 6,825 10 9 6,844 
2007 6,885 3 3 6,891 
2008 6,894 4 4 6,902 
2009 7,032 1 1 7,034 
2010 7,108 6 12 7,126 
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Chapter 3 :  
The Adoption and Production of Master's Degrees by U.S. Colleges and Universities 
 
Mendota Seminary was founded in 1893 in Mendota, Illinois.  In 1912, the 
seminary moved to Aurora, 40 miles west of Chicago, where it was renamed Aurora 
College.  The 1973 Carnegie Commission classified Aurora College as a “Liberal Arts II” 
college, meaning that curricular offerings were primarily in undergraduate liberal-arts 
majors, but that the college was unselective.  From 1969 to 1979 full time equivalent 
(FTE) undergraduate enrollments declined from 931 to 644.  Enrollment decline 
represented a threat to organizational survival because tuition accounted for 59% of total 
current revenues in 1969.
9
  
In 1980 Aurora College adopted master‟s degrees for the first time. 10  Two years 
later the first master‟s degrees were awarded; 23 students received master‟s degrees in 
business administration and 11 students received master‟s degrees in criminal justice.  In 
1985 Aurora College changed its name to Aurora University and began granting 
additional master‟s degrees: information sciences in 1985; teacher education and 
recreation management in 1986; social work in 1987; and educational administration in 
1994.  The number of master‟s degrees awarded annually at Aurora increased from 34 in 
1982, to 170 in 1990, and to 565 in 2000. In 2009, Aurora awarded 650 master‟s degrees, 
                                                 
9
 Statistics about Aurora College finances and degrees are based on author‟s calculations from survey data. 
10
 Master‟s degree adoption is defined as two years prior to the year the degree was first awarded. 
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241 in teacher education, 188 in educational administration, 119 in social work, 68 in 
business administration, and 24 in recreation management.  
The history of Aurora University raises two research questions.  What factors 
explain the adoption and of new master‟s degrees by colleges and universities (herein 
institutions)?  What factors explain the production (i.e., number of degrees conferred 
annually) of master‟s degrees by institutions?  The annual U.S. production of master‟s 
degrees increased from 290,000 in 1987 – 29% of the total number of bachelor‟s degrees 
awarded that year – to 670,000 in 2009 – 41% of the total number of bachelor‟s degrees 
awarded that year.
11
   
Empirical research on the proliferation of master‟s degrees remains scant.  
Conrad, Haworth, and Millar (1993) analyze the attributes of different master‟s programs 
and student experiences in these programs. Other contributions focus on particular 
master‟s degrees (e.g., Baker, Orr, & Young, 2007), often in relation to professional 
associations (e.g., Khurana, 2007), or discuss the growth of master‟s degrees as part of a 
larger research question (e.g., Gumport & Snydman, 2002).  Kraatz and Zajac (1996) find 
that liberal arts colleges adopted vocational baccalaureate degrees during a period of 
changing student preferences and declines in the “traditional” college-age population, but 
no research has examined the growth of master‟s degrees from the perspective of degree 
granting institutions.   
I derive testable hypotheses about the adoption and production of master‟s 
degrees from three theoretical perspectives.  Resource dependence theory argues that 
institutions adopt and produce master‟s degrees in response to declines in “traditional” 
revenues (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Research on the pursuit of prestige implies that the 
                                                 
11
 Author‟s calculation based on IPEDS survey data. 
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production of master‟s degrees increases because institutions pursue prestige by 
maximizing revenue from all sources (Bowen, 1980; Winston, 1999), including master‟s 
degrees.  Finally, drawing from human capital theory (Becker, 1964; Goldin & Katz, 
2008), institutions adopt degrees associated with occupations demanded by the labor 
market.   
I test these hypotheses by applying panel modeling methods to a panel dataset of 
all accredited institutions from 1969 to 2009.  I analyze the total annual production of 
master‟s degrees.  I also analyze the adoption of specific master‟s degree programs – 
including business, education, health, computer science, engineering, psychology, and 
biological sciences – which collectively account for 75% of all master‟s degrees awarded 
in 2009.  
 Results from statistical analyses support different narratives for different kinds of 
institutions.  In support of resource dependence theory, non-prestigious private 
institutions adopt/produce master‟s degrees in interdisciplinary social science fields in 
response to declines in freshman enrollments and when alternative revenues are weak.  
Liberal arts colleges with strong alternative revenues do not adopt master‟s degrees at all, 
implying that master‟s degrees represent an option of last resort for institutions with a 
historical mission of undergraduate education.  The results for prestigious research 
universities are mostly consistent with the literature on the pursuit of prestige; research 
universities enjoy strong student demand for master‟s degrees and increase the 
production of master‟s degrees even as alternative revenue streams grow.  I discuss the 
implications of these results for the equity and efficiency goals of education policy, and 
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for the literature on vertical stratification of institutions (e.g., Cheslock & Gianneschi, 
2008). 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Labor Market Demand for Skills 
I derive three sets of hypotheses from three theoretical perspectives.  The first 
hypothesis argues that institutions adopt degrees that are demanded by the labor market.  
Both human capital theory and “functionalism” in sociology share the idea that advances 
in technology cause changes in the division of labor, creating demand for new skills.  In 
economics, Goldin and Katz (2008) argue that technology is “skill biased”; firms require 
highly educated workers in order to exploit technological advances.  For example, 
Chandler (1977) argues that advances in technology (e.g., transportation and 
refrigeration) allowed entrepreneurs to capitalize on economies of scale, leading to the 
emergence of the large corporation.  In turn, the rise of the large corporation increased 
demand for college educated labor because managing the logistics of bureaucracy 
required high levels of literacy, numeracy, and communication skills (Brown, 1995).  In 
sociology, Clark (1962, p. 2) reflects on post-World War II economic growth: 
technology alters nearly all institutions. Not the least of the alterations is seen in 
technology's effect on the role of education. Our age demands armies of skilled 
technicians and professional experts, and to the task of preparing these men the 
educational system is increasingly dedicated. 
 
 These ideas inform a hypothesis about institutional behavior.  Technological 
advances create demand for workers possessing the skills to exploit these advances 
(Goldin & Katz, 2008).  A shortage of skilled workers causes wages to increase.  
Individuals invest in human capital because they expect a positive return on their 
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investment (Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1962).  Ceteris paribus, individuals will invest in 
skills related to occupations experiencing skill shortages because these are associated 
with the highest wages.   Therefore institutions that desire strong enrollments adopt 
degrees associated with occupations experiencing strong labor market demand.  
H1: Institutions adopt academic programs related to occupations demanded by the labor 
market. 
 This hypothesis also represents a policy ideal for policymakers interested in 
economic growth.  Policymakers fund postsecondary education, in part, because of the 
perceived relationship between human capital investment and regional economic growth 
(Grubb & Lazerson, 2004; Schultz, 1962).  Policymakers want institutions to focus on 
degree programs associated with occupations that are experiencing growth in total 
employment (e.g., nursing) because graduates from these programs are likely to find 
employment.  Policymakers also want institutions to focus on degree programs associated 
with growing wages because wage growth implies a shortage of skilled labor.  When 
shortages of skilled labor force firms to raise wages, firms may relocate operations to 
regions where labor is less expensive. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Summary of the theory.  I derive a second set of hypotheses from resource 
dependence theory (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Whereas economics 
often assumes that firms pursue the goal of profit maximization, resource dependence 
theory highlights the goals of survival, autonomy, and power.   All organizations require 
resources from the external environment to survive (Parsons, 1956).  Organizations desire 
a predictable flow of resources because uncertainty undermines survival.  For example, 
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the increasing volatility in state higher education appropriations (Doyle & Delaney, 2009) 
may compel public universities to seek more stable revenue sources.  Resource 
dependence theory defines autonomy and power as two sides of the same coin.  
Organizations dependent on resources from a particular organization are beholden to the 
performance requirements of that organization, undermining autonomy.  Therefore, 
organizations attempt to avoid resource exchanges that entail unfavorable power 
asymmetries and seek exchanges entailing favorable power asymmetries.  
 Dependence is the key concept in resource dependence theory.  Dependence 
occurs when a particular resource is (1) important for organizational survival, (2) other 
organizations have discretion over the distribution of that resource, and (3) few 
alternative sources for that resource exist.  Resource importance can be measured as the 
proportion of total inputs or outputs accounted for by that exchange.
12
 For example, 
student enrollments represent the primary revenue-source for non-prestigious liberal arts 
colleges whereas prestigious liberal arts colleges generate revenues from enrollments, 
endowments, and donations.  Resource discretion refers to obligations the focal 
organization must fulfill to obtain the resource from the second organization.  
Organizations prefer resources that come with few strings attached. For example, public 
institutions prefer unconditional state appropriations over performance funding 
conditional on increasing graduation rates (Dougherty & Hong, 2005).   
Finally, dependence increases when there are few alternative organizations that 
can provide a critical resource.  Organizational relationships with local, state, or federal 
governments often involve problematic dependencies because resources provided by the 
                                                 
12
 Resource criticality is another component of resource importance. A critical resource is one that the 
organization cannot function without. For example, organization typically cannot function without 
electricity even though it represents as small proportion of total inputs. 
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government often cannot be obtained elsewhere.   Whereas regional state colleges have 
an unfavorable asymmetric relationship with state governments, prestigious public 
universities have many revenue sources and may enjoy countervailing power over the 
state in that the state depends on these institutions to attract high-innovation industries 
and to retain high-ability individuals. 
Resource dependence theory describes a litany of behavioral repertoires 
organizations can use to avoid unfavorable dependencies.  When dependence results from 
reliance on a single critical resource exchange, the most direct solution is 
diversification.
13
  Diversification can occur through the development of substitutable 
exchanges, such as when cereal manufacturers began to produce cereal bars, or more 
radically by moving into entirely new industries.  The adoption of master‟s degrees can 
be thought of a substitutable exchange for undergraduate enrollment revenue. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978, p. 131) note that diversification often involves mission drift, that is “the 
tendency for organizations to redefine their stated goals to fit new contingencies in the 
environment ….[permitting] the organization to take on new tasks or activities, lessening 
dependence on old environments and activities.”   
Most empirical contributions to research dependence theory analyze the responses 
of corporations to dependencies that cannot be attenuated through diversification.  These 
responses, largely outside the scope of the present research, include compliance, mergers, 
cooptation, and the formation of alliances or professional associations to gain 
countervailing control.
14
  Empirical support for these responses has been mixed (Davis & 
                                                 
13
 Diversification is defined as “altering the purposes and structure of the organization so that it no longer 
requires only a limited range of inputs or serves only a few markets” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 109). 
14
 First, organizations may simply comply with demands or seek a stronger relationship with the 
organization providing scarce resources.  For example, Covaleski (1988) shows that the University of 
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Cobb, 2009).  Resource dependence theory is a child of the 1960s and 1970s and the 
behavioral repertoires posited by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) did not reflect the 
repertoires used by organizations in the 1980s and 1990s.
15
  Nevertheless, the diagnosis 
of the problem faced by organizations – dependence – remains apt: “the underlying 
theoretical approach of diagnosing the sources of power and dependence and predicting 
when and in what direction organizations are likely to respond still yields great insight 
into organizational behavior” (Davis & Cobb, 2009, p. 23).   
Application of the theory. I use resource dependence theory to diagnose the 
problem of dependence for colleges and universities, but I am selective in predicting 
organizational responses. I argue that tuition from master‟s degrees programs offers an 
alternative source of revenue when “traditional” revenues decline.  I hypothesize two 
traditional revenues. First, undergraduate enrollments are an important resource for all 
institutions.  Enrollments are affected by the size of the college-age population.  The 
population of “traditional” college freshman – defined as ages 18 and 19 – declined from 
                                                                                                                                                 
Madison, Wisconsin responded to declines in state appropriations, in part, by attempting to demonstrate the 
university‟s contribution to the state economy.  Other strategies involve gaining countervailing control over 
organizations that supply critical resources.  Organizations may form professional associations – for 
example the American Association of Community Colleges or the Association of Private Sector Colleges 
and Universities – to lobby for legislation, attempting to make the external environment more conducive to 
the goals of the organization.  Organizations may avoid dependence through guile or secrecy, for example 
through symbolic but not substantive fulfillment of obligations, or by claiming that the organization is 
paralyzed by conflicting demands from stakeholders.  Mergers present another option.  Vertical mergers – 
buying suppliers or distributors – are a method of extending organizational control over exchanges vital to 
the organization.  Horizontal mergers – buying competitors – reduces competition and allows the 
organizations to gain more control over key suppliers in that they have fewer outlets for their products.  
Finally, the “cooptation” strategy is to invite members of controlling organizations to participate in various 
activities of the focal organization – most notably to sit on the corporate board – in order to socialize these 
individuals to the goals of the focal organization. 
15
 Resource dependence theory says that power and stability, not profit, are the goals of corporations.  This 
may have been true in the 1970s, but not in the 1980s and 1990s with the rise of “shareholder capitalism” 
(Davis, 2009).  Consistent with the 1960s and 1970s, resource dependence theory predicts that firms often 
grow through diversification, but hostile takeovers eliminated the large conglomerate firm (Davis, 
Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994).  Finally, by the 1990s corporate board interlocks were nonexistent with 
competitors and were very rare with key suppliers, due to issues of legality and the high-visibility of 
corporate boards (Davis & Greve, 1997).  By contrast, organizational repertoires such as outsourcing, 
downsizing, and spinoffs, unanticipated by Peffer and Salancik (1978), have become commonplace. 
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a peak of 8.7 million in 1977 to a low of 6.9 million in 1992 before increasing again 
(NCES, 2010, Table 15).  Population decline is especially damaging for non-prestigious 
private institutions that struggle to attract students (Jones, 2001; Mayhew, 1979).  Pfeffer 
& Salancik (1978, p. 46) write that “universities have defined themselves as 
processing…people between 18 and 22 years of age. As the supply of people in that 
cohort has decreased….one response has been to broaden the range of needed inputs to 
include older people in adult education and continuing education programs.”  
Second, state appropriations are an important resource for public institutions.  
From 1977 to 2002, state appropriations for higher education fell from $8.53 per $1,000 
in personal income to $7.07 per $1,000 in personal income (Kane, Orszag, & Gunter, 
2003).  Resource dependence theory predicts that public institutions will attempt to 
diversify their revenue streams in response to declining state appropriations.   
H2: Institutions will adopt master‟s degrees in response to declines in (a) 
undergraduate enrollments and (b) declines in state appropriations.
16
 
H3: Institutions will increase the production of master‟s degrees in response to 
declines in (a) undergraduate enrollments and (b) state appropriations. 
Resource dependence theory argues that the “extent of diversification [in response 
to declining or uncertain resources] should be related to the proportion of resources 
exchanged with one or a few dominant organizations” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 127).  
In other words, the diversification response should be stronger when that problematic 
resource exchange represents a higher proportion of total inputs or outputs.  
                                                 
16
 Future versions of this chapter may include hypotheses related to volatility of state appropriations (Doyle 
& Delaney, 2009). 
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Organizations already having diverse revenue streams have a smaller incentive to 
diversify in response to one problematic resource exchange.   
H4: Institutions with strong alternative sources of revenue are less likely than 
institutions with weak alternative sources of revenue to adopt master‟s degrees. 
H5: Institutions with strong alternative sources of revenue will have lower annual 
production of master‟s degrees than institutions with weak alternative sources of revenue. 
 If master‟s degrees represent attempts to diversify revenues then institutions will 
focus on degree programs that generate high enrollments.  Few prospective students 
possess the prerequisite skills for master‟s degrees in scientific or technical fields (e.g., 
engineering, computer science, or statistics).  By contrast, interdisciplinary social-science 
degrees (e.g., business, public health, social work, or education) have low fixed costs 
(Middaugh, Graham, Shahid, Carroll, & National Center for Education Statistics., 2003) 
and have the potential to generate strong enrollments because students may apply 
regardless of undergraduate major.  As the number of “good” jobs in business or social-
service occupations is surpassed by the number of aspirants, inter-disciplinary social 
science master‟s degrees allow individuals to differentiate themselves from baccalaureate 
degree holders:
17
 
H6: (a) Adoption of new master‟s degrees and (b) production of master‟s degrees 
will be higher in interdisciplinary social-science fields than in scientific or technical 
fields. 
                                                 
17
 Collins (1974) notes that education requirements are higher in social-service occupations than “market-
oriented” occupations.  Higher education requirements are often the result of lobbying by professional 
associations (Larson, 1977).  Demand for degrees resulting from increased education requirements 
represents a different source of demand than increasing competition for jobs due to “educational arms 
races” (Frank & Cook, 1995). 
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Prestige and Status 
Pursuit of Prestige. Research on prestige in economics and status in sociology 
yields a third set of hypotheses on the adoption and production of master‟s degrees.  In 
economics, Bowen (1980) describes colleges and universities as organizations that make 
as much money as they can and spend all the money they make on the pursuit of prestige.  
Winston (1999) states that higher education is an industry in which a vital input, prestige, 
can be bought only from its customers, students.  Institutions, therefore, pursue prestige 
by competing with one another for students with the highest pre-collegiate academic 
achievement.  Institutions compete for these desirable students by spending more on each 
student than they charge in tuition.  That is, they offer a subsidy.  That subsidy is 
comprised of revenues sources that are not undergraduate tuition revenue.  Institutions 
with the largest sources of non-tuition revenue have the highest subsidies and are more 
successful in competing for the most desirable students.  For example, tuition and fees are 
lower at Harvard than the George Washington University, but spending per student is 
higher at Harvard due to greater non-tuition revenues. 
Selective institutions purposely set undergraduate tuition price and class size at 
levels where excess demand remains because prospective students often evaluate 
institutions based on selectivity and the pre-collegiate academic achievement of enrolled 
students (Winston, 1999).  These characteristics are used to evaluate institutions in 
guidebooks such as Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges and U.S. News and World 
Report (USNWR).  Bowman and Bastedo (2009) find that “getting on the front page” of 
USNWR rankings significantly increases the following year‟s admissions indicators.  
Attracting students with strong pre-collegiate academic achievement increases future 
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revenues because these students are likely to earn high incomes and donate to their alma 
mater, enabling institutions to increase student subsidies in future periods (Winston, 
1999).   Therefore, affluence and prestige reinforce one another in successive iterations. 
 The implications of Winston (1999) diverge from resource dependence theory 
with respect to the master‟s degree granting behavior of institutions.  Resource 
dependence theory implies that institutions relying heavily on particular resource 
exchanges (e.g., undergraduate enrollments and state appropriations) have a greater 
incentive to diversify revenue streams than institutions that already have diversified 
revenue streams.  By contrast, Winston (1999) implies that institutions maximize revenue 
from all non-tuition sources in order to subsidize the pursuit of prestige in undergraduate 
and PhD education.  However, institutions will not maximize short-term net tuition 
revenue in by increasing sticker price or undergraduate class size, because these decisions 
would negatively affect rankings, and therefore future revenue.   
I argue that institutions can pursue prestige by increasing revenue from master‟s 
degrees because the characteristics and behaviors of master‟s degree students do not 
contribute to overall USNWR College Rankings (U.S. News & World Report, 2010).  
Furthermore, for several USNWR graduate school rankings (e.g., education) the GRE 
scores and acceptance rate for master‟s degree students do not contribute to the ranking. 
This creates an incentive for academic units to generate revenues through the expansion 
of master‟s degree programs but to maintain selective doctoral degree programs.  The 
strategy of pursuing revenues and prestige through master‟s degrees is discussed by 
Ehrenberg (2000, p. 184):  
The attraction of expanding professional master's programs is that [master‟s 
degree] students….typically receive much less financial assistance from 
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university funds than do students enrolled in Ph.D. programs and also receive less 
financial aid, on average, than do the university's undergraduates. Hence these 
programs have the potential to generate revenues that can help support the core 
undergraduate and doctoral programs at the institution.  
 
Signaling and status. Signaling theory (Spence, 1973) helps explain strong 
student demand for master‟s degrees from prestigious institutions.  A signal is any 
observable indicator held by an actor that meets two criteria.  First, the indicator must be 
partially “manipulable” by the actor possessing the signal.  Second, obtaining the signal 
requires effort, but requires less effort for actors with higher native productivity.  A 
baccalaureate degree is a signal because (a) individuals influence receipt of the degree 
and (b) the degree is easier to obtain for smarter individuals (Spence, 1973).  In contrast 
to human capital theory (Becker, 1964), signaling theory assumes that education does not 
increase productivity; rather, productive workers have an easier time obtaining the 
baccalaureate degree than less productive workers.  Therefore, the population of degree 
holders will be more productive than the population of non-degree holders.  Employers, 
uncertain about the productivity of an individual applicant, use possession of 
baccalaureate degree to discriminate among job applicants. 
As the proportion of job applicants holding a baccalaureate degree approaches 
one, employers can no longer use that credential to discriminate between applicants.  
Instead, employers discriminate between job applicants based on the selectivity of the 
degree granting institution; degrees from more selective institutions send stronger signals.  
Hershbein (2010) finds that as the supply of college educated labor has increased over 
time, so has the “signaling effect” on wages due to graduating from a selective institution.  
Most individuals, however, cannot gain admission to selective undergraduate institutions.   
Hershbein (2010) also finds that, for students attending non-selective institutions, the 
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signaling effect of graduating with a high GPA has increased.  Graduating with a high 
GPA is one way that students attending non-selective institutions can differentiate 
themselves.  I argue that obtaining a master‟s degree represents another means by which 
individuals attempt to differentiate themselves from the growing number of baccalaureate 
degree holders.  Signaling theory implies that master‟s degrees from prestigious 
institutions send stronger signals than master‟s degrees from non-prestigious institutions.  
Therefore, student demand should be higher for master‟s degrees from prestigious 
institutions than for master‟s degrees from non-prestigious institutions.  As Stephen 
Trachtenberg, president emeritus of The George Washington University, explained:  
“[A master‟s degree] does allow one to upgrade one‟s alma mater. If you 
originally matriculated at a college you are vaguely uneasy about, taking an M.A. 
at a more elite institution allows you to kick down and kiss up, henceforth letting 
you tell people you „went to school‟ in New Haven” (New York Times, 2009). 
 
 Summarizing the literature on signaling and prestige, students have high demand 
for master‟s degrees from prestigious institutions because they send strong signals.  At 
the same time, institutions will attempt to expand the production of master‟s degrees to 
subsidize the pursuits of prestige in undergraduate and doctoral education.  Taken 
together, these ideas imply that the production of master‟s degrees is higher at prestigious 
institutions than at non-prestigious institutions. 
H7: Prestigious institutions will have higher annual production of master‟s 
degrees than non-prestigious institutions.
18
 
                                                 
18
 I have constructed H7 as an amalgamation of resource dependence and the pursuit of prestige in 
economics.  A related hypothesis is that prestigious institutions would produce master‟s degrees in a wider 
array of fields, as opposed to higher production in H7.  This new hypothesis would draw from the neo-
institutional literature that organizations of a certain type adhere to practices that are taken for granted by 
organizations of that type (Meyer, 2008). It suggests that prestigious institutions are beholden to a “tyranny 
of coverage” in the scope of their curricula. I leave this hypothesis to a future paper. 
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 In sociology, Podolny‟s (1993) work on status reinforces the signaling perspective 
on prestige, but also offers divergent predictions.  Status is defined as the perceived 
quality of a producer‟s products in relation to the perceived quality of products made by 
competitors.  The market status of a firm‟s product fulfills the two criteria of a signal.  
First, the producer exercises some control over its status.  Second, the lower the quality of 
the product, the more difficult it becomes to acquire a reputation of high quality.  Note 
that quality for Podolny (1993) is analogous to productivity for Spence (1973).
19
     
 Achieving high status has beneficial effects on both revenues and costs for an 
organization, largely consistent with the signaling perspective.  Consumers ordinally rank 
producers along the single dimension of status.  Consumers are willing to pay more for 
high status products because the risk of low-quality is low and because possession of high 
status products confer distinction in social spheres (Bourdieu, 1984).  High status 
producers also enjoy lower costs; holding production costs constant, producers incur 
fewer marketing costs to convince customers to buy.  For example, whereas Northeastern 
University may incur substantial advertising costs to incite applications to their master‟s 
degree in public administration, Harvard‟s Kennedy School of Government can generate 
large cohort sizes almost purely on the basis of reputation. 
 Podolny (1993) diverges from economics in predicting which organizations are 
likely to offer master‟s degrees.  Given that high status producers can charge higher 
                                                 
19
 Nevertheless, Podolny‟s (1993) research on status is not merely an application of signaling. For Spence 
(1973) a signal is something that is on-average true because those actors that evaluate signals will cease to 
value a “bad” signal after successive iterations, for example when an employer finds that graduates from a 
particular institution often perform poorly on the job.  For Podolny (1993) status is loosely coupled from 
quality and that relationship does not necessarily become tighter over time.  In industries where quality is 
difficult to judge – education being a canonical example (Meyer & Scott, 1983) – the relationship between 
status and quality can be particularly loose; “the greater the decoupling [between status and quality], the 
more the status position insulates and circumscribes the producer's action and the more the producer's 
reputation becomes external to itself” (Podolny, 1993, p. 835). 
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prices and enjoy lower costs than low-status producers, Podolny (1993) argues that 
economic theory has no explanation for why high-status producers do not achieve 
monopoly status in all segments of a product market.  He argues that entering in market 
exchanges with lower-status market participants (producers and customers) undermines 
status: “to the extent that a higher-status producer attempts to expand into the position of 
a lower-status competitor, it changes its reputation and thus alters the cost-and-revenue 
profile that provided it with the initial advantage” (Podolny, 1993, p. 845).  Because 
liberal-arts colleges are historically defined as organizations that specialize in 
undergraduate, liberal arts education, entering the market for master‟s degrees would 
undermine the status of high status liberal arts colleges. By contrast, research universities 
will not avoid master‟s degrees because their brand image does not depend on providing 
only liberal arts education.
 20
  I present the following hypothesis: 
H8: Prestige will be negatively associated with the production of master‟s degrees 
for liberal arts colleges and positively associated with the production of master‟s degrees 
at universities. 
 
Data and Methods 
Sample and Analysis Period 
I test these hypotheses on a panel dataset of all baccalaureate granting institutions 
from 1969 to 2009 (where 2009 = 2008-09 academic year).  I use the Higher Education 
General Information Survey (HEGIS) for the years 1969 to 1986, ant its successor the 
                                                 
20
 Although I do not present a formal hypothesis, scholarship on status implies that research universities 
will avoid adopting low-status master‟s degrees that undermine the status of the entire organization.  For 
example, it is unlikely that the University of Chicago would ever adopt a master‟s degree in corrections 
management.   
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Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) for the years 1987 to 2009.
 21
  
Multiple survey components are completed in each year. This chapter employs data from 
the completions, finance (principally revenues), enrollments, and institutional 
characteristics survey components.
22
 I use Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 
1979-2008 to test the hypothesis that institutions adopt degrees demanded by the labor 
market.   
Although institution-level data are available from 1969-2009, models are run on a 
smaller analysis period depending on which variables are included in the models.  The 
analysis period begins in 1975, the year that several key revenue variables become 
available.  However, the analysis period ends prior to 2009 depending on when certain 
variables included in the models cannot be measured consistently over time. I explain 
these inconsistencies below. The analysis sample consists of all institutions categorized 
as research, doctoral, comprehensive, or liberal arts by the 1976 Carnegie Commission, 
about 1,250 institutions per year with modest attrition due to death or mergers.  I omit 
associate‟s institutions, specialized institutions (e.g., medical, law, business, seminaries, 
etc.), and for-profit institutions (which generally did not complete the HEGIS survey). 
Variables 
 Dependent variable. Two types of dependent variables are constructed from the 
HEGIS/IPEDS completions surveys.  The first type of dependent variable is the total 
                                                 
21
 Each institution has an identification code. Several ID codes represent the individual campuses of larger 
institution (e.g., the individual campuses of Youngstown State University in Ohio).  At times, a survey 
component – most often in finance – will be reported at the level of the larger institution rather than the 
individual campus levels. This is called a “parent-child relationship”; the parent aggregates data for all the 
children. If a parent-child relationship ever exists for any survey component in any year, I aggregate all 
data to the parent level for all survey components in all years, and use the institutional characteristics of the 
parent institution. This chapter uses the parent-child relationships defined by the Delta Cost Project( 
http://www.deltacostproject.org/data/index.asp). Future iterations will use different definitions. 
22
 The completions (i.e. degrees awarded) data begins in 1966. The other surveys begin in 1969. 
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number of master‟s degrees produced by a particular institution in a particular year. 
Production measures may be for a particular type of master‟s degree (e.g., MBA) or the 
total master‟s degree production across all degree programs.  This chapter models 
production variables using linear panel models.   
The second type of dependent variable measures the adoption of a particular 
master‟s degree program (e.g., educational administration) by a particular institution in a 
particular year.  Similar to Kraatz and Zajac (1996), I define the adoption of master‟s 
degrees as two years prior to the year a degree was first awarded.  Degrees are classified 
according to the Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP), which was first 
introduced in 1983 and has been revised periodically.
23
  I use standardized cross-walks to 
categorize codes from legacy classification systems into the CIP for the years 1966 
through 1982 (Huff, Chandler, & NCES, 1970; Malitz, 1981). An individual degree 
program has a six-digit CIP code (e.g., 13.0406 is higher education administration). 
These individual degree programs are categorized within four-digit series (e.g., 13.04 is 
educational administration) and then within two-digit series (e.g., 13 is education).  I 
create adoption and production measures use two-digit and four-digit series because six-
digit degree programs are often not reliably recorded across institutions.
24
  
Labor market demand for skills (H1).  I create employment measures using 
CPS data to test the hypothesis that institutions adopt degrees demanded by the labor 
market.  I create two time-varying, occupation-specific employment measures: total 
                                                 
23
 1966 – 1970  uses the “pre-HEGIS” classification; 1971 – 1982 uses the HEGIS classification; 1983 – 
1986 uses the 1980 CIP; 1987 – 1991 uses the 1985 CIP; 1992 – 2002 uses the 1990 CIP; and 2003 – 2010 
uses the 2000 CIP. 
24
 I take precautions to avoid “false positive” mistakes due to new CIP codes being introduced with new 
iterations of the CIP.  If an institution first awards a particular degree within two years of a new iteration of 
the CIP classification (i.e. 2000 CIP began in 2003 academic year) and that degree is new to that iteration 
of the CIP, then I do not count this as adoption. 
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employment, and average weekly earnings.  The idea is that an institution is more likely 
to adopt a particular degree program when total employment or mean weekly earnings at 
the state/regional level increase in the related occupation.  The measures are weighted to 
be representative of the national population. These labor market measures are called 
“generated estimators” in that they are estimates from a sample and as such require a 
special variance estimation procedure (Hole, 2006). At present, I treat employment 
measures as ordinary regressors. 
Depending on un-weighted occupation-level sample size, I create employment 
measures at the state-level or the nine-category census division level (New England, Mid 
Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, 
West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific).  The rationale for creating measures at the 
census division level is that for occupations with relatively small total employment (e.g., 
educational administrators), small sample sizes at the state level cause measures of 
average earnings and total employment to be imprecise and erratic over time.  Therefore, 
I use state-level measures for “large” occupations (e.g., management) and division-level 
measures for “small” occupations.  At present, the distinction between a small and large 
occupation is a subjective judgment based on weighted and un-weighted state-level 
sample size.  In the future, I will distinguish small and large occupations based on the 
tightness of confidence intervals on state-level employment measures. 
Details on the construction of CPS employment measures are as follows.  The 
CPS interviews about 65,000 households each month in eight “rotation groups.”  
Households in each rotation group are interviewed for four consecutive months, have 
eight months off, and then are interviewed for four consecutive months (NBER, 2010).  
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Questions about weekly earnings are asked in the last interview of the first four months 
and the last interview of the second four months, which are referred to as the “outgoing 
rotation groups.” Therefore, each month of CPS data contains two outgoing rotation 
groups.  I use data from both outgoing rotation groups for the years 1979 to 2008 to 
create the employment measures.  
The CPS uses the Census Occupational Classification (COC) system, which has 
been based on the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system since 1983.  I use 
standardized crosswalks to convert older versions of the COC to more recent versions of 
the COC, and then from COC codes to SOC codes.  The primary advantage the SOC over 
the COC is that, like the CIP, the SOC is a hierarchical classification system, in which 
individual occupations are placed within larger groups of occupations (e.g., 11-
9033=postsecondary education administrators; 11-9030=education administrators; 11-
900=other management occupations; 11-00=management occupations).  The next step is 
to assign degrees programs to each occupation.  Standard crosswalks between 
occupations and degrees are unreliable. Therefore, I manually selected the occupations 
that are associated with particular degree programs.  Due to fundamental changes in the 
year 2000 iteration of the SOC, labor market measures from 1979-2002 are generally 
incomparable to measures from 2003-2008.  Therefore, models which include 
employment measures use years prior to the implementation of the 2000 SOC. 
 Resource dependence theory measures (H2, H3, H4, H5).  Measures relating to 
resource dependence theory hypotheses are created from the HEGIS/IPEDS enrollments 
survey and the revenue questions of the finance survey.  Enrollments serve as a proxy for 
tuition revenue because tuition revenue is not measured consistently over time and 
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because undergraduate tuition is not separated from graduate tuition.  I rely on two 
undergraduate enrollment measures for H2a and H3a: total undergraduate FTE 
enrollments (undergraduate enrollments) and undergraduate freshman FTE enrollments 
(freshman enrollments).  I argue that institutional leaders will be particularly sensitive to 
declines in freshman enrollments as a “canary in the coal-mine” for declining enrollment 
revenues that will work their way through the institution in subsequent time periods.   
I also create measures of revenues that are consistent over time despite changes in 
FASB accounting standards that affected private institutions in 1997 (NCES, 2000) and 
GASB accounting standards that were phased in for public institutions beginning in 2002 
(NCES, 2009).  For each revenue source I create a measure of raw revenue and revenue 
per total FTE.
25
  I use total state appropriations to test H2b and H3b.  To test hypotheses 
H4 and H5 I create the following revenue measures: state grants and contracts; federal 
appropriations, grants, and contracts; local appropriations, grants, and contracts; revenue 
from auxiliary enterprises; and the sum of investment revenue (principally endowment 
revenue) and private grant revenue (which includes donations).  The rationale for 
combining investment revenue and private grant revenue is that this variable is the 
measure of “donative resources” as defined by Winston (1999).  Unfortunately, this 
measure cannot be measured consistently across accounting standards, whereas the other 
revenue measures can.  Therefore, models that include endowment revenue and private 
grant revenue use only the years prior to changes in accounting standards.   
Prestige/status (H7, H8).  I use the 1976 Carnegie Classification to identify 
liberal-arts colleges.  This iteration of the Carnegie Classification  – rather than the 1970 
                                                 
25
 The revenue per FTE measures are based on total FTE (undergraduate + graduate), with the exception of 
state appropriations, which are based on undergraduate FTE. 
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or 1987 version – is sensible because 1975 is the first year of the analysis period.  I use 
the 1982 version of Barron‟s Profile of American Colleges as a measure of prestige.26  
The measure has five categories: (1) not selective; (2) selective; (3) very selective; (4) 
highly selective; (5) most selective.  This measure is more a measure of selectivity than 
prestige, in that it is purely derived from the selectivity and the high-school academic-
preparation of enrolled students (Barron's, 1981). 
 Control variables.  I include additional control variables: a six-category, time-
invariant measure of urbanization drawn from HEGIS surveys; a binary time-invariant 
measure of religious affiliation drawn from HEGIS; institutional control (public vs. 
private); a seven-category measure of year founded; and a six-category region variable 
(Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, South, Midwest, Southwest, West).  Other covariates may 
influence the adoption and production of master‟s degrees.  For example, I do not yet 
include measures of tuition price, out-of-state students, institutional assets and 
expenditures, ratio of tenured to non-tenured faculty, and turnover in senior management 
(e.g., president).  If these omitted variables are correlated with the dependent variable and 
independent variables in the model, then the coefficients on included variables may be 
biased.  Therefore, future iterations of this chapter will add additional covariates related 
to the adoption and production of master‟s degrees. 
Methods 
 This chapter tests hypotheses using panel modeling methods.  I model the annual 
production of master‟s degrees using linear panel models and the adoption of specific 
                                                 
26
 I use 1982 Barron‟s data because I have these data from another project.  I also have 1972 Barron‟s data. 
I chose 1982 because it is closer to the first year of data in regression analyses.  Key variables are available 
beginning in 1975, but 1978 is the first year of regression analysis due to a three year lag in the time 
varying covariates. 
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degrees using binary panel models.  I discuss linear panel models first. Many principles 
of linear panel models extend to binary panel models.  For each dependent variable I fit 
random effects estimators and fixed effects estimators.  Random effects models and fixed 
effects models rely on different assumptions.  The goal is to choose an estimator that is as 
efficient as possible (i.e., lowest standard errors) without making unreasonable 
assumptions that lead to biased estimates.  Although economists generally prefer fixed 
effects models over random effects models, I will argue that, for the data employed in 
this study, random effects models are sometimes preferable to fixed effects models. 
 Linear panel models. The basic individual-specific linear panel model is shown 
in Equation (1).  The dependent variable     represents the number of master‟s degrees 
awarded at institution i in year t.  I use a natural log of total master‟s degrees to account 
for the non-normal distribution of the variable.  The natural log of zero is undefined. I 
replace the natural log of zero with zero, which Cameron and Travedi (2005) identify as 
an acceptable fix.  Although not shown in this chapter, I also model the total production 
of master‟s degrees using Poisson panel models.  Poisson models make weak 
assumptions about the distribution of the dependent variable and are appropriate for 
dependent variables with a large number of zeros.  Because the results for Poisson panel 
models are very similar to linear panel models, I present results for the simpler linear 
panel models.
27
  
                          (1) (Individual-specific effects linear panel model) 
 [   |            , for all t  (2) (Strict exogeneity assumption) 
 [  |          [                (3) (Random effects assumption) 
                                                 
27
 I do not fit Tobit panel models because these models cannot incorporate a fixed effects estimator 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). 
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The unit-invariant, time-invariant intercept is represented by  ;       is a matrix of 
independent variables that vary across units and over time, including total undergraduate 
FTE enrollments, undergraduate freshman enrollments, state appropriations, state grants, 
total federal revenue, total local government revenue, auxiliary enterprise revenue, the 
sum of endowment revenue and private grant revenue, and time (in years);   is the 
associated vector of coefficients. I use lags of the time-varying regressors – specifically a 
three year lag – because changes in revenue/enrollment variables are hypothesized to 
affect the master‟s degree granting behavior of institutions in subsequent periods, rather 
than the present period.
28
    is a matrix of independent variables that vary across units but 
not over time, including institutional control (public/private), religious affiliation, liberal 
arts college, “prestige”, urbanization, region, and year founded;   is the associated vector 
of coefficients. 
   is the “individual-specific error term,” which varies across units but not over 
time; and     is the “idiosyncratic error term,” which varies across units and over time. 
Equation (1) is called the individual-specific linear panel model due to the existence of 
the individual-specific error term   , as opposed to the population average linear panel 
model which does not separate the idiosyncratic error term into time-invariant and time-
varying components.   
All “basic” panel models assume some form of “strict exogeneity” meaning that 
the idiosyncratic error term,    , is uncorrelated with     ,   , and   , as shown in Equation 
(2).  Relaxing this assumption generally requires an instrument (Cameron & Trivedi, 
                                                 
28
 The models presented in this chapter use a three-year lag for enrollment and revenue variables.  
Assuming that most master‟s degree programs take two years to complete, the three year lag implies that 
changes in enrollments/ revenues affect master‟s degree enrollments one year after changes in 
enrollments/revenues, and affect master‟s degree production three years after changes in 
enrollment/revenues.  I find the results are robust to lag specifications of 2, 3, 4, and 5 years. 
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2005).  Random effects models, and implicitly population average models, make the 
additional “random effects assumption” that the individual-specific effect,  , is 
uncorrelated with independent variables      and   , equation (3).  If the random effects 
assumption is true, then    can be modeled as part of the composite error term and the 
coefficients will be unbiased.  If the random effects assumption is false, then part of the 
error term,   , is correlated with the regressors, meaning that the coefficients are biased.  
If we believe the random effects assumption, we should fit random effects estimators. If 
we do not believe the random effects assumption, we should fit fixed effects estimators.  
Random effects estimators are more efficient than fixed effects estimators, because 
modeling the individual-specific effect usually provides additional knowledge about the 
composite error structure.  Economists generally do not believe the random effects 
assumption and usually prefer fixed effects estimators over random effects estimators 
because they prioritize bias over efficiency (Cheslock & Rios-Aguilar, 2010). 
The estimator for Equation (1) differs depending on whether the analyst assumes 
a population average, fixed effects, or random effects model.  The estimator for the 
population average model is just a pooled OLS model (Equation (4), but without the 
individual specific effect,   ).  Fixed estimators perform a transformation on the panel 
OLS model that eliminate the fixed effects,   , in order to generate unbiased estimates of 
coefficients   and  .  Two fixed effects estimators are common, the within estimator 
shown in Equation (5) and the first-difference estimator shown in equation (6).  
         
            (4) 
      ̅  (      ̅ ) 
  (      ̅) (5) 
            (           ) 
              (6) 
 154 
 
Note that the within estimator eliminates    by subtracting the panel mean (e.g., 
average private giving at Harvard across all years of data) from each observation. The 
within estimator is a panel OLS on the transformed model.  The within estimator utilizes 
only “within” variation (variation over time within a given panel) to calculate 
coefficients.  Coefficients should be interpreted as how a change in     relative to the 
panel mean  ̅  affects    relative to the panel mean  ̅ . The individual specific error,   , is 
eliminated because it does not vary over time and     ̅   . However, time-invariant 
regressors    are eliminated along with the individual-specific effect,    because    
  ̅   .   
The random effects estimator uses both within and between variation.  The 
random effects estimator employs a different transformation, shown in Equation (7).  The 
random effects transformation does not eliminate time-invariant regressors, but nor does 
it eliminate the unobserved individual-specific effect.  Note that whereas the within 
transformation uses the panel mean, the random effects transformation uses  ̂  times the 
panel mean. The equation for  ̂ is shown in equation (8).    An important point to note is 
that when  ̂=0, the random effects estimator simplifies to a panel OLS model.  When 
 ̂   , the random effects estimator simplifies to the within estimator shown in equation 
(6).   Note that  ̂            .  Therefore, in linear panel models with many time 
periods the coefficients on random effects models and fixed effects models should be 
similar.  The greater the number of time periods, the more the random effects estimator 
uses within variation rather than between variation.  For the present research, I find that 
fixed-effects (within) estimators and random effects estimators have nearly identical 
coefficients owing to the larger number of time periods.  Given that the coefficients on 
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fixed effects and random effects estimators are so similar I report both fixed effects and 
random effects estimates, which have the advantage of calculating coefficients for time 
invariant covariates. 
      ̂  ̅  (   ̂ )  (   
    ̂  ̅ ) 
  (    ̂ )   
   (   ̂ )    (     ̂   ̅) 
(7) 
Where,  ̂    
  
√  
     
  
 (8) 
 Binary panel models of adoption. I employ binary (logit) panel models to study 
the adoption of specific master‟s degrees.  Studies of adoption often employ hazard 
models (Berry & Berry, 1990; Davis & Greve, 1997; Doyle, 2006; McLendon, Hearn, & 
Deaton, 2006).  A “continuous-time” hazard model means that the exact timing of an 
event is known, for example the exact time a light-bulb fails (DesJardins, 2003).  Thus, 
Davis and Greve (1997) can reasonably use a continuous-time hazard model because they 
know the exact day a firm adopts a poison-pill.  A “discrete-time” hazard model means 
that the analyst knows only that an event occurred at some point within a time-interval.  
Allison (1982) shows that discrete-time hazard models can be estimated using binary 
panel models where all post-adoption observations are removed from the analysis 
sample.
29
  Hazard models implicitly make the random effects assumption that individual-
specific effects – usually called “unobserved heterogeneity” – are not correlated with 
regressors.  Following Tucker (2008), I choose to model adoption using binary panel 
models because empirical methods for dealing with endogeneity are more robust for 
binary panel methods than for hazard methods.  Furthermore, future research may employ 
                                                 
29
 Discrete-time hazard models can be estimated using binary panel models with a complementary log-log 
distribution. 
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two-stage panel models, jointly modeling adoption of a specific degree and production 
conditional on adoption. 
 Equation (9) shows a general logit panel model for the probability that institution 
i adopts a specific degree (e.g., MBA) in year t.  I fit random effects and fixed effects 
estimators.  Fixed effects binary panel models are problematic for the present research 
because the fixed effects transformation requires within-panel variation in both dependent 
and independent variables (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  Institutions that never adopt a 
specific master‟s degree do not have variation in the dependent variable and are dropped 
from the analysis.  This is problematic because I am interested in both the causes of 
adoption and non-adoption. For example, I theorize that prestigious liberal arts colleges 
will not adopt master‟s degrees because they maintain strong demand for undergraduate 
programs and have robust alternative revenue sources.  Therefore, this chapter presents 
model results from random effects logit panel models of adoption.  Fixed effects 
estimates are available upon request. 
  [     |          
       
  
(         
  )
 (9) 
Limitations 
This chapter has several limitations.  The first is a problem of research scope.  I 
test hypotheses about (a) labor market demand for skills, (b) resource dependence theory, 
and (c) the pursuit of status/prestige.  Testing several theoretical perspectives in a single 
chapter limits the amount of space that can be devoted to each perspective, and forces the 
author to make general statements about theoretical traditions each contain internal 
inconsistencies.  Furthermore, the inclusion of measures from multiple hypotheses in a 
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single model can dramatically diminish the length of the analysis period when measures 
for certain constructs are unavailable in some years.
30
   
Second, the production of master‟s degrees is the outcome of supply by 
institutions and demand by students, but my analyses focus entirely on the supply side.  
Drawing on theory (Podolny, 1993; Spence, 1973), I make assumptions that prestigious 
institutions enjoy stronger demand for bachelor‟s degrees and for master‟s degrees but I 
do not test this assumption directly.  I assume that declines in freshman enrollments for 
non-prestigious institutions are a result of lack of demand. However, these institutions 
may instead be choosing to lower the sizes of their freshman classes.  Future iterations of 
this chapter may attempt to incorporate direct measures of student demand (e.g., 
measures of the number of applications, number of students accepted, number of 
accepted students enrolled).  Following Card and Lemieux (2001), I may attempt to 
simultaneously model supply and demand for the independent variable – undergraduate 
enrollments – in models of master‟s degree production.  Related, I will attempt to find 
instruments for key independent variables. In a panel setting, the availability of 
instruments helps relax the strict exogeneity assumption that regressors are uncorrelated 
with the idiosyncratic error term,    , which varies across units and over time (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2005).
31
   
 Third, In the future I hope to incorporate a better measure of prestige. The ideal 
variable would measure prestige rather than selectivity and would be time-varying.  How 
                                                 
30
 For example, measures of labor market demand for skills are only available beginning in 1979 and 
require a lag of several years, so analyses that include labor market measures eliminate all years prior to 
1982.   
31
 For example, change in state tax revenues – often caused by the budget cycle (Kane, et al., 2003) – may 
be an instrument for state appropriations since state tax revenues affect appropriations but, arguably, may 
have no effect on production of master‟s degrees once the appropriation controls (e.g., state unemployment 
rate) are included. 
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do prestige and selectivity differ? Selectivity can be measured directly based on 
applications, acceptances, yield, and the pre-collegiate academic preparation of enrolled 
students (Barron's, 1981).  I believe that Podolny‟s (1993) definition of status is 
equivalent to the concept of prestige.  Podolny (1993) defines status as the perceived 
quality of a producer‟s products in relation to products of competitors.  Therefore, status 
includes an element of reputation that selectivity does not.    
U.S. News and World Report (USNWR) rankings provide the best available 
measure of prestige because 25% of rankings are based on reputation scores from 
administrators at peer institutions (U.S. News & World Report, 2010).  Bastedo and 
Bowman (2010) find that, over time, administrators base reputation scores almost entirely 
on published rankings.  In turn, these rankings have been shown to influence the 
perception and behavior of prospective students (Bowman & Bastedo, 2009; Espeland & 
Sauder, 2007).  Unfortunately, USNWR rankings are unavailable until 1992.  Therefore, 
variable construction must balance the ideal of a true measure of prestige with the 
availability of time-varying data. 
Finally, degree specific models of adoption include measures of employment in 
related occupations.  Whereas some degree programs (e.g., educational administration, 
nursing) prepare students for relatively specific occupations, other degree programs (e.g., 
MBA) prepare students for a wide range of occupations.  It may not be appropriate to 
assign particular occupations to degree programs that prepare students for a wide variety 
of occupations.  In future iterations of this chapter, I may include employment measures 
only for degree programs that prepare students for relatively specific occupations. 
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Dependent variables. Tables 1 through 4 present descriptive statistics on 
dependent variables. Table 3.1 shows the median annual production of master‟s degrees, 
the dependent variable for linear panel models. Bachelor‟s degrees are shown for 
comparison.  I categorize institutions by liberal arts status and “prestige” because H8 
predicts that the relationship between master‟s degree production and prestige will be 
different for liberal arts colleges vs. universities.  For the purpose of descriptive statistics, 
prestige is separated into three categories: low (Barron‟s=1); medium (Barron‟s=2,3); 
high (Barron‟s=4,5).   
Table 3.1 shows that median annual production of master‟s degrees increases 
dramatically for universities of all selectivity levels.  However, production is highest for 
highly selective universities.  For liberal arts colleges, the median selective liberal arts 
college awarded a handful of master‟s degrees from 1966 to 1975, at which point median 
production fell to zero.  By contrast, median master‟s degree production for the 
low/medium liberal arts college increased dramatically since 1995.  Master‟s degree 
production is highly right-skewed.  Table 3.2 shows mean master‟s degree production, 
which is much higher than median master‟s degree production.  By 2009, mean master‟s 
degree production at highly selective universities had reached 1,350 and had reached 143 
for low/medium liberal arts colleges as compared to 21 for highly selective liberal arts 
colleges. 
 Tables 3 and 4 show the percent of institutions that ever-award or ever-adopt 
master‟s degrees in specific subject areas, which is similar to the dependent variable for 
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logit panel models.  MBAs are adopted by nearly all universities. Selective liberal arts 
colleges never adopt MBAs, whereas adoption by low/medium liberal arts colleges 
increases rapidly beginning in 1975.  A moderate number of highly selective liberal arts 
colleges are early adopters of education master‟s degrees, but production (not shown) 
becomes zero for most of these institutions. Adoption of education master‟s degrees by 
low/medium selective liberal arts colleges is also dramatic.  Adoption of health master‟s 
degrees increases dramatically at all universities and for low/medium liberal arts colleges.  
However, master‟s degrees in computer science, engineering, and biological sciences (not 
shown) are not adopted by either low/medium or highly selective liberal arts colleges. 
 Independent variables.  Figures 3.1-3.5 present descriptive statistics on 
enrollments and state appropriations.  Figure 3.1 shows median total undergraduate FTE 
enrollments as a proportion of undergraduate FTE enrollment in 1975.  Median 
undergraduate enrollments relative to 1975 enrollments increased for all institution types, 
but especially for those of lesser selectivity.  Figure 3.2 presents the same variable but for 
the 25
th
 percentile institution, rather than the median institution.  For 25th percentile 
liberal arts colleges with low/medium selectivity, total undergraduate enrollments were 
less than 1975 enrollments for the years 1975-1992.  Because these institutions rely 
strongly on undergraduate enrollment revenue, the decline in total undergraduate 
enrollments represents severe financial strain. 
 Figure 3.3 shows median freshman undergraduate FTE enrollments as a 
proportion of 1975 freshman undergraduate FTE enrollments.  The median liberal arts 
college with low/medium selectivity experienced modest declines in freshman 
enrollments relative to 1975 enrollments during the years 1982-1988 and again from 
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1991-1993.  Figure 3.4 shows the same variable, but for 25
th
 percentile institutions rather 
than median institutions.  Note that freshman enrollments decline dramatically for all 
institution types except highly selective liberal arts colleges and highly selective 
universities.  The freshman enrollment declines are especially sharp for low/medium 
liberal arts colleges.  I argue that freshman enrollments are a leading indicator of 
financial strain that institutional leaders pay attention to.  H2 states that institutions will 
increase production of master‟s degrees in response to declines in freshman enrollments. 
 Finally, Figure 3.5 shows median state appropriations per undergraduate FTE (in 
$000s) for public institutions.  I aggregate medium and highly selective public 
institutions because only four public institutions were categorized as highly selective.  
Generally, state appropriations per FTE increase during economic booms and decline 
during recessions when state tax revenues decline.  However, Kane Orszag, and Gunter 
(2003) show that state higher education appropriations have not rebounded from recent 
recessions the way they did for previous recessions because a higher proportion of state 
revenues are diverted to mandatory funding programs such as K-12 education and 
Medicare.  Figure 3.5 shows that medium/highly selective public institutions have higher 
appropriations per FTE than institutions with low selectivity, but this chasm has 
diminished in recent decades mostly due to declines in state appropriations for 
institutions with medium/high selectivity.  Many institutions face even sharper declines in 
state appropriations than the median institution shown in Figure 3.5.  I hypothesize that 
institutions will increase the production of master‟s degrees to generate enrollment 
revenue in response to declines in state appropriations. 
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Production of Master’s Degrees 
 Table 3.5 presents linear panel regression results, where the dependent variable is 
logged annual production of master‟s degrees. Each column represents a different 
sample: (1) all institutions; (2) public institutions; (3) private liberal arts colleges; (4) 
private universities of low selectivity (Barron‟s=1); and (5)  highly selective universities 
(includes four public universities); and (6) “Research 1” (R1) universities (institutions 
categorized as Research 1 by the 1976 Carnegie Classification).  All models use cluster 
robust standard errors, cluster to deal with serial correlation within panels and robust to 
deal with heteroskedasticity.  I present random effects models in Table 3.5 because the 
coefficients for random effects estimators and fixed effects estimators are very close 
owing to the large number of time periods for each panel.  Therefore, the random effects 
coefficients on time-varying covariates primarily use within variation rather than between 
variation. Random effects estimators have the additional advantage of calculating 
coefficients on time-invariant covariates.  Fixed effect (within) models that utilize within 
variation exclusively are presented in Appendix Tables 1-7. 
The analysis period in Table 3.5 begins in 1978, because key revenue variables 
become available in 1975 and I use a three year lag (results were robust to lags of 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 years).  The analysis period ends when (lagged) new accounting standards emerge.  
Private institutions adopted FASB accounting standards in 1997 and public institutions 
adopted GASB 34/35 accounting standards beginning in 2002.  The measure 
“endowment and grants” – the sum of endowment revenues + private grants (which 
includes donations) – is inconsistent across accounting standards.  Appendix Tables 1-5 
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show models for a 1978-2009 analysis period, but the coefficient on endowment and 
grants should not be interpreted. 
 Drawing on resource dependence theory, I hypothesize that production of 
master‟s degrees increases following declines in undergraduate enrollments (H3a).  I use 
two measures of undergraduate enrollments, (a) FTE total undergraduate enrollments (b) 
FTE freshman undergraduate enrollments.  Contrary to resource dependence theory, 
growth in total undergraduate enrollments is significantly associated with subsequent 
growth of master‟s degrees.  This is true for all institutions, public institutions, liberal arts 
colleges, and private universities with low selectivity.  In other words, the analysis period 
spans a period of overall growth in undergraduate enrollments. Growth in undergraduate 
enrollments is associated with growth in master‟s degree production.   
Although hypothesis testing depends primarily on the sign and significance of the 
coefficient, it useful to interpret the coefficients.  Given that the dependent variable is 
logged annual master‟s degree production, the coefficient of 0.050 for “L3 Undergrad 
FTE (000)” can be interpreted as follows: an increase of 1,000 undergraduate FTE 
students three years ago is associated with a five percent increase in total production of 
master‟s degrees in the current year. 
 The coefficients on freshman enrollments provide different results.  For the 
sample of all institutions, growth in freshman enrollments has a significant, positive 
relationship with subsequent master‟s degree production. This result conflicts with H3a.  
However, for liberal arts colleges and private universities of low selectivity, declines in 
freshman enrollments are positively associated with subsequent production of master‟s 
degrees.  This result supports H3a.   
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The vast majority of liberal arts colleges are non-selective. Figures 3 and 4 show 
that non-selective liberal arts colleges often experienced dramatic decline in freshman 
enrollments.  The modeling results suggest that liberal arts colleges responded to declines 
in freshman enrollments by increasing the production of master‟s degrees.  The same is 
true for unselective private universities of low-selectivity in column (4), but not for 
medium-selective private universities in Appendix Table 3.5, or for highly selective 
universities in column (5).  Resource dependence theory also suggests that public 
institutions should increase production of master‟s degrees in response to declines in state 
appropriations (H3b).  Column (2) shows that this hypothesis is not supported. 
 H5 states that institutions with strong alternative sources of revenue will have 
lower annual production of master‟s degrees than institutions with weak alternative 
sources of revenue.  Although I include several alternative revenue measures, I 
emphasize endowment and grants and auxiliary enterprise revenues, as these are 
important sources of revenue for many institutions.  Endowment and grants has a 
significant, negative relationship with subsequent production of master‟s degrees.  This is 
true for all institutions, for public institutions, and for liberal arts colleges, and for highly 
selective universities.  Growth in auxiliary enterprise revenue is also negatively 
associated with subsequent production of master‟s degrees for all institutions and 
especially for liberal arts institutions.  These findings support the idea that production of 
master‟s degrees is lower when institutions have strong alternative revenue streams, 
implying that master‟s degrees are produced in order to diversify institutional revenues.  
Note that the sample of highly selective universities has a significantly negative 
 165 
 
coefficient on endowment and grants but the sample of research universities does not. I 
discuss this finding in the conclusion. 
 H7 states that master‟s degree production is positively associated with prestige, 
because prestigious institutions enjoy stronger demand than non-prestigious institutions 
and because all institutions desire as much revenue as possible (Winston, 1999).  H8 adds 
nuance, stating that prestige will be positively associated with master‟s degree production 
at universities and negatively associated with master‟s degree production at liberal arts 
colleges, because master‟s degrees represent low-status market segments for high-status 
liberal arts colleges.  Column (1) shows that the main effect for the five-category prestige 
variable is significantly positive, consistent with H7 (I treat prestige as a continuous 
variable for the interaction effect that tests H8).  The 0.640 coefficient means that a one-
unit increase in prestige is associated with a 64% increase in production of master‟s 
degrees.  I find a similar result for the sample of public institutions, when I treat prestige 
as a categorical variable with prestige=1 as the base category.
32
     
 I test H8 using an interaction effect between prestige and liberal arts colleges on 
the sample of all institutions.  The main effect of prestige is positively significant.  The 
main effect of being a liberal arts college is associated with a 104% reduction in the 
annual production of master‟s degrees relative to universities.  The interaction effect of 
prestige X liberal arts is significantly negative.  Whereas the slope of prestige for 
universities is 0.640, the slope of prestige for liberal arts colleges is (0.640 – 0.728)= -
0.088; for liberal arts colleges a one-unit increase in prestige is associated with a 9% 
reduction in annual production of master‟s degrees, in addition to the lower intercept 
                                                 
32
 Note that there are no public institutions with prestige=5 and only four public institutions with 
prestige=5. 
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associated with being a liberal arts college.  The significantly different slopes on prestige 
for liberal arts colleges versus universities provide strong support for H8. 
 Other results deserve mention, though they are not associated with specific 
hypotheses.  First, production of master‟s degrees increases over time.33  Second, 
production of master‟s degrees is significantly higher in urban institutions.34  This result 
implies that strong master‟s degree production depends on being located in an urban area 
with a large pool of working adults who are potential customers.  Third, master‟s degree 
production is lower for institutions with a religious affiliation.  
Finally, public institutions have higher master‟s degree production after 
controlling for covariates.  The significant effect for public institutions diminishes when 
urbanization covariates are removed because private institutions are disproportionately 
located in urban areas, which are associated with higher production of master‟s degrees.  
The significant effect for public institutions vanishes when the sample consists of 
institutions with prestige of 3, 4, or 5 (not shown).  However, most institutions of higher 
education are not prestigious.   
One potential explanation for the higher production of master‟s degrees at public 
institutions is that for the bulk of non-prestigious institutions, public institutions have a 
broader scope of degree offerings than private institutions.  One finding from the 
adoption models (see below) is that adoption of a master‟s degree is more likely when the 
institution offers bachelor‟s degrees in the same subject.  Therefore, production of 
master‟s degrees may be higher at public institutions than private institutions because the 
larger scope of baccalaureate degrees at public institutions provides more opportunities 
                                                 
33
 Here I model time as a continuous variable, but modeling time as an indicator variable does not 
significantly affect the coefficients for other regressors. 
34
 This finding does not hold when the dependent variable is production of bachelor‟s degrees (not shown). 
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for bricolage when attempting to generate enrollments from master‟s degrees.  However, 
this finding deserves a more thorough investigation. 
Adoption of Master’s Degrees 
 Table 3.6 presents selected results for binary panel models of adoption of specific 
master‟s degrees: first master‟s degree ever adopted, business (2-digit CIP), education (2-
digit CIP), educational administration (4-digit CIP), health (2-digit CIP), and computer 
science (2-digit CIP).  The distinction between 2-digit CIP codes vs. 4-digit CIP codes 
merits explanation.
35
  The analysis period for these models generally begins in 1983 
because these models include employment variables that are available beginning in 1979 
and use a four-year lag.  The end of the analysis period reflects the last lagged year of 
“old” accounting standards.  Model results that do not use employment variables, hence 
having, a 1978-1999 analysis period, are shown in Appendix Tables 6-15, as are results 
for adoption of master‟s degrees in teaching (4-digit CIP), nursing (4-digit CIP), 
engineering (2-digit CIP), and psychology (2-digit CIP), and biology (2-digit CIP).   
Table 3.6 and Appendix Tables 8-18 present random effects panel models of 
adoption.  I do not present fixed effect logit panel models of adoption; the fixed effects 
transformation eliminates any panel that does not have an event during the analysis 
period, but the correlates of non-adoption are theoretically important to this research.  
Stata does not provide cluster-robust standard errors for random effects logit panel 
models.  Cameron and Travedi (2009) recommend using boot-strapped standard errors.  I 
                                                 
35
 Adoption of a master‟s degree in education represents the first time an institution awards a master‟s 
degree within the 2-digit CIP code for education, which is “13.”  This may be a master‟s degree in 
mathematics teacher education (13.1311), special education for students with hearing impairments 
(13.1003), higher education administration (13.0406), etc. Adoption of a master‟s degree in educational 
administration represents the first time an institution awards a master‟s degree within the 4-digit CIP code 
for educational administration, which is “13.04.” This may be a master‟s degree in general educational 
leadership and administration (13.0401), higher education administration (13.0406), etc. 
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presently lack the computing power to fit bootstrap standard errors for all models.  
Therefore the results in Table 3.6 are based on regular standard errors.  I experimented 
with bootstrap standard errors for several models (not shown) and generally found 
standard errors to be 1.5 to 2 times larger than regular standard errors. Therefore, 
marginally significant coefficients should be viewed with some skepticism. 
 Table 3.6 shows results for three mutually exclusive samples: private non-liberal 
arts institutions; liberal arts colleges; and public institutions.  Institutions are included in 
analyses if they have not yet adopted the degree in question prior to the beginning of the 
analysis period. Institutions are dropped from the analysis sample in the period after 
adoption.  The analysis period – either 1978-1999 or 1983-1999 depending on whether 
employment variables are included – is problematic because many institutions adopted 
“common” master‟s degree programs (e.g., MBA) prior to the analysis period and, 
therefore, were excluded from analyses.  This problem affects universities more than 
liberal arts colleges; the sample sizes are quite small for universities with respect to 
particular degrees (e.g., MA in Business, MA in Education). 
 My discussion of results focuses on liberal arts colleges.  Of the total 531 liberal 
arts institutions in 1978, 397 had not yet adopted a master‟s degree.  Table 3.6 shows that 
growth in total undergraduate enrollments is associated with an increase in the probability 
of adoption. This result runs contrary to H2a. I interpret total undergraduate enrollments 
as being a proxy for overall growth of the institution, which is positively associated with 
adoption of master‟s degrees as these liberal arts colleges attempt to become universities.  
Declines in freshman enrollments are positively associated with the likelihood of 
adopting a master‟s degree. This result is consistent with H2a; after controlling for 
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changes in total undergraduate enrollments, liberal arts colleges adopt master‟s degrees in 
response to declines in freshman enrollments.  Consistent with H4, liberal arts colleges 
are less likely to adopt master‟s degrees when alternative revenues – here endowment and 
grants and revenue from auxiliary enterprises – grow.  The results for private non-liberal 
arts institutions and public institutions say little because so few of these institutions have 
yet to adopt prior to the analysis period. 
 The results for adoption of master‟s degrees in business are largely consistent 
with the results for first master‟s degree adopted.  After controlling for total 
undergraduate enrollments, liberal arts colleges adopt master‟s degrees in business in 
response to declines in freshman enrollments.  Strong endowment and grants revenues 
are negatively associated with adoption for liberal arts colleges, consistent with H4.  
Having previously awarded a bachelor‟s degree in business is positively associated with 
adoption for liberal arts colleges.  H2b states that public institutions will adopt master‟s 
degrees in response to declines in state appropriations.  This hypothesis is not supported 
for master‟s degrees in business, or for other master‟s degrees modeled.  H1 states that 
institutions will adopt master‟s degrees demanded by the labor market.  I create state-
level, occupation-level measures of total employment and weekly earnings.  The 
significant coefficient of 0.238 for weekly earnings implies that a $100 increase in 
weekly earnings for management occupations, relative to the panel mean, increases the 
likelihood that liberal arts colleges located in that state will adopt a master‟s degree in 
business. There is no similar effect for total employment in management occupations for 
liberal arts colleges. 
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 The results for master‟s degrees in education, educational administration, and 
health follow similar patterns.  After controlling for total undergraduate growth, liberal 
arts colleges adopt in response to declines in freshman enrollments, but strong alternative 
revenues are negatively associated with adoption.  Coefficients on the employment 
variables do not show clear patterns.  Public universities and private universities adopt 
master‟s degrees in health in response to increases weekly earnings in health occupations.  
Liberal arts institutions are more likely to adopt master‟s degrees in educational 
administration when the number of jobs in educational administration declines.
 36
   
 The correlates for adoption of computer science master‟s degrees by liberal arts 
colleges show a somewhat different pattern.  Whereas master‟s degrees in business, 
health, and education were adopted in response to declines in freshman enrollments and 
when alternative revenues were weak, this is not true for master‟s degrees in computer 
science.  Similarly, I find that adoption of master‟s degrees in biology (Appendix Table 
3.18) and master‟s degrees in engineering (not shown) are not associated with declines in 
freshman enrollments or growth in alternative revenues.
37
  Consistent with H6a, I argue 
that master‟s degrees in computer science, engineering, and biology are not as attractive 
sources of enrollment funding because these degrees are associated with high fixed costs 
and fewer students have the prerequisite skills to enroll in comparison to master‟s degrees 
in business, education, health, and psychology. 
 
                                                 
36
 The employment measure is at the regional – nine census regions in the country – rather than state level 
due to insufficient sample size in the CPS at the state level. 
37
 So few liberal arts colleges adopt master‟s degrees in engineering that the models can only be run using a 
longer analysis period, 1983-2006, which spans the changes in accounting standards such that measures of 
endowment + private grant revenue are not measured consistently. 
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Conclusion 
Summary 
To summarize, H1 states that institutions adopt master‟s degrees related to 
occupations experiencing strong labor-market demand.  Models are most salient for 
liberal arts colleges because most universities have adopted master‟s degrees in 
“common” fields prior to the analysis period.  Adoption of master‟s degrees in business, 
education, and computer science are positively related to earnings in the associated 
occupation.  However, adoption of master‟s degrees in educational administration is 
negatively related to regional employment in educational administration occupations.  To 
summarize, the evidence suggests that for certain degrees, adoption is related to rising 
earnings in related occupations, but not to rising employment in the occupation.  
Preliminary analyses of fixed effect models of degree-specific production (e.g., number 
of MBAs produced annually by an institution) shows similar results. More research is 
needed before causal statements can be made. 
Drawing on resource dependence theory, I hypothesize that the adoption (H2) and 
production (H3) of master‟s degrees will increase in response to declines in (a) 
undergraduate enrollment (b) state appropriations.  I create measures of total 
undergraduate enrollments and freshman enrollments.  In conflict with H2a and H3a, 
adoption and production of master‟s degrees is positively related to growth in total 
undergraduate enrollments, implying that overall institutional growth occurs 
simultaneously at the undergraduate and graduate levels.  Furthermore, for the sample of 
all institutions, growth in freshman enrollments is positively associated with increased 
master‟s degree production, also in conflict with H3a.  However, in support of H3a, 
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liberal arts colleges adopt master‟s degrees in interdisciplinary social/science fields 
(H6a), in response to declines in freshman enrollments.  Figures 3 and 4 show that liberal 
arts colleges and unselective universities experienced the most dramatic declines in 
freshman enrollments as the size of the “traditional” college-aged population decreased.  
Consistent with H3a, I find that these institutions increased the production of master‟s 
degrees in response to declines in freshman enrollments.  Analysis do not support the 
hypotheses that public institutions adopt (H2b) master‟s degrees or increase the 
production (H3b) of master‟s degrees in response to declines in state appropriations. 
I find that for liberal arts colleges, adoption of specific master‟s degrees is 
negatively associated with growth in alternative revenues (chiefly, endowment and grants 
and auxiliary enterprises, consistent with H4.  Both descriptive statistics and binary panel 
models show that high status liberal arts colleges (e.g., Bowdoin and Carleton) have 
strong alternative revenues and generally do not adopt master‟s degrees.  Prior to the 
analysis period, many high status liberal arts colleges did award a handful of master‟s 
degrees but stopped at about the time low-status liberal arts colleges began adopting 
master‟s degrees. I argue that this is no coincidence.   
Consistent with H5, production of master‟s degrees is negatively associated with 
strong alternative revenues for public institutions, liberal arts colleges, and for the sample 
of all institutions.  This result implies that institutions attempt to increase revenue from 
master‟s degrees when alternative revenues are weak.  Consistent with H6b, production 
is skewed towards business and “social service degrees” (e.g., education, health, social 
work) rather than technical and scientific fields.   I argue that interdisciplinary social 
science degrees have the potential to generate strong enrollments because students can 
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apply regardless of undergraduate major.  Further, social service degrees may experience 
strong student demand because the education requirements for employment are highest in 
social service degrees (Collins, 1974). 
Linear panel models of master‟s degree production on the sample of all 
institutions show that the main effect of prestige is positively related to production of 
master‟s degrees, consistent with H7.  The strongly negative coefficient on the interaction 
between prestige and liberal arts colleges supports H8 that prestige is negatively 
associated with the production of master‟s degrees for liberal arts colleges and positively 
associated with the production of master‟s degrees at universities.  For liberal arts 
colleges, master‟s degrees are clearly a revenue source of last resort.  High status liberal 
arts colleges avoid master‟s degrees in order to maintain their status (Podolny, 1993), 
relying instead on their strong revenues from tuition, endowment, and donation.   
Discussion 
The relationship for between alternative revenues, master‟s degrees, and prestige 
is more complicated for universities than for liberal arts colleges.  Whereas resource 
dependence theory argues that institutions increase the production of master‟s degrees 
when alternative revenues are weak (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), literature on the pursuit 
of prestige implies that institutions maximize revenue from all sources to subsidize the 
pursuit of prestige (Bowen, 1980).  Two stories emerge from the analyses.  Most 
institutions are not prestigious, and the results show that non-prestigious institutions 
increase production of master‟s degrees when alternative revenues are weak, consistent 
with resource dependence theory.   
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The results are somewhat different for prestigious institutions.  Column (5) of 
Table 3.5 shows the results for linear panel models of degree production for the sample of 
39 highly selective universities (Barron‟s=4 or 5 & liberal arts college=0).  Production of 
master‟s degrees is unrelated to revenues from state grants, auxiliary enterprises, and 
federal revenues, consistent with Bowen (1980), but negatively related to revenue from 
endowments and private grants, consistent with (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Column (6) 
of Table 3.5 shows the results for the sample of 49 R1 universities, as defined by the 
1976 Carnegie Classification.  Consistent with Bowen (1980), production of master‟s 
degrees is unrelated to all alternative revenues sources, including endowments and 
private grants, and even has a positive relationship with state grants.   
What explains the slightly different findings for R1 universities versus highly 
selective universities? Sixteen institutions are both highly selective and R1 (e.g., 
University of Chicago, Harvard).  These institutions are mostly private and are included 
in the analyses of both columns (5) and (6) in Table 3.5. There are 33 R1 institutions that 
are not highly selective. These are mostly public institutions (e.g., University of Arizona, 
UC Boulder).  There are 23 institutions that are highly selective but not R1 (e.g., 
Brandeis, Dartmouth, and Lehigh) and these institutions behave like a hybrid between 
prestigious universities and prestigious liberal arts colleges with respect to the production 
of master‟s degrees.  For these 23 institutions production of master‟s degrees is 
negatively related to endowment and donation revenue, consistent with resource 
dependence theory.  Therefore, the statement by Bowen (1980) that a university 
maximizes revenue from all possible sources seems to be true for R1 universities, some 
of which are more prestigious than others.   
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Why is production of master‟s degrees at R1 institutions unrelated to alternative 
revenue streams?  One possible explanation is that selective non-research universities 
(e.g., Lehigh, Brandeis) limit the growth of master‟s degrees because they value a brand 
identity as selective undergraduate institutions with modest graduate enrollments.  This 
reasoning is similar to the rationale for selective liberal arts colleges avoiding the 
adoption of master‟s degrees.   
A second plausible explanation is based on the idea that research universities are 
large, complex organizations with many academic units and non-academic units.  At the 
organization level, revenues from endowments, donations, auxiliary enterprises, and 
federal research grants may be quite strong.  However, particular academic units (e.g., 
Harvard Graduate School of Education), may not benefit directly from auxiliary or 
endowment revenues.  These academic units may have a strong financial incentive to 
expand master‟s degree production, especially when the university adopts a responsibility 
centered management (RCM) budgeting systems which requires academic units to 
generate revenues to match costs (Priest, Becker, Hossler, & St. John, 2002). 
Setting aside the differences between R1 universities and highly selective 
universities, descriptive statistics show that these two groups have higher annual 
production of master‟s degrees than other institutions. This finding has implications for 
the literature on institutional stratification.  Cheslock and Gianneschi (2008) find that 
prestigious public institutions generate more revenue from “voluntary” funding than 
regional public institutions.  Slaughter, Leslie, and Rhoades (1997; 2004)  find that 
commercialization of academic research disproportionately benefits research universities.  
Similarly, increased reliance on revenue from master‟s degrees is likely to widen the gap 
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between the “haves” and “have-nots” because research R1 universities and highly 
selective universities generate more revenue from master‟s degrees than other 
institutions. 
The finding that revenue concerns affect the adoption and production of master‟s 
degrees has important implications for the goal of equal opportunity.
38
  If master‟s 
degrees are largely valued by institutions and academic units for the purpose of 
generating revenue, then master‟s degree programs will place more emphasis on 
recruiting students who can afford the tuition.  As the educational “requirements” 
(Collins, 1974) for occupations continue to rise, low-income individuals who cannot 
afford master‟s degree tuition will be unable to compete for certain job opportunities 
(Berg, 1970).   
Revenue from master‟s degrees may also be used to pursue equal opportunity by 
subsidizing the education of low-income or under-represented students at the 
baccalaureate, doctoral, or master‟s degree level.  However, Doyle (2010) finds that 
institutional aid is increasingly devoted to attracting high achieving students in order to 
raise academic profile, rather than increase access for low-income students.  Therefore, 
revenue from master‟s degrees more likely subsidizes the pursuit of prestige than the 
pursuit of equal opportunity. 
The present research also has implications for the efficiency goal of education.  
From the perspective of economic growth, efficient spending on education would mean 
that individuals do not receive education in excess of the skills required to perform job 
                                                 
38
 This finding is most robust for small private institutions, where “wiggling X” causes “Y” to move.  
Organization-level data may not capture the financial pressures experienced by academic units within large, 
complex organizations.  However, archival and qualitative research on master‟s degrees in education 
(Levine, 2005) and business (Khurana, 2007) suggest that revenue concerns affect the adoption and 
production of master‟s degrees within academic units at large, complex institutions. 
 177 
 
duties adequately (Labaree, 1997).  However, the goal of social efficiency does not affect 
the decision by individuals of whether to invest in educational credentials.  Competition 
intensifies when the number of desirable jobs is surpassed by the number of people 
competing for those jobs (Blau, 1994; Boudon, 1974).  Individuals compete for scarce 
jobs, in part, by acquiring more education than the next person.  Therefore, individuals 
have an incentive to invest in credentials in excess of job skill requirements in order to 
obtain a position.  In aggregate, this individually rational behavior contributes to a 
socially inefficient “arms race in educational attainment” (Frank & Cook, 1995).  I argue 
that student demand for master‟s degrees is rising because individuals attempt to 
differentiated themselves as the proportion of baccalaureate degree holders surpasses the 
number of jobs that “require” a college-degree (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008; NCES, 
2010).   
University presidents often highlight the contribution of higher education to skills 
demanded by the labor market (Vitullo & Johnson, 2010).  If this is true, then institutions 
should adopt degrees that are demanded by the labor market, those experiencing growth 
in total employment and increase in earnings.  I find a mixed relationship between 
institutional adoption decisions and labor market demand for skills.  Adoption of certain 
degrees – e.g., Business, Education – increases when earnings in the associated 
occupation increase.  I do not find a similar relationship for changes in total employment.  
Indeed, liberal arts institutions are more likely to adopt master‟s degrees in educational 
administration when regional employment in educational administration declines.  When 
employment in an occupation declines, individuals have a stronger incentive to obtain 
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credentials in order to differentiate themselves in the competition for scarce job 
opportunities. 
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Tables 
 
Table 3.1 Median annual production of bachelor‟s degrees and master‟s degrees, by liberal arts status (1976 Carnegie 
Classification and “prestige” (1982 Barron‟s Category) 
  
University 
Low Select 
(Barron‟s=1) 
University 
Med Select 
(Barron‟s=2,3) 
University 
High Select 
(Barron‟s=4,5) 
Liberal Arts Low/ 
Med Select 
(Barron‟s=1,2,3) 
Liberal Arts 
High Select 
(Barron‟s=4,5) 
 Bachelor‟s Degrees 
1966 300 438 672 111 279 
1970 443 658 737 150 295 
1975 476 834 941 139 347 
1980 476 821 1,029 138 379 
1985 491 843 1,091 143 402 
1990 557 912 1,101 162 422 
1995 660 958 1,106 190 410 
2000 684 983 1,253 222 426 
2005 754 1,102 1,240 253 451 
2009 829 1,227 1,309 261 472 
 Master‟s Degrees 
1966 15 82 283 0 2 
1970 48 148 343 0 3 
1975 111 247 430 0 4 
1980 121 256 442 0 0 
1985 104 215 552 0 0 
1990 117 254 551 0 0 
1995 126 313 672 1 0 
2000 164 367 708 11 0 
2005 212 409 862 27 0 
2009 234 473 881 42 0 
N (1990) 304 380 39 484 33 
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Table 3.2 Mean master‟s degree production of master‟s degrees, by liberal arts status (1976 Carnegie Classification and 
“prestige” (1982 Barron‟s Category) 
  
University 
Low Select 
(Barron‟s=1) 
University 
Med Select 
(Barron‟s=2,3) 
University 
High Select 
(Barron‟s=4,5) 
Liberal Arts Low/ 
Med Select 
(Barron‟s=1,2,3) 
Liberal Arts 
High Select 
(Barron‟s=4,5) 
1966 86 233 544 3 32 
1970 142 353 609 5 36 
1975 218 482 675 9 30 
1980 226 466 728 14 22 
1985 207 430 772 17 17 
1990 219 483 871 30 18 
1995 264 584 975 45 21 
2000 303 631 1,035 77 19 
2005 380 735 1,212 114 21 
2009 412 790 1,349 143 21 
N (1990) 304 380 39 484 33 
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Table 3.3 Percent of institutions ever adopting or awarding specific master‟s degrees 
 Business (2-digit CIP) Education (2-digit CIP) 
 University Liberal Arts University Liberal Arts 
Selectivity Low Medium High Low/Med High Low Medium High Low/Med High 
1966 20.5% 38.3% 64.1% 0.2% 0.0% 56.0% 72.8% 61.5% 9.2% 21.9% 
1970 33.0% 47.1% 66.7% 1.0% 0.0% 62.2% 75.4% 69.2% 10.9% 30.3% 
1975 48.7% 59.1% 82.1% 2.9% 0.0% 68.8% 79.3% 69.2% 15.2% 30.3% 
1980 55.0% 67.2% 82.1% 7.4% 0.0% 72.8% 83.5% 74.4% 18.1% 30.3% 
1985 62.3% 73.2% 82.1% 14.2% 0.0% 76.4% 85.6% 74.4% 23.5% 30.3% 
1990 67.8% 76.3% 84.6% 17.8% 0.0% 78.6% 86.6% 74.4% 33.3% 30.3% 
1995 71.8% 79.5% 84.6% 26.6% 0.0% 83.4% 89.5% 74.4% 44.0% 30.3% 
2000 77.4% 82.9% 87.2% 39.3% 0.0% 87.4% 92.9% 74.4% 52.8% 30.3% 
2005 80.3% 86.0% 92.3% 47.3% 0.0% 89.6% 94.4% 76.9% 61.2% 30.3% 
2009 82.9% 87.0% 92.3% 50.7% 0.0% 91.0% 94.7% 76.9% 63.9% 30.3% 
           
 Teaching (4-dgit CIP) Educ Admin (4-dgit CIP) 
 University Liberal Arts University Liberal Arts 
Selectivity Low Medium High Low/Med High Low Medium High Low/Med High 
1966 51.0% 61.1% 48.7% 6.0% 18.8% 33.2% 43.6% 23.1% 1.7% 0.0% 
1970 57.1% 72.2% 61.5% 8.9% 27.3% 36.7% 48.2% 25.6% 1.8% 0.0% 
1975 64.6% 75.6% 64.1% 12.5% 30.3% 47.7% 56.2% 35.9% 3.3% 0.0% 
1980 70.2% 78.5% 66.7% 14.0% 30.3% 52.1% 57.7% 43.6% 4.7% 0.0% 
1985 73.4% 80.6% 69.2% 18.4% 30.3% 58.0% 61.7% 43.6% 7.2% 0.0% 
1990 75.3% 82.4% 69.2% 26.5% 30.3% 58.2% 64.0% 43.6% 9.9% 0.0% 
1995 80.1% 83.4% 69.2% 32.3% 30.3% 60.1% 65.3% 43.6% 14.5% 0.0% 
2000 83.1% 85.5% 69.2% 37.2% 30.3% 63.1% 69.1% 48.7% 18.6% 0.0% 
2005 86.3% 87.8% 71.8% 44.5% 30.3% 67.2% 72.5% 51.3% 23.4% 0.0% 
2009 87.0% 88.6% 71.8% 48.7% 30.3% 69.2% 73.3% 51.3% 26.1% 0.0% 
N (1990) 93 81 548 42 475 93 81 548 42 475 
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Table 3.4 Percent of institutions ever adopting or awarding specific master‟s degrees 
 Health (2-digit CIP) Nursing (4-digit CIP) 
 University Liberal Arts University Liberal Arts 
Selectivity Low Medium High Low/Med High Low Medium High Low/Med High 
1966 4.6% 17.5% 43.6% 0.2% 0.0% 1.5% 7.9% 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1970 9.2% 25.9% 46.2% 0.4% 0.0% 3.7% 13.5% 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1975 24.7% 43.0% 53.9% 1.3% 3.0% 6.2% 18.4% 18.0% 0.2% 0.0% 
1980 31.4% 52.0% 59.0% 2.1% 3.0% 9.7% 23.9% 23.1% 0.2% 0.0% 
1985 39.7% 60.6% 61.5% 7.2% 3.0% 15.1% 31.5% 30.8% 3.6% 0.0% 
1990 44.4% 64.7% 64.1% 11.2% 3.0% 18.8% 36.8% 33.3% 5.4% 0.0% 
1995 49.5% 69.2% 66.7% 16.6% 3.0% 25.6% 41.6% 33.3% 8.2% 0.0% 
2000 58.1% 73.4% 66.7% 23.5% 3.0% 34.6% 48.0% 33.3% 13.3% 0.0% 
2005 63.6% 77.3% 74.4% 31.5% 3.0% 40.8% 52.9% 33.3% 17.4% 0.0% 
2009 66.6% 79.1% 74.4% 34.1% 3.0% 43.1% 54.0% 33.3% 19.8% 0.0% 
           
 Engineering (2-dgit CIP) Computer Science (2-dgit CIP) 
 University Liberal Arts University Liberal Arts 
Selectivity Low Medium High Low/Med High Low Medium High Low/Med High 
1966 10.0% 26.9% 71.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 4.1% 20.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
1970 16.7% 33.1% 74.4% 0.0% 3.0% 5.1% 14.6% 41.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1975 18.8% 36.0% 74.4% 0.4% 3.0% 10.7% 24.7% 53.9% 0.2% 0.0% 
1980 21.4% 38.3% 74.4% 0.4% 3.0% 16.8% 33.1% 61.5% 0.2% 0.0% 
1985 25.9% 41.2% 76.9% 0.6% 3.0% 22.6% 41.2% 69.2% 2.0% 0.0% 
1990 28.0% 44.7% 76.9% 0.8% 3.0% 26.6% 47.1% 71.8% 3.3% 0.0% 
1995 30.6% 46.3% 76.9% 1.5% 3.0% 29.2% 50.8% 74.4% 4.0% 3.0% 
2000 33.9% 48.8% 79.5% 2.6% 3.0% 34.9% 56.7% 74.4% 5.1% 3.0% 
2005 36.1% 51.3% 82.1% 3.0% 3.0% 42.1% 59.8% 82.1% 7.2% 6.1% 
2009 37.1% 51.6% 82.1% 3.0% 3.0% 43.8% 60.1% 84.6% 7.6% 6.1% 
N (1990) 93 81 548 42 475 93 81 548 42 475 
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Table 3.5 Logged production of master‟s degrees, random effects linear panel models, by sample, analysis period 1978-1999 
 (1) 
All 
 
(2) 
Public 
 
(3) 
Lib Arts 
 
(4) 
Priv Univ 
Low Select 
(5) 
University 
High Select 
(6) 
Research 1 
(1976 Carnegie) 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) (H3a) 0.050*** 0.037*** 1.236*** 0.321* 0.037 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.177) (0.139) (0.038) (0.006) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) (H3a) 0.089* 0.036 -1.692*** -0.442* 0.150** 0.011 
 (0.042) (0.024) (0.386) (0.189) (0.052) (0.018) 
L3. State Approp (H3b)  0.000     
  (0.000)     
L3 Endow+PrivGrant (H5) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.024*** 0.005 -0.001* 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 State Grants (H5) -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 0.033 0.001 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.036) (0.040) (0.001) (0.000) 
L3 Auxiliary Revenues (H5) -0.002* -0.000 -0.059*** 0.024 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.016) (0.020) (0.001) (0.000) 
L3 Federal Revenues (H5) -0.001* -0.000 0.000 -0.034 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.023) (0.001) (0.000) 
L3 Local Revenues (H5) -0.002*** -0.001 -0.012 -0.647*** 0.005 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.069) (0.177) (0.003) (0.001) 
Time (Years) 0.048*** 0.026*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.021*** 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.003) 
Public Institutions 0.865***      
 (0.180)      
Religious Institution -0.562***  -0.139 -1.590** -2.159*  
 (0.131)  (0.150) (0.512) (0.966)  
Liberal Arts College (H8) -1.041***      
 (0.268)      
Prestige (Barron‟s) (H7)(H8) 0.640***      
 (0.087)      
Liberal Arts X Prestige (H8) -0.728***      
 (0.115)      
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 (1) 
All 
 
(2) 
Public 
 
(3) 
Lib Arts 
 
(4) 
Priv Univ 
Low Select 
(5) 
University 
High Select 
(6) 
Research 1 
(1976 Carnegie) 
Prestige=2 (Barron‟s) (H7)  0.962*** 0.324*    
  (0.194) (0.141)    
Prestige=3 (Barron‟s) (H7)  1.087*** -0.118    
  (0.291) (0.289)    
Prestige=4 (Barron‟s) (H7)  1.300* -0.390    
  (0.513) (0.361)    
Prestige=5 (Barron‟s) (H7)   0.196    
   (0.821)    
Rural -1.460*** -1.558*** -0.902*** -0.737 -2.385* -0.342 
 (0.155) (0.238) (0.220) (0.820) (0.968) (0.247) 
Metro Area<250,000 -1.323*** -1.045*** -0.783** -3.082***  -0.287 
 (0.182) (0.262) (0.259) (0.876)  (0.296) 
Metro Area<500,000 -0.939*** -0.506 -0.528* -2.203*** -0.876 -0.322 
 (0.187) (0.266) (0.265) (0.612) (0.677) (0.354) 
Metro Area<1,000,000 -0.771*** -0.539 -0.433 -1.314 -1.141** -0.348 
 (0.181) (0.275) (0.300) (0.848) (0.399) (0.255) 
Metro Area<2,000,000 -0.497* 0.071 -0.854** -1.796* 0.083 -0.147 
 (0.203) (0.312) (0.304) (0.823) (0.829) (0.397) 
N_clust 1,249 424 531 66 39 49 
N 27,006 11,432 11,326 1,384 853 1,070 
g_max 22 27 22 22 22 22 
g_avg 21.62 26.96 21.33 20.97 21.87 21.84 
r2_w 0.16 0.15 0.29 0.27 0.43 0.36 
r2_b 0.58 0.36 0.18 0.47 0.56 0.37 
r2_o 0.55 0.34 0.21 0.44 0.56 0.37 
sigma_u 1.62 1.47 1.37 1.85 1.43 0.54 
sigma_e 0.71 0.54 0.83 0.84 0.17 0.12 
Rho 0.84 0.88 0.73 0.83 0.99 0.95 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
  
1
8
5
 
Table 3.6 Adoption of specific master‟s degrees, random effects logit panel models, selected results by sample 
 
First Ever MA Degree MA in Bus (2-digit CIP) 
Sample Priv Univ. Lib Arts Public Priv Univ. Lib Arts Public 
Analysis Period 1978-1999 1978-1999 1978-1999 1983-1999 1983-1999 1983-1999 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) (H2a) 0.777 1.471*** 0.829 0.610 0.860** 0.113 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) (H2a) -0.473 -5.570*** -0.571 -2.054 -3.817** 0.480 
L3 State Approp per FTE ($000) (H2b)   -1.075   -0.005 
L3 Endow+PrivGrant per FTE ($000) (H4) -0.125 -0.101** -0.148 -0.036 -0.115* 0.267 
L3 Aux Rev per FTE ($000) (H4) -0.231 -0.133* -0.223 -0.019 -0.099 -0.054 
L4 Employ, State Level (10,000) (H1)    0.001 -0.005 -0.014 
L4 Weekly Earn, State Level ($100) (H1)    -0.004 0.238* -0.007 
Ever Grant BA in Subject    0.958 2.366* 0.191 
Number of Institutions 64 397 64 111 478 133 
Wald Chi2 6.34 45.93 6.87 17.24 94.88 33.12 
 
      
 MA in Edu (2-digit CIP) MA in Health (2-digit CIP) 
Sample Priv Univ. Lib Arts Public Priv Univ. Lib Arts Public 
Analysis Period 1983-1999 1983-1999 1983-1999 1983-1999 1983-1999 1983-1999 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) (H2a) 0.507 0.810*** 0.148 -0.084 1.493** 0.107 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) (H2a) -2.080 -3.731*** 1.122 1.405 -5.900** 0.369 
L3 State Approp per FTE ($000) (H2b)   -0.001   0.080* 
L3 Endow+PrivGrant per FTE ($000) (H4) 0.081 -0.087* -1.379 0.011 -0.237** 0.178 
L3 Aux Rev per FTE ($000) (H4) -0.116 -0.110* -0.023 0.461* -0.110 -0.174 
L4 Employ, State Level (10,000) (H1) -0.038 -0.008 0.049 -0.042 -0.011 0.005 
L4 Weekly Earn, State Level ($100) (H1) 0.262 0.265* 0.175 1.052** 0.201 0.440* 
Ever Grant BA in Subject 0.016 1.173** 0.789 1.689 1.929** 2.094*** 
Number of Institutions 82 422 59 163 512 210 
Wald Chi2 31.05 86.99 10.20 32.78 41.82 50.98 
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 MA in Ed Admin (4-digit CIP) MA in Computer Sci (2-digit CIP) 
Sample Priv Univ. Lib Arts Public Priv Univ. Lib Arts Public 
Analysis Period 1983-1999 1983-1999 1983-1999 1978-1999 1983-1999 1983-1999 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) (H2a) 0.166 0.997** -0.138 0.433** 1.650* 0.561** 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) (H2a) -0.550 -5.125** 1.433 -0.884 -4.948 -1.232 
L3 State Approp per FTE ($000) (H2b)   0.191*   0.006 
L3 Endow+PrivGrant per FTE ($000) (H4) 0.042 -0.258** -1.859 0.086* -0.257 0.705 
L3 Aux Rev per FTE ($000) (H4) -0.034 0.113 -0.266 -0.078 0.062 -0.056 
L4 Employ, Regional Level (10,000) (H1) -0.042 -0.136** -0.034 NA -0.020 -0.011 
L4 Weekly Earn, Regional Lvl ($100) (H1) -0.273 -0.028 -0.960* NA 0.900* 0.055 
Ever Grant BA In Subject -0.098 -23.815 -28.578 1.546** 2.032** 1.979* 
Number of Institutions 153 504 156 244 526 278 
Wald Chi2 19.47 58.47 18.75 61.48 26.50 29.99 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Covariates not included in table: State grants; federal government revenue; religions affiliation; time (years); urbanization 
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Figures 
Figure 3.1 Total undergraduate FTE enrollments as a percentage of 1975 enrollments for institutions in the 50
th
 percentile 
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Figure 3.2 Total undergraduate FTE enrollments as a percentage of 1975 enrollments for institutions in the 25
th
 percentile 
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Figure 3.3 Freshman undergraduate FTE enrollments as a percentage of 1975 enrollments for institutions in the 50
th
 percentile 
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Figure 3.4 Freshman undergraduate FTE enrollments as a percentage of 1975 enrollments for institutions in the 25
th
 percentile 
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Figure 3.5 Median state appropriations per undergraduate FTE ($000s) 
 
 
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
Public Med/High (N=194)
Public Low (N=233)
 192 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 3.1 Random effects and fixed effects linear panel regression, whole 
sample 
 (1) 
RE (1978-
1999) 
(2) 
FE (1978-1999) 
(3) 
RE(1978-
2009) 
(4) 
RE(1978-2009) 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
L3 Undergrad FTE 
(000) 0.050*** 0.030* 0.074*** 0.059*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh 
(000) 0.089* 0.079* -0.014 -0.016 
 (0.042) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032) 
L3 
Endow+PrivGrant -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 State Grants -0.000 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3 Auxiliary 
Revenues -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3 Federal 
Revenues -0.001* -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 Local 
Revenues -0.002*** -0.001* -0.002** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Time (Years) 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public Institutions 0.865*** . 0.860*** . 
 (0.180) . (0.174) . 
Religious 
Institution -0.562*** . -0.493*** . 
 (0.131) . (0.131) . 
Liberal Arts 
College -1.041*** . -0.729** . 
 (0.268) . (0.267) . 
Prestige (Barron‟s) 0.640*** . 0.604*** . 
 (0.087) . (0.086) . 
Liberal Arts X 
Prestige 
-0.728***  -0.808***  
 (0.115)  (0.117)  
Rural -1.460*** . -1.523*** . 
 (0.155) . (0.152) . 
Metro -1.323*** . -1.323*** . 
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 (1) 
RE (1978-
1999) 
(2) 
FE (1978-1999) 
(3) 
RE(1978-
2009) 
(4) 
RE(1978-2009) 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
Area<250,000 
 (0.182) . (0.176) . 
Metro 
Area<500,000 -0.939*** . -0.969*** . 
 (0.187) . (0.184) . 
Metro 
Area<1,000,000 -0.771*** . -0.815*** . 
 (0.181) . (0.176) . 
Metro 
Area<2,000,000 -0.497* . -0.463* . 
 (0.203) . (0.201) . 
N_clust 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249 
N 27,006 27,006 38,921 38,921 
g_max 22 22 32 32 
g_avg 21.62 21.62 31.16 31.16 
r2_w 0.16 0.16 0.25 0.25 
r2_b 0.58 0.12 0.56 0.16 
r2_o 0.55 0.08 0.52 0.11 
sigma_u 1.62 2.53 1.60 2.42 
sigma_e 0.71 0.71 0.86 0.86 
rho 0.84 0.93 0.78 0.89 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; variables omitted from regression table: region, year 
founded 
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Appendix Table 3.2 Random effects and fixed effects linear panel regression, public 
institutions 
 (1) 
RE (1978-
1999) 
(2) 
FE (1978-1999) 
(3) 
RE(1978-
2009) 
(4) 
RE(1978-2009) 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
L3 Undergrad FTE 
(000) 0.037*** 0.027** 0.036*** 0.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh 
(000) 0.036 0.036 0.031 0.031 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
L3 
Endow+PrivGrant -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 State Grants -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3.astatev2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 Auxiliary 
Revenues -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 Federal 
Revenues -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 Local 
Revenues -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time (Years) 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Prestige=2 
(Barron‟s) 0.962*** . 0.954*** . 
 (0.194) . (0.190) . 
Prestige=3 
(Barron‟s) 1.087*** . 1.127*** . 
 (0.291) . (0.279) . 
Prestige=4 
(Barron‟s) 1.300* . 1.270* . 
 (0.513) . (0.494) . 
Rural -1.558*** . -1.568*** . 
 (0.238) . (0.230) . 
Metro 
Area<250,000 -1.045*** . -1.047*** . 
 (0.262) . (0.251) . 
Metro 
Area<500,000 -0.506 . -0.521* . 
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 (1) 
RE (1978-
1999) 
(2) 
FE (1978-1999) 
(3) 
RE(1978-
2009) 
(4) 
RE(1978-2009) 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
 (0.266) . (0.254) . 
Metro 
Area<1,000,000 -0.539 . -0.564* . 
 (0.275) . (0.264) . 
Metro 
Area<2,000,000 0.071 . 0.060 . 
 (0.312) . (0.307) . 
N_clust 424 424 424 424 
N 11,432 11,432 13,550 13,550 
g_max 27 27 32 32 
g_avg 26.96 26.96 31.96 31.96 
r2_w 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.21 
r2_b 0.36 0.26 0.36 0.26 
r2_o 0.34 0.21 0.35 0.19 
sigma_u 1.47 1.86 1.42 1.81 
sigma_e 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.58 
rho 0.88 0.92 0.86 0.91 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: region, year founded 
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Appendix Table 3.3 Random effects and fixed effects linear panel regression, liberal arts 
colleges  
 (1) 
RE (1978-
1999) 
(2) 
FE (1978-1999) 
(3) 
RE(1978-
2009) 
(4) 
RE(1978-2009) 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
L3 Undergrad FTE 
(000) 1.236*** 1.224*** 1.358*** 1.351*** 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.183) (0.181) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh 
(000) -1.692*** -1.564*** -1.719*** -1.615*** 
 (0.386) (0.383) (0.450) (0.441) 
L3 
Endow+PrivGrant -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3 State Grants -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.026) (0.026) 
L3 Auxiliary 
Revenues -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
L3 Federal 
Revenues 0.000 -0.005 -0.018 -0.022 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) 
L3 Local 
Revenues -0.012 -0.017 0.020 0.016 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.062) (0.063) 
Time (Years) 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Religious 
Institution -0.139 . -0.082 . 
 (0.150) . (0.155) . 
Prestige=2 
(Barron‟s) 0.324* . 0.234 . 
 (0.141) . (0.148) . 
Prestige=3 
(Barron‟s) -0.118 . -0.436 . 
 (0.289) . (0.306) . 
Prestige=4 
(Barron‟s) -0.390 . -0.997** . 
 (0.361) . (0.369) . 
Prestige=5 
(Barron‟s) 0.196 . -0.453 . 
 (0.821) . (0.813) . 
Rural -0.902*** . -1.012*** . 
 (0.220) . (0.221) . 
Metro -0.783** . -0.818** . 
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 (1) 
RE (1978-
1999) 
(2) 
FE (1978-1999) 
(3) 
RE(1978-
2009) 
(4) 
RE(1978-2009) 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
Area<250,000 
 (0.259) . (0.261) . 
Metro 
Area<500,000 -0.528* . -0.579* . 
 (0.265) . (0.273) . 
Metro 
Area<1,000,000 -0.433 . -0.561 . 
 (0.300) . (0.301) . 
Metro 
Area<2,000,000 -0.854** . -0.801** . 
 (0.304) . (0.305) . 
N_clust 531 531 531 531 
N 11,326 11,326 16,188 16,188 
g_max 22 22 32 32 
g_avg 21.33 21.33 30.49 30.49 
r2_w 0.29 0.29 0.40 0.40 
r2_b 0.18 0.05 0.22 0.09 
r2_o 0.21 0.11 0.28 0.20 
sigma_u 1.37 1.54 1.43 1.61 
sigma_e 0.83 0.83 0.99 0.99 
rho 0.73 0.78 0.68 0.73 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: region, year founded  
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Appendix Table 3.4 Random effects and fixed effects linear panel regression, private 
universities low selectivity (Barrons=1) 
 (1) 
RE (1978-
1999) 
(2) 
FE (1978-1999) 
(3) 
RE(1978-
2009) 
(4) 
RE(1978-2009) 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
L3 Undergrad FTE 
(000) 0.321* 0.313* 0.399*** 0.392** 
 (0.139) (0.143) (0.119) (0.121) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh 
(000) -0.442* -0.417* -0.608* -0.595* 
 (0.189) (0.187) (0.259) (0.261) 
L3 
Endow+PrivGrant 0.005 0.004 -0.009** -0.009** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) 
L3 State Grants 0.033 0.030 0.012 0.011 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
L3 Auxiliary 
Revenues 0.024 0.023 0.001 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) 
L3 Federal 
Revenues -0.034 -0.035 -0.030** -0.030* 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) 
L3 Local 
Revenues -0.647*** -0.666*** -0.320** -0.332** 
 (0.177) (0.175) (0.115) (0.115) 
Time (Years) 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) 
Religious 
Institution -1.590** . -1.611*** . 
 (0.512) . (0.489) . 
Rural -0.737 . -0.528 . 
 (0.820) . (0.815) . 
Metro 
Area<250,000 -3.082*** . -2.500** . 
 (0.876) . (0.880) . 
Metro 
Area<500,000 -2.203*** . -1.964** . 
 (0.612) . (0.606) . 
Metro 
Area<1,000,000 -1.314 . -1.039 . 
 (0.848) . (0.833) . 
Metro 
Area<2,000,000 -1.796* . -1.509 . 
 (0.823) . (0.804) . 
N_clust 66 66 66 66 
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N 1,384 1,384 1,977 1,977 
g_max 22 22 32 32 
g_avg 20.97 20.97 29.95 29.95 
r2_w 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.36 
r2_b 0.47 0.08 0.46 0.08 
r2_o 0.44 0.10 0.43 0.13 
sigma_u 1.85 2.22 1.80 2.16 
sigma_e 0.84 0.84 0.95 0.95 
Rho 0.83 0.88 0.78 0.84 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: region, year founded 
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Appendix Table 3.5 Random effects and fixed effects linear panel regression, private 
universities, medium selectivity (Barrons=2, 3) 
 (1) 
RE (1978-
1999) 
(2) 
FE (1978-1999) 
(3) 
RE(1978-
2009) 
(4) 
RE(1978-2009) 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
L3 Undergrad FTE 
(000) 0.082* 0.062 0.140** 0.123** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.043) (0.045) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh 
(000) -0.079 -0.084 -0.092 -0.083 
 (0.092) (0.093) (0.098) (0.099) 
L3 
Endow+PrivGrant -0.002 -0.002 -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 State Grants 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
L3 Auxiliary 
Revenues -0.001 -0.002 -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3 Federal 
Revenues 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3 Local 
Revenues 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Time (Years) 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Religious 
Institution -0.845*** . -0.782*** . 
 (0.242) . (0.226) . 
Rural -2.384*** . -2.430*** . 
 (0.500) . (0.491) . 
Metro 
Area<250,000 -2.300*** . -2.272*** . 
 (0.442) . (0.411) . 
Metro 
Area<500,000 -1.885*** . -1.901*** . 
 (0.559) . (0.532) . 
Metro 
Area<1,000,000 -1.233*** . -1.211*** . 
 (0.366) . (0.336) . 
Metro 
Area<2,000,000 -0.373 . -0.382 . 
 (0.401) . (0.379) . 
N_clust 190 190 190 190 
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N 4,152 4,152 6,009 6,009 
g_max 22 22 32 32 
g_avg 21.85 21.85 31.63 31.63 
r2_w 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.20 
r2_b 0.44 0.23 0.47 0.22 
r2_o 0.42 0.11 0.45 0.14 
sigma_u 1.61 2.14 1.54 2.02 
sigma_e 0.54 0.54 0.65 0.65 
rho 0.90 0.94 0.85 0.91 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: region, year founded 
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Appendix Table 3.6 Random effects and fixed effects linear panel regression, highly 
selective universities (note: includes four public institutions) 
 (1) 
RE (1978-
1999) 
(2) 
FE (1978-1999) 
(3) 
RE(1978-
2009) 
(4) 
RE(1978-2009) 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
L3 Undergrad FTE 
(000) 0.037 0.034 0.102 0.099 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.055) (0.058) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh 
(000) 0.150** 0.148** 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.112) (0.112) 
L3 
Endow+PrivGrant -0.001* -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 State Grants 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3 Auxiliary 
Revenues -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L3 Federal 
Revenues 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 Local 
Revenues 0.005 0.005 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Time (Years) 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.009 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
Religious 
Affiliation -2.159* . -2.015* . 
 (0.966) . (0.990) . 
Rural -2.385* . -2.361* . 
 (0.968) . (0.949) . 
Metro 
Area<250,000 . .   
 . .   
Metro 
Area<500,000 -0.876 . -0.896 . 
 (0.677) . (0.641) . 
Metro 
Area<1,000,000 -1.141** . -1.149** . 
 (0.399) . (0.370) . 
Metro 
Area<2,000,000 0.083 . -0.009 . 
 (0.829) . (0.816) . 
N_clust 39 39 39 39 
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N 853 853 1,243 1,243 
g_max 22 22 32 32 
g_avg 21.87 21.87 31.87 31.87 
r2_w 0.43 0.43 0.17 0.17 
r2_b 0.56 0.21 0.58 0.27 
r2_o 0.56 0.18 0.56 0.25 
sigma_u 1.43 1.61 1.48 1.58 
sigma_e 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.39 
rho 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.94 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: region, year founded 
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Appendix Table 3.7 Random effects and fixed effects linear panel regression, Research 1 
institutions (1976 Carnegie Classification) 
 (1) 
RE (1978-
1999) 
(2) 
FE (1978-1999) 
(3) 
RE(1978-
2009) 
(4) 
RE(1978-2009) 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
L3 Undergrad FTE 
(000) 0.005 0.003 0.010 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh 
(000) 0.011 0.010 0.004 0.004 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
L3 
Endow+PrivGrant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 State Grants 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 Auxiliary 
Revenues -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 Federal 
Revenues 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
L3 Local 
Revenues 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time (Years) 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Rural -0.342 . -0.451 . 
 (0.247) . (0.239) . 
Metro 
Area<250,000 -0.287 . -0.331 . 
 (0.296) . (0.274) . 
Metro 
Area<500,000 -0.322 . -0.418 . 
 (0.354) . (0.338) . 
Metro 
Area<1,000,000 -0.348 . -0.364 . 
 (0.255) . (0.242) . 
Metro 
Area<2,000,000 -0.147 . -0.143 . 
 (0.397) . (0.378) . 
N_clust 49 49 49 49 
N 1,070 1,070 1,559 1,559 
g_max 22 22 32 32 
g_avg 21.84 21.84 31.82 31.82 
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r2_w 0.36 0.36 0.55 0.55 
r2_b 0.37 0.29 0.42 0.26 
r2_o 0.37 0.23 0.43 0.26 
sigma_u 0.54 0.65 0.57 0.63 
sigma_e 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 
rho 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.95 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: region, year founded 
  
 206 
 
Appendix Table 3.8 Adoption of first master‟s degree, random effects logit panel model 
 
Priv Univ. Liberal Arts Public 
 (1978-1999)  (1978-1999)  (1978-1999) 
 
b/se b/se b/se 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) 0.777 1.471*** 0.829 
 
(0.721) (0.403) (0.713) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) -0.473 -5.570*** -0.571 
 
(1.495) (1.483) (1.492) 
L3. State Grants/TotFTE ($000) -0.753 -0.005 -0.868 
 
(0.632) (0.125) (0.675) 
L3. State Approp/TotFTE ($000)  
 
-1.075 
   
(1.368) 
L3. Aux Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.231 -0.133* -0.223 
 
(0.217) (0.055) (0.212) 
L3. Fed Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.461 -0.195** -0.460 
 
(0.298) (0.067) (0.292) 
L3. Endow+PrivGrant/TotFTE ($000) -0.125 -0.101** -0.148 
 
(0.185) (0.038) (0.190) 
Religious Institution -0.168 0.382* 
 
 
(0.849) (0.182) 
 Time (Years) 0.188 0.030 0.183
 
(0.127) (0.025) (0.118) 
Number of Institutions 64 397 64 
N 888 6,042 888 
Max Number of Time Periods 22 22 22 
Avg Number of Time Periods 13.88 15.22 13.88 
chi2 6.34 45.93 6.87 
Log likelihood -148.97 -784.90 -148.63 
sigma_u 2.08 0.30 2.08 
Rho 0.57 0.03 0.57 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: urbanization 
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Appendix Table 3.9 Adoption of MA in business (2-digit CIP), random effects logit panel 
model 
 Private University Liberal Arts Public 
 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) 0.528 0.610 0.993*** 0.860** 0.095 0.113 
 
(0.459) (0.323) (0.251) (0.276) (0.116) (0.147) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) -1.137 -2.054 -4.361*** -3.817** 0.250 0.480 
 
(1.418) (1.208) (1.176) (1.294) (0.560) (0.736) 
L3. State Grants/TotFTE ($000) 0.059 0.034 0.067 0.049 0.449 0.429 
 
(0.256) (0.176) (0.102) (0.113) (0.266) (0.414) 
L3. State Approp/TotFTE ($000) 
    
-0.025 -0.005 
     
(0.042) (0.057) 
L3. Aux Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.223 -0.019 -0.026 -0.099 -0.147 -0.054 
 
(0.182) (0.108) (0.054) (0.064) (0.118) (0.135) 
L3. Fed Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.130 -0.036 0.025 -0.125 -0.074 -0.081 
 
(0.150) (0.093) (0.021) (0.077) (0.083) (0.114) 
L3. Endow+PrivGrant/TotFTE 
($000) -0.080 -0.036 -0.141** -0.115* 0.241 0.267 
 
(0.132) (0.083) (0.045) (0.048) (0.322) (0.343) 
L4 Employment Mgt Occ (10,000) 
State level 
 
0.001 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.014 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.009) 
L4 Weekly Earn Mgt Occ ($100) 
State level 
 
-0.004 
 
0.238* 
 
-0.007 
  
(0.199) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.144) 
Religious Institution -1.466 -0.365 0.348 0.480* 
  
 
(0.806) (0.390) (0.193) (0.219) 
  Time (Years) 0.170** 0.031 0.059*** 0.083*** 0.008 0.016 
 
(0.065) (0.038) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.034) 
Ever Grant BA in Bus 2.472 0.958 2.070** 2.366* 0.384 0.191 
 
(1.571) (1.144) (0.724) (1.019) (0.485) (0.680) 
Number of Institutions 135 111 521 478 159 133 
N 2,118 1,484 9,541 7,009 2,532 1,776 
Max Number of Time Periods 22 17 22 17 22 17 
Avg Number of Time Periods 15.69 13.37 18.31 14.66 15.92 13.35 
chi2 14.82 17.24 106.53 94.88 40.27 33.12 
Log likelihood -270.59 -175.33 -716.36 -565.05 -331.23 -226.02 
sigma_u 2.96 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Rho 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: urbanization 
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Appendix Table 3.10 Adoption of MA in education (2-digit CIP), random effects logit 
panel model 
 Private University Liberal Arts Public 
 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) 0.094 0.507 0.933** 0.810*** 0.258 0.148 
 
(0.232) (0.321) (0.305) (0.238) (0.293) (0.461) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) -0.409 -2.080 -4.314*** -3.731*** -0.312 1.122 
 
(0.998) (1.596) (1.282) (1.076) (1.232) (1.831) 
L3. State Grants/TotFTE ($000) -0.648 -0.402 -0.047 -0.068 0.421 0.273 
 
(0.375) (0.381) (0.127) (0.122) (0.411) (0.655) 
L3. State Approp/TotFTE ($000) 
    
0.056 -0.001 
     
(0.071) (0.117) 
L3. Aux Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.152 -0.116 -0.058 -0.110* -0.111 -0.023 
 
(0.108) (0.125) (0.055) (0.053) (0.178) (0.289) 
L3. Fed Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.289 -0.457 -0.250** -0.181* 0.129 0.428* 
 
(0.171) (0.260) (0.088) (0.078) (0.100) (0.190) 
L3. Endow+PrivGrant/TotFTE 
($000) -0.008 0.081 -0.133** -0.087* -0.273 -1.379 
 
(0.086) (0.101) (0.043) (0.037) (0.422) (0.796) 
L4 Employment Edu Occ (10,000) 
State level 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.008 
 
0.049 
  
(0.021) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.064) 
L4 Weekly Earn Edu Occ ($100) 
State level 
 
0.262 
 
0.265* 
 
0.175 
  
(0.271) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.328) 
Religious Institution 0.385 0.143 0.221 0.229 
  
 
(0.348) (0.429) (0.212) (0.195) 
  Time (Years) 0.091** 0.155** 0.100** 0.040* 0.076* 0.247* 
 
(0.029) (0.053) (0.031) (0.020) (0.036) (0.122) 
Ever Grant BA in Edu -0.105 0.016 1.396** 1.173** 0.924 0.789 
 
(0.510) (0.706) (0.470) (0.408) (0.874) (1.209) 
Number of Institutions 99 82 454 422 67 59 
N 1,614 1,143 7,951 5,743 1,177 853 
Max Number of Time Periods 22 17 22 17 22 17 
Avg Number of Time Periods 16.30 13.94 17.51 13.61 17.57 14.46 
chi2 25.81 31.05 35.39 86.99 23.79 10.20 
Log likelihood -195.22 -124.91 -729.27 -627.99 -133.89 -90.48 
sigma_u 0.01 0.01 0.76 0.01 0.01 1.24 
Rho 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.32 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: urbanization 
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Appendix Table 3.11 Adoption of MA in teaching (4-digit CIP), random effects logit 
panel model 
 Private University Liberal Arts 
 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) 0.151 -0.002 0.690 0.616* 
 
(0.192) (0.298) (0.353) (0.254) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) 0.614 1.502 -3.934** -3.809** 
 
(0.732) (1.034) (1.520) (1.260) 
L3. State Grants/TotFTE ($000) 0.010 0.097 -0.251 -0.219 
 
(0.293) (0.285) (0.183) (0.177) 
L3. Aux Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.182 -0.072 0.015 -0.003 
 
(0.114) (0.144) (0.060) (0.061) 
L3. Fed Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.156 -0.475 -0.004 0.002 
 
(0.118) (0.307) (0.029) (0.025) 
L3. Endow+PrivGrant/TotFTE 
($000) 0.071 -0.062 -0.100* -0.084 
 
(0.082) (0.156) (0.044) (0.043) 
L4 Employment Teach Occ (10,000) 
State level  -0.019 
 
-0.014 
  
(0.035) 
 
(0.017) 
L4 Weekly Earn Teach Occ ($100) 
State level  -0.196 
 
0.165 
  
(0.243) 
 
(0.128) 
Religious Institution 0.691 0.315 0.633* 0.475 
 
(0.396) (0.512) (0.312) (0.243) 
Time (Years) 0.050 0.163** 0.066* -0.009 
 
(0.029) (0.058) (0.033) (0.027) 
Ever Grant BA in Teaching 0.844 0.307 0.417 0.349 
 
(0.532) (0.570) (0.380) (0.364) 
Number of Institutions 117 99 467 442 
N 2,010 1,444 8,677 6,383 
Max Number of Time Periods 22 17 22 17 
Avg Number of Time Periods 17.18 14.59 18.58 14.44 
chi2 29.06 25.21 21.30 35.32 
Log likelihood -180.32 -111.56 -542.08 -479.89 
sigma_u 0.01 0.00 0.75 0.01 
Rho 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: urbanization 
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Appendix Table 3.12 Adoption of MA in education administration (4-digit CIP), random 
effects logit panel model 
 Private University Liberal Arts Public 
 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp 
Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp 
Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp 
Vars 
1983-
1999 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) 0.022 0.166 1.124** 0.997** -0.080 -0.138 
 
(0.233) (0.326) (0.373) (0.384) (0.108) (0.285) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) 0.555 -0.550 -5.248** -5.125** 0.813 1.433 
 
(0.964) (1.497) (1.675) (1.821) (0.558) (1.469) 
L3. State Grants/TotFTE ($000) -0.166 0.111 -0.528* -0.358 0.276 0.343 
 
(0.263) (0.281) (0.250) (0.254) (0.267) (0.446) 
L3. State Approp/TotFTE ($000) 
 
 
 
 0.042 0.191* 
  
 
 
 (0.040) (0.095) 
L3. Aux Rev/TotFTE ($000) 0.015 -0.034 0.133* 0.113 -0.251 -0.266 
 
(0.100) (0.129) (0.057) (0.079) (0.223) (0.431) 
L3. Fed Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.091 -0.335 0.028 0.043* 0.117 0.116 
 
(0.073) (0.190) (0.019) (0.020) (0.099) (0.271) 
L3. Endow+PrivGrant/TotFTE 
($000) 0.001 0.042 
-
0.252*** -0.258** -1.147 -1.859 
 
(0.057) (0.074) (0.070) (0.079) (0.651) (1.204) 
L4 Employ EdAdm Occ (10,000) 
Regional level (9 regions) 
 
-0.042 
 
-0.136** 
 
-0.034 
  
(0.075) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.159) 
L4 Weekly Earn EdAdm Occ 
($100) 
Regional level (9 regions) 
 
-0.273 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.960* 
  
(0.236) 
 
(0.159) 
 
(0.434) 
Religious Institution -0.011 -0.348 0.551 0.674* 
 
 
 
(0.320) (0.431) (0.291) (0.316) 
 
 
Time (Years) 0.039 0.127** 0.070** 0.071* -0.038 0.131 
 
(0.027) (0.045) (0.023) (0.031) (0.033) (0.088) 
Ever Grant BA in Edadm -0.480 -0.098 -23.626 -23.815 -22.527 -28.578 
 
(0.760) (0.782) (59033) (94739) (76020) (70810) 
Number of Institutions 174 153 524 504 167 156 
N 3,203 2,335 10,370 7,786 3,222 2,405 
Max Number of Time Periods 22 17 22 17 22 17 
Avg Number of Time Periods 18.41 15.26 19.79 15.45 19.29 15.42 
chi2 16.20 19.47 60.23 58.47 19.58 18.75 
Log likelihood -225.85 -142.91 -351.90 -303.42 -158.21 -101.34 
sigma_u 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 4.69 
Rho 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: urbanization 
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Appendix Table 3.13 Adoption of MA in health (2-digit CIP), random effects logit panel 
model 
 Private University Liberal Arts Public 
 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp 
Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp 
Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp 
Vars 
1983-
1999 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) 0.134 -0.084 1.461*** 1.493** 0.193* 0.107 
 
(0.260) (0.531) (0.428) (0.466) (0.082) (0.097) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) -0.101 1.405 -5.365** -5.900** 0.089 0.369 
 
(0.859) (1.923) (1.658) (1.849) (0.373) (0.451) 
L3. State Grants/TotFTE ($000) 0.055 0.036 -0.271 -0.197 -0.205 -0.260 
 
(0.192) (0.292) (0.195) (0.194) (0.291) (0.338) 
L3. State Approp/TotFTE ($000)  
   
0.082** 0.080* 
     
(0.030) (0.035) 
L3. Aux Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.450** -0.461* -0.067 -0.110 -0.120 -0.174 
 
(0.170) (0.214) (0.076) (0.081) (0.103) (0.113) 
L3. Fed Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.016 0.016 0.032 0.025 -0.047 -0.059 
 
(0.069) (0.060) (0.079) (0.087) (0.058) (0.067) 
L3. Endow+PrivGrant/TotFTE 
($000) -0.001 0.011 -0.241** -0.237** 0.075 0.178 
 
(0.091) (0.103) (0.076) (0.081) (0.298) (0.306) 
L4 Employ Health Occ 
(10,0000)  -0.042 
 
-0.011 
 
0.005 
State level 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.012) 
L4 Weekly Earn Health Occ 
($100)  1.052** 
 
0.201 
 
0.440* 
State level 
 
(0.401) 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.180) 
Religious Institution -0.146 -0.029 0.036 0.110 
  
 
(0.542) (0.827) (0.264) (0.275) 
  Time (Years) 0.127* 0.154 0.079** 0.017 0.027 -0.025 
 
(0.057) (0.087) (0.028) (0.044) (0.019) (0.034) 
Ever Grant BA in Health 1.234 1.689 1.819*** 1.929** 2.218*** 2.094*** 
 
(0.772) (1.244) (0.509) (0.589) (0.560) (0.605) 
Number of Institutions 202 163 536 512 241 210 
N 3,365 2,364 10,317 7,675 4,051 2,898 
Max Number of Time Periods 22 17 22 17 22 17 
Avg Number of Time Periods 16.66 14.50 19.25 14.99 16.81 13.80 
chi2 17.45 32.78 49.22 41.82 61.52 50.98 
Log likelihood -298.07 -184.33 -435.02 -393.97 -428.26 -329.64 
sigma_u 2.40 3.72 0.62 0.58 0.00 0.00 
Rho 0.64 0.81 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.00 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: urbanization 
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Appendix Table 3.14 Adoption of MA in nursing (4-digit CIP), random effects logit 
panel model 
 Private University Public 
 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) 0.216 0.203 0.100 0.081 
 
(0.159) (0.189) (0.057) (0.065) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) -0.585 -0.387 -0.338 -0.288 
 
(0.624) (0.751) (0.286) (0.325) 
L3. State Grants/TotFTE ($000) -0.107 -0.093 0.066 0.323* 
 
(0.120) (0.142) (0.080) (0.135) 
L3. State Approp/TotFTE ($000) 
  
0.011 0.004 
   
(0.033) (0.040) 
L3. Aux Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.211* -0.316* -0.107 -0.066 
 
(0.104) (0.141) (0.109) (0.115) 
L3. Fed Rev/TotFTE ($000) 0.049 0.037 -0.068 -0.145 
 
(0.035) (0.052) (0.088) (0.113) 
L3. Endow+PrivGrant/TotFTE 
($000) -0.065 -0.036 0.400 0.330 
 
(0.069) (0.086) (0.228) (0.280) 
L4 Employment Nurse Occ (10,000) 
State level 
 
-0.040 
 
0.039 
  
(0.038) 
 
(0.031) 
L4 Weekly Earn Nurse Occ ($100) 
State level 
 
0.377 
 
0.096 
  
(0.200) 
 
(0.146) 
Religious Institution 0.027 0.155 
  
 
(0.320) (0.398) 
  Time (Years) 0.072 0.025 0.029 -0.013
 
(0.037) (0.063) (0.018) (0.036) 
Ever Grant BA in Nursing 2.610*** 3.025*** 3.346*** 3.147*** 
 
(0.525) (0.718) (0.526) (0.528) 
Number of Institutions 262 241 355 335 
N 4,899 3,555 6,688 4,942 
Max Number of Time Periods 22 17 22 17 
Avg Number of Time Periods 18.70 14.75 18.84 14.75 
chi2 33.73 27.74 63.05 60.52 
Log likelihood -279.20 -227.51 -457.44 -387.47 
sigma_u 0.59 0.87 0.00 0.01 
Rho 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: urbanization 
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Appendix Table 3.15 Adoption of MA in computer science (2-digit CIP), random effects 
logit panel model 
 
Private 
University Liberal Arts Public 
 
No Emp 
1978-1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) 0.433** 1.633** 1.650* 0.202* 0.561** 
 
(0.150) (0.599) (0.693) (0.079) (0.181) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) -0.884 -4.592 -4.948 -0.210 -1.232 
 
(0.558) (2.490) (2.919) (0.291) (0.711) 
L3. State Grants/TotFTE ($000) 0.180* -1.226 -0.944 -0.156 -0.127 
 
(0.078) (0.719) (0.744) (0.319) (0.478) 
L3. State Approp/TotFTE ($000)    0.023 0.006 
 
   (0.034) (0.061) 
L3. Aux Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.078 0.082 0.062 0.031 -0.056 
 
(0.084) (0.132) (0.152) (0.107) (0.193) 
L3. Fed Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.075 -0.107 -0.162 0.117 0.359* 
 
(0.044) (0.192) (0.275) (0.089) (0.155) 
L3. Endow+PrivGrant/TotFTE 
($000) 0.086* -0.351* -0.257 0.599* 0.705 
 
(0.044) (0.154) (0.145) (0.237) (0.380) 
L4 Employment CompSci (10,000) 
Regional level (9 regions)   -0.020  -0.011 
 
  (0.037)  (0.025) 
L4 Weekly Earn CompSci ($100) 
Regional level (9 regions)   0.900*  0.055 
 
  (0.451)  (0.309) 
Religious Institution -0.189 -0.836 -0.580   
 
(0.269) (0.570) (0.625)   
Time (Years) -0.063** -0.057 -0.154 -0.030 0.040 
 
(0.024) (0.051) (0.083) (0.027) (0.061) 
Ever Grant BA in CompSci 1.546** 2.192*** 2.032** 1.642*** 1.979* 
 
(0.495) (0.660) (0.730) (0.430) (0.950) 
Number of Institutions 244 544 526 318 278 
N 4,497 11,070 8,381 5,565 4,031 
Max Number of Time Periods 22 22 17 22 17 
Avg Number of Time Periods 18.43 20.35 15.93 17.50 14.50 
chi2 61.48 26.26 26.50 56.79 29.99 
Log likelihood -293.74 -130.57 -108.90 -491.25 -330.23 
sigma_u 0.00 1.31 1.11 1.01 2.26 
Rho 0.00 0.34 0.27 0.24 0.61 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: urbanization 
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Appendix Table 3.16 Adoption of MA in engineering (2-digit CIP), random effects logit 
panel model 
 Private University Public 
 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp Vars 
1983-
1999 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) 0.218 0.274 0.181* 0.218* 
 
(0.292) (0.383) (0.083) (0.094) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) -0.228 -0.635 0.045 0.021 
 
(1.233) (1.699) (0.396) (0.459) 
L3. State Grants/TotFTE ($000) -0.470 -0.411 0.024 0.033 
 
(0.476) (0.526) (0.323) (0.353) 
L3. State Approp/TotFTE ($000)   0.048 0.037 
 
  (0.037) (0.043) 
L3. Aux Rev/TotFTE ($000) 0.066 0.121 -0.148 -0.270 
 
(0.108) (0.125) (0.132) (0.165) 
L3. Fed Rev/TotFTE ($000) 0.055 0.044 0.228* 0.354*** 
 
(0.119) (0.131) (0.091) (0.100) 
L3. Endow+PrivGrant/TotFTE 
($000) 
Regional level (9 regions) -0.017 0.000 0.535 0.835* 
 
(0.112) (0.124) (0.306) (0.328) 
L4 Employment Engr Occ (10,000) 
Regional level (9 regions)  -0.033  -0.014 
 
 (0.025)  (0.016) 
L4 Weekly Earn Engr Occ ($100)  0.679  0.310 
 
 (0.482)  (0.291) 
Religious Institution -0.235 -0.183   
 
(0.478) (0.573)   
Time (Years) 0.016 -0.043 -0.009 -0.053 
 
(0.038) (0.065) (0.024) (0.035) 
Ever Grant BA in Engr 1.556** 1.580* 1.963*** 1.928*** 
 
(0.531) (0.676) (0.400) (0.468) 
Number of Institutions 225 213 268 255 
N 4,572 3,381 5,268 3,931 
Max Number of Time Periods 22 17 22 17 
Avg Number of Time Periods 20.32 15.87 19.66 15.42 
chi2 15.75 12.59 64.62 68.29 
Log likelihood -119.46 -93.34 -258.36 -201.53 
sigma_u 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.00 
Rho 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: urbanization 
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Appendix Table 3.17 Adoption of MA in psychology (2-digit CIP), random effects logit 
panel model 
 Private University Liberal Arts Public 
 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp 
Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp 
Vars 
1983-
1999 
No Emp 
1978-
1999 
Emp 
Vars 
1983-
1999 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) 0.130 0.189 0.540 0.683 0.668* 0.295 
 
(0.186) (0.384) (0.367) (0.361) (0.277) (0.282) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) 0.141 0.417 -3.542* -4.411* -0.456 0.749 
 
(0.781) (1.421) (1.741) (1.787) (1.194) (1.150) 
L3. State Grants/TotFTE ($000) -0.007 -0.242 0.187 0.198 0.359 -0.472 
 
(0.225) (0.369) (0.138) (0.136) (0.374) (0.858) 
L3. State Approp/TotFTE ($000)     0.198* 0.220 
 
    (0.097) (0.129) 
L3. Aux Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.074 -0.167 -0.035 0.013 -0.346 0.100 
 
(0.084) (0.179) (0.090) (0.084) (0.269) (0.294) 
L3. Fed Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.076 -0.146 0.001 -0.000 -0.278 -0.268 
 
(0.089) (0.128) (0.051) (0.063) (0.260) (0.266) 
L3. Endow+PrivGrant/TotFTE 
($000) 0.080 0.226** -0.170* -0.159* 0.362 -0.568 
 
(0.053) (0.087) (0.069) (0.069) (0.774) (1.023) 
L4 Employ Psych Occ (10,000) 
Regional level (9 regions)  0.119  -0.018  -0.314* 
 
 (0.106)  (0.049)  (0.138) 
L4 Weekly Earn Psych Occ 
($100) 
Regional level (9 regions)  0.051  0.272  0.235 
 
 (0.322)  (0.211)  (0.344) 
Religious Institution 0.408 1.227 0.150 0.334   
 
(0.320) (0.774) (0.298) (0.305)   
Time (Years) 0.024 0.181* 0.055 0.011 0.123* 0.245* 
 
(0.024) (0.077) (0.034) (0.031) (0.054) (0.120) 
Ever Grant BA in Psych 0.925 1.629 0.688 1.901 3.490* 0.783 
 
(1.055) (1.787) (0.548) (1.020) (1.668) (1.158) 
Number of Institutions 174 152 510 488 166 149 
N 3,083 2,204 10,043 7,525 3,085 2,299 
Max Number of Time Periods 22 17 22 17 22 17 
Avg Number of Time Periods 17.72 14.50 19.69 15.42 18.58 15.43 
chi2 18.88 16.94 19.43 38.60 27.60 10.21 
Log likelihood -266.44 -175.25 -369.32 -317.35 -202.06 -128.49 
sigma_u 0.01 2.68 0.69 0.09 3.82 1.92 
rho 0.00 0.69 0.13 0.00 0.82 0.53 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Variables omitted from regression table: urbanization 
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Appendix Table 3.18 Adoption of MA in biology/life sciences (2-digit CIP), random 
effects logit panel model  
 
Private University 
1978-1999 
Liberal Arts 
1978-1999 
Public 
1978-1999 
 
b/se b/se b/se 
L3 Undergrad FTE (000) 0.714*** 0.052 0.207 
 
(0.215) (1.094) (0.249) 
L3 UG FTE Fresh (000) -1.984 -0.000 0.195 
 
(1.108) (4.031) (1.188) 
L3. State Grants/TotFTE ($000) 0.011 -0.098 -0.127 
 
(0.461) (0.496) (0.627) 
L3. State Approp/TotFTE ($000)   0.080 
 
  (0.065) 
L3. Aux Rev/TotFTE ($000) 0.044 0.047 0.010 
 
(0.141) (0.052) (0.226) 
L3. Fed Rev/TotFTE ($000) -0.024 -0.009 0.324** 
 
(0.137) (0.026) (0.122) 
L3. Endow+PrivGrant/TotFTE ($000) 0.158* -0.015 0.027 
 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.715) 
Religious Institution -0.232 -1.218  
 
(0.567) (0.700)  
Time (Years) -0.017 0.031 -0.016 
 
(0.044) (0.054) (0.043) 
Number of Institutions 164 508 126 
N 3,305 10,414 2,591 
Max Number of Time Periods 22 22 22 
Avg Number of Time Periods 20.15 20.50 20.56 
chi2 28.91 4.15 13.07 
Log likelihood -92.10 -97.58 -92.06 
sigma_u 0.00 1.71 0.01 
Rho 0.00 0.47 0.00 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: do not include models with employment variables due to low number of individuals employed in 
biology/life sciences occupations 
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Chapter 4 :  
Mission Drift in Liberal Arts Colleges: The Rise of the Enrollment Economy 
 
 Clark (1956) studies mission drift and the enrollment economy, using California 
adult education as a case.  The traditional pedagogical philosophy of adult education 
providers was similar to that of K-12 and higher education: educators determine what 
knowledge is important and students exercise choice within predetermined channels.
39
  
However, adult education administrators were particularly sensitive to the enrollment 
economy – the extent to which “school income is largely set by student attendance” 
(Clark, 1956, p. 332) – because revenue from state and local governments was 
determined by enrollments.  Prior to 1925, adult education generated strong enrollments 
by providing basic education to immigrants.  Legislators valued adult education because 
socializing immigrants was a national imperative.   
After 1925, however, enrollments declined as immigration ebbed. Administrators 
responded by broadening the curriculum to generate enrollments.  Enrollments eventually 
became the primary criteria by which courses were initiated and continued.  The 
pedagogical philosophy of educators determining what knowledge students obtain was 
abandoned in favor of a customer service ethic.  Clark (1956, p. 336) concludes that, 
this value adaptation, where purpose is reduced to service, will be pronounced 
when (a) organizations attached to a precarious value (b) continue to find 
themselves without a dependable clientele, or more broadly, with no specific 
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 Clark (1956) distinguishes between adult education and community colleges. 
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outside social forces to sustain them. Then organizational needs of survival and 
security are likely to propel an adaptation to a diffuse social base, and purpose 
will be adjusted accordingly. 
Clark‟s (1956) analysis of California adult education is prescient of contemporary 
critiques of commercialization, marketization, privatization, and consumerism in higher 
education (e.g., Bloom, 1987; Bok, 2003; Kirp, 2003; Labaree, 1997; Newman, 
Couturier, & Scurry, 2004; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).    
Empirical scholarship examining the historical origins of the contemporary higher 
education system tends to identify efforts to increase enrollments as the impetus for 
important changes in organizational behavior (Brint & Karabel, 1989; Kraatz & Zajac, 
1996; Veysey, 1965).  Brint and Karabel (1991) argue that community colleges originally 
focused on the “academic mission” of lower-level (i.e. freshman and sophomore) 
undergraduate coursework.  However, community college enrollments related to the 
academic mission declined once universities realized they could increase tuition-related 
revenue by no longer diverting students to community colleges for lower-level 
coursework.  In response, community colleges invented the “vocational mission” to 
generate the enrollments necessary for survival (Brint & Karabel, 1989).  In another 
exemplar, Kraatz and Zajac (1996) show that liberal arts colleges adopted professional 
baccalaureate degrees to generate enrollments in response to market conditions that had 
become hostile to the traditional liberal arts curriculum.  
Building on these studies, this paper shows how the contemporary higher 
education system emerges from previous efforts to generate enrollments amidst a 
changing external environment.  Building on Kraatz and Zajac (1996), I study 
organizational change in liberal arts colleges.  Specifically, I analyze why liberal arts 
colleges become universities and I examine the effects of becoming a university on 
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organizational outcomes.  Whereas Kraatz and Zajac (1996) find that curricula at liberal 
arts colleges becomes more heterogeneous, I show that many liberal arts colleges adopt 
an entirely new organizational form, the comprehensive university. 
Published systems that categorize and rank colleges and universities typically 
distinguish colleges from universities on the basis of enrollment size, the scope of degree 
programs, and the level of degree programs (e.g., baccalaureate, doctoral).  At the 
margin, however, the distinction between a college and a university is not clear cut and 
the definition of a university changes over time (Barron's, 1971, 2003; Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching., 1973, 2005; U.S. News & World Report 
inc., 1996, 2003).  In the analyses to follow, I define “becoming a university” as an event 
in which a liberal arts college deletes the word “college” from its name and adds the word 
“university.”  Therefore, the dependent variable is purely a change in organizational 
name.  However, the name change may be caused by changes in curricula and it may 
have subsequent effects on curricula. 
Becoming a university is an organizational change that can be studied as the 
adoption of an innovation (Rogers, 2003).  After reviewing the literature on 
organizational change and mission drift in liberal arts colleges (e.g., Breneman, 1994; 
Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Morphew, 2002), I derive testable hypotheses about adoption by 
integrating institutional theory literatures on radical change (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996), market forces (D'Aunno, Succi, & Alexander, 2000; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996), the 
“old-institutionalism” (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Selznick, 1957), and diffusion (Greve, 
1995; Rao, Davis, & Ward, 2000).  I test these hypotheses by applying panel methods to 
a panel dataset of all liberal arts colleges from 1970 to 2010.   
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I find that colleges become universities to engage in behaviors that increase 
enrollments and diversify their customer base.  Colleges are also more likely to become 
universities when their network contacts have previously become universities.  However, 
market position, non-tuition revenue, and organizational age are negatively related to 
becoming a university.  The effects of becoming a university include enrollment growth, 
subsequent adoption of professional master‟s degrees, and increases in both tuition 
revenue and total revenue.  
This study makes contributions scholarship on mission drift in higher education 
(Aldersley, 1995; Baker, Orr, & Young, 2007; Morphew, 2002).  I make a conceptual 
contribution by defining mission drift as a form of “divergent change” (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996), which can be studied using concepts from institutional theory.  I make an 
analytic contribution by using panel data and panel methods to study the causes of 
mission drift. 
The central contribution of this study, however, is to reintroduce Clark‟s (1956) 
concept of the enrollment economy as an important impetus of organizational change in 
postsecondary education.
40
  All colleges and universities – especially non-prestigious 
organizations – depend on enrollments as a primary revenue source.  The enrollment 
economy becomes increasingly important to organizational decision-making as the 
proportion of total revenue derived from tuition increases over time.
41
  When the 
enrollment economy dominates organizational decision making, the ethic that educators 
                                                 
40
 Although prior studies of organizational change highlight the importance of enrollments (Brint & 
Karabel, 1989; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Veysey, 1965), the enrollment economy is not their central thesis.  
Contemporary critiques of postsecondary education also discuss enrollments (e.g., Kirp, 2003; Newman, et 
al., 2004), but as part of broader marketization and commercialization trends.  Other critiques focus on 
research commercialization (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004), and auxiliary enterprises (Bok, 2003), but few 
universities generate substantial revenues from research and auxiliary enterprises provide modest revenues 
for most organizations (Wellman & AIR, 2009). 
41
 Author‟s calculations. 
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determine curricula is replaced by a customer service ethic in which students determine 
curricula by voting with their feet. 
Research on institutional aid to students and enrollment management (e.g., Doyle, 
2010; Kraatz, Ventresca, & Deng, 2010; McPherson & Schapiro, 1999) implies that the 
enrollment economy concept should also include organizational efforts to attract certain 
kinds of students.  Therefore, I suggest that the question “how does this change in 
organizational behavior affect enrollments from desired student populations” can 
generate research on a number of topics.  These topics include organizational budgeting 
systems (Hearn, Lewis, Kallsen, Holdsworth, & Jones, 2006), institutional aid to students 
(Doyle, 2010), administrative reorganization (Kraatz, et al., 2010), recruitment of out-of-
state students (Curs, 2010), adoption of summer programs, grade inflation, and capital 
construction projects. 
 
Literature on Organizational Change in Liberal Arts Colleges 
 Scholars and educators have long argued that liberal arts colleges make important 
and unique contributions to society.  Breneman (1990, p. 3) summarizes several of these 
contributions: 
Liberal arts colleges are distinguished by a mission of providing four-year 
baccalaureate education exclusively, in a setting that…rewards good teaching 
above all else. [They] are the source of a disproportionate number of graduates 
who go on to earn doctorates and to pursue academic careers.  Their “privateness” 
means that certain values – religious and otherwise – can inform their mission in 
ways not possible at state institutions, while their small size makes possible a 
sense of community among students, faculty, and staff that can rarely be achieved 
in larger settings. 
 
  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, three changes in the external 
environment threatened the survival of liberal arts colleges.  First, student preferences 
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changed dramatically from the liberal arts to professional majors (Brint, Riddle, Turk-
Bicakci, & Levy, 2005; Labaree, 2006; Turner & Bowen, 1990).  Second, the population 
of “traditional” college freshman – defined as ages 18 and 19 – declined from a peak of 
8.7 million in 1977 to a low of 6.9 million in 1992 (NCES, 2010, Table 15).  Third, 
liberal arts colleges faced increased competition, due to the growing enrollment capacity 
of public institutions which charged lower tuition prices (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996).  Given 
these adverse economic conditions, many commentators feared that liberal arts colleges 
would become extinct (e.g., Mayhew, 1979; Zammuto, 1984).  These fears proved 
unfounded. Enrollments at most liberal arts colleges grew rather than declined and few 
colleges closed their doors (Breneman, 1994; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; St. John, 1991). 
 However, Breneman (1990, p. 3) made the “startling discovery” that many liberal 
arts colleges survived only by transforming themselves into a different kind of 
organization: 
While I began with the belief that there were roughly 600 such institutions in this 
country, I have concluded that, given a reasonable definition of a liberal arts 
college, we have only about 200 of them left.  My discovery was as simple as it 
was disturbing: the liberal arts college as we know it is disappearing…and another 
type of institution – the professional college – is taking its place. 
 
Breneman (1990, 1994) defines a liberal arts college as an organization that 
awards at least 40% bachelor‟s degrees in liberal arts fields and does not have 
“significant” graduate and first-professional programs.  Applying these criteria to 1985-
86 HEGIS data, the population of 600 liberal arts colleges, as defined by the 1987 
Carnegie Classification, diminished to 200 colleges.  Curiously, Breneman‟s (1994) 
book-length analyses focus only on the 200 “remaining” liberal arts colleges, ignoring the 
400 organizations that ceased to fulfill his liberal arts criteria.  Furthermore, Breneman 
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(1994) does not analyze change over time in curricula, the primary reason for the decline 
in the number of liberal arts colleges. 
Kraatz and Zajac (1996) analyzed curricular change in liberal arts colleges at a 
time when the cutting-edge in neo-institutional theory predicted that organizations in 
strong institutional environments would be resistant to change, even in the face of 
adverse economic conditions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Scott, 1983).  Liberal 
arts colleges provided an ideal test case; these organizations had rich institutional 
histories and the liberal arts curriculum was the core of its organizational identity.  
Contrary to the predictions of institutional theory, most liberal arts colleges adopted 
professional bachelor‟s degrees from 1971 to 1986, especially non-selective tuition-
dependent institutions and those lacking “distinctive” resources (e.g., reputation, student 
quality, endowment) (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001).  Kraatz (1998) 
shows that professional baccalaureate degrees diffused from prior to potential adopters 
via membership in inter-organizational consortia (e.g., The Christian College 
Association), especially when prior adoption increased organizational performance.   
The research set-up of Kraatz and Zajac (1996) is not immune to criticism.  As 
their story goes, liberal arts colleges exhibited homogenous, liberal arts curricula prior to 
the onset of adverse market conditions.  As early as 1966, however, 87% of liberal arts 
colleges awarded at least one professional bachelor‟s degree, 49% of colleges awarded 
bachelor‟s degrees in business, and the colleges exhibited strong heterogeneity in the 
proportion of professional degrees awarded.
42
   
A more nuanced criticism of Kraatz and Zajac (1996) relates to the concept of 
mission drift.  Mission drift, usually defined in terms of curriculum, is a shift away from 
                                                 
42
 Author‟s calculations. 
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an organization‟s historic mission towards the mission of another type of college or 
university (Aldersley, 1995).  Kraatz and Zajac (1996) argue that the population of liberal 
arts colleges becomes more heterogeneous with respect to curriculum, but that liberal arts 
colleges do not adopt an entirely different organizational form.  In contrast, I argue that 
the curricular change observed by Kraatz and Zajac (1996) represents the early stages of 
mission drift, in which many liberal arts colleges become comprehensive universities. 
Existing scholarship identifies two causes of mission drift.  First, drawing on the 
mechanism of mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), organizations pursue 
legitimacy and prestige by mimicking the curricular offerings of prestigious universities 
(Aldersley, 1995; Morphew, 2002; Toma, 2009).  Second, drawing on resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), organizations expand curricula to grow 
revenues and diversify clientele (Baker, et al., 2007; Morphew, 2002).  Empirical 
contributions document patterns of mission drift but do not identify causes.  One problem 
is methodological; the quantitative studies have two data points – before and after – and 
use cross-sectional methodologies (Aldersley, 1995; Baker, et al., 2007; Morphew, 2002), 
so it is impossible to show how changes in independent variables affect the dependent 
variable.  Another problem is conceptual; neo-institutional explanations are not mutually 
exclusive from resource dependence explanations because revenue and prestige reinforce 
one another (Winston, 1999).   
To summarize the literature review, liberal arts colleges make important and 
unique contributions to society (Breneman, 1994).  Breneman notes that most liberal arts 
colleges have transformed into “small professional colleges,” but does not analyze the 
curricular changes at the heart of this transformation.  Kraatz and Zajac (1996) analyze 
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curricular change, but argue that liberal arts colleges are becoming more heterogeneous, 
as opposed to becoming a different kind of organization.  Contributions to the mission 
drift literature do not analyze the causes of organizational change.  Further, pitting two 
theoretical traditions – resource dependence and institutional theory – is unlikely to result 
in novel insights about mission drift.   
I analyze mission drift in liberal arts colleges by integrating several literatures 
within a single theoretical tradition, neo-institutional theory.  I argue that liberal arts 
colleges and comprehensive universities have distinct “organizational templates” 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996) and mission drift occurs when an organization adopts a 
different organizational template.   I argue that liberal arts colleges signal a change to the 
comprehensive university template by changing their name to include the word 
“university.”  In the next section I develop this theoretical framework and present testable 
hypotheses. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Organizational Templates 
 Although recent contributions to neo-institutional theory focus on organizational 
change, earlier contributions explain isomorphism, the process by which organizations 
within a field become more similar over time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer, 1977).  
Aside from technical efficiency, organizational survival depends on observing the taken-
for-granted rules that define appropriate action within an organizational field. For 
example, whereas a university must have a president to appear legitimate, a law firm 
must have partners.  In the nascent stages of an organizational field, organizations exhibit 
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considerable diversity because institutionalized rules are sparse or weakly enforced.  
Over time, there is an increase in the number of rules that must be observed by 
organizations in the field.  Organizational diversity decreases as individual organizations 
begin to behave according to these rules; the field becomes isomorphic. 
 Greenwood and Hinings (1996) define an “organizational template” as the set of 
rules that define permissible and prohibited behaviors an organization.  In the “old 
institutionalism,” organizational templates emerge from unique organizational histories 
(Clark, 1972; Selznick, 1949, 1957).  In neo-institutional theory, organizational templates 
originate outside the organization, but have force over all organizations within the field.  
In other words, the institutional environment provides the template for organizing.  
Organizational templates are created, reinforced, and modified through repetitive 
interactions between actors in the field.  For example, due to the competitive and 
repetitive process of admissions, the “no-loan” tuition policies adopted by Princeton and 
Harvard diffused through the population of elite colleges and universities (McLendon, 
Flores, & Park, 2010), becoming a requisite component of the organizational template. 
The organizational template concept is useful for analyzing organizational 
change.  “Convergent change” occurs within the parameters of an existing organizational 
template, as in the diffusion of no-loan tuition policies (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).  
“Divergent change” occurs when an organization moves from one organizational 
template to another.  Divergent change enables organizations to engage in behaviors that 
were discouraged in their old organizational template.  Convergent change is typical 
during “normal” periods in an industry.  Divergent change occurs during periods of 
heightened opportunities and threats, such as the introduction of destabilizing 
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technologies (Schumpeter, 1942), dramatic regulatory change (Davis, Diekmann, & 
Tinsley, 1994), or adverse market conditions (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996).   
The organizational template concept can be applied to the study of liberal arts 
colleges.  The liberal arts college template, as described by Breneman (1990), states that 
liberal arts colleges should observe the following rules: award bachelor‟s degrees in 
liberal arts majors; do not award graduate degrees; enroll-full time, residential students 
between 18 to 24 years old; and keep enrollments below 1,800 students.   
I argue that adverse market conditions – changing student preferences, declining 
college-age population, and the growing public sector – rendered the liberal arts college 
template unsuitable to the basic goal of organizational survival.  Liberal arts colleges are 
highly tuition dependent, but in the 1970s and 1980s, many colleges faced declining 
enrollments due to these adverse market conditions.  The liberal arts college template 
prohibited many solutions that would increase enrollments.  Faced with an organizational 
template incongruent with market conditions, I argue that many liberal arts colleges 
adopted the comprehensive template.  The comprehensive university template encourages 
enrollment growth, encourages the adoption of professional undergraduate and graduate 
degree programs, and encourages organizations to enroll part-time students, older-
students, and commuter students. 
Organizational Name Changes and Legitimacy  
I argue that changing the organizational name to include the word “university” is 
a signal that the liberal arts college template has been abandoned in favor of the 
comprehensive university template.  Glynn and Abzug (2002) define “symbolic 
isomorphism” as the resemblance of an organization‟s symbolic attributes to those of 
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other organizations within its institutional field.  Symbolic isomorphism increases 
organizational legitimacy.  An organizational name is one attribute of symbolic 
isomorphism.  A credible name signals conformity to the institutional field the 
organization seeks to identify with, resulting in increased legitimacy vis-à-vis peer 
organizations and potential customers (Glynn & Abzug, 2002). 
 Drawing on Greenwood and Hinings (1996), Glynn and Marquis (2007) argue 
that name changes are likely when organizations change templates as the result of 
dramatic changes in the external environment.  During periods of opportunity and threat, 
such as the dot-com boom and bust (Glynn & Marquis, 2004), organizations change 
names to signal the transition from a template no longer fit with the environment to a 
template more compatible with the environment.  Further, Glynn and Marquis (2007, p. 
4) argue that name changes are “typically part of a deeper set of organizational changes, 
involving shifts in strategy, structure, and leadership.” 
 Given the literature on ceremonial policy adoption (Weber, Davis, & Lounsbury, 
2009; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998), are name changes substantive or ceremonial 
changes?  Although name changes signal “ceremonial conformity” (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977) to an organizational template, they may have real effects.  By changing names, 
organizations decrease “identity ambiguities” (Glynn & Marquis, 2007) vis-à-vis internal 
stakeholders, who are given a clearer sense of organizational direction, and potential 
customers, who see the organization participating in new market segments. 
 Morphew (2002) suggests that colleges become universities to send signals to 
customers in new market segments: 
As the president of a former college put it, “When you say „college,‟ a lot of 
people attribute that [term] to a relatively small, limited type of institution. . . . For 
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better or worse, the university designation conjures up in people‟s minds a much 
more extensive academic program.”….The chair of faculty senate at Quinnipiac 
University, Hamden, Connecticut, which changed its name from “Quinnipiac 
College” in June 2000 [said]: “Quinnipiac had very solid academic programs, 
especially in business and health, but it was not marketed well. We were not too 
well-known outside of Connecticut. . . . By changing the name to Quinnipiac 
University, we‟re telling the world we no longer are a little tiny college.” 
(Morphew, 2002, p. 210) 
 
Another rationale for becoming a university is to signal the future strategic 
direction of the organization to internal stakeholders.  Many enrollment generating 
activities – e.g., graduate programs, plans for enrollment expansion, and larger student to 
faculty ratios – are perceived as illegitimate to internal stakeholders when the 
organization is identified with the liberal arts college template.  Changing the 
organizational name to include the word “university” signals to internal stakeholders that 
a new set of organizational behaviors are permissible or can increase in scale.  
Market Factors Causing Divergent Change 
 The empirical literature finds that divergent change is precipitated by market 
factors (Davis, 2005).  Changes in customer preferences, regulation, and technology may 
result in a market that can no longer support the existing number of organizations 
(D'Aunno, et al., 2000; Schumpeter, 1942).  Faced with threats to survival, organizations 
may change templates. 
 The probability that an organization changes templates in response to adverse 
market conditions depends on the organization‟s market position.   Even as market 
conditions worsen, organizations holding favorable positions relative to their competitors 
can perform sufficiently well without engaging in divergent change (D'Aunno, et al., 
2000; Greve, 1996).  Kraatz and Zajac (2001) argue that organizations with substantial 
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stock of distinctive, valuable resources (e.g., reputation, endowment, physical capital) are 
partially buffered from adverse market conditions.   
 Organizations with unfavorable market positions are especially likely to change 
templates when market conditions worsen (Greve, 1996; Hirsch, 1986).  Organizations 
with weak reputation and brand identity have less to lose by engaging in divergent 
change (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001).  Summarizing the literature on “deviant” innovation, 
Davis (2005, p. 488) writes, “there appears to be a common dynamic to how markets 
trump legitimacy… in which marginal players find an innovative but often illegitimate 
means of making money, which is then emulated by core players who thus bring 
legitimacy to the practice."  For example, Hirsch (1986) shows that hostile takeovers 
were first adopted by “outsider” firms and were initially deemed illegitimate by large 
corporations.       
 I apply the literature on organizational change and market factors to the case of 
liberal arts colleges.  Three factors contributed to adverse economic conditions for liberal 
arts colleges in the late 1970s and the 1980s: a change in student preferences away from 
the liberal arts and towards professional curricula (Turner & Bowen, 1990); a decline in 
the population of “traditional” college freshmen (NCES, 2010, Table 15); and an increase 
in the enrollment capacity at lower-tuition public universities (Thelin, 2004), meaning 
that liberal arts colleges faced more competition for fewer students.  These three market 
changes negatively affected enrollments at liberal arts colleges (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996).  
Liberal arts colleges – especially non-selective colleges – are sensitive to declines in 
enrollments because they generate most of their revenue from tuition.  Therefore, I 
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hypothesize that liberal arts colleges are likely to change organizational templates after 
experiencing enrollment decline: 
H1: Declines in freshman enrollments increase the probability that a college will become 
a university.  
 H1 focuses on freshman enrollments, rather than total undergraduate enrollments, 
for two reasons. First, freshman enrollments are a leading indicator of enrollment 
difficulties that administrators pay close attention to.  Second, organizational name 
change may occur after the organization has begun the process of divergent change by 
adding professional degrees, recruiting part-time students, recruiting older students, etc.  
These changes are likely to be cause an increase in total undergraduate enrollments prior 
to changing organizational names. 
 I hypothesize that liberal arts colleges with strong organizational resources and a 
strong market position will be less likely to become a university despite adverse market 
conditions.  Colleges with strong financial resources (e.g., endowment revenue, private 
giving) are more insulated from changes in market conditions than colleges that depend 
principally upon tuition revenue.  Furthermore, demand for liberal arts education at 
prestigious liberal arts colleges remains strong amongst high-achieving, high income 
households, even as professional education becomes more popular nationally. Therefore, 
I hypothesize that: 
H2: Liberal arts colleges with strong organizational resources and strong market position 
will be less likely to become universities. 
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Institutional Factors Causing Divergent Change 
 Organizational age.  “Institutional factors” also affect the probability of 
divergent change.  Proponents of the old institutionalism argue that strong organizational 
histories can buffer organizations from field-level factors (Kraatz, et al., 2010; Kraatz & 
Zajac, 2001; Selznick, 1949, 1957).  Clark (1972) analyzes the concept of “organizational 
saga” through his case study of three liberal arts colleges – Reed, Swarthmore, and 
Antioch.  An organizational saga is defined as a set of publicly expressed beliefs about an 
organization that is (a) rooted in history, (b) claims unique accomplishment, and (c) is 
held with sentiment by the group.  The organizational saga often includes a founding 
myth that is embellished over time and “includes affect that turns a formal place into a 
beloved institution, to which participants may be passionately devoted” (Clark, 1972, p. 
178).
43
  Clark (1972, p. 183) concludes that,  
An organizational saga is thus a valuable resource, created over a number of years 
out of the social components of the formal enterprise. As participants become 
ideologues, their common definition becomes a foundation for trust and for 
extreme loyalty.  Such bonds give the organization a competitive edge in 
recruiting and maintaining personnel and help it to avoid the vicious circle in 
which some actual or anticipated erosion of organizational strength leads to the 
loss of some personnel, which leads to further decline and lose. 
 
Therefore, an organizational saga is valuable, distinctive resource (Barney, 1991).  
Kraatz and Zajac (2001) posit a “resources as commitments” perspective.  Distinctive 
resources are a source of prolonged competitive advantage, but require a prolonged 
commitment to obtain. Therefore, organizations possessing such resources will be 
reticent change templates in response to potentially fickle market changes. I argue that 
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 For example, William T. Foster founded Reed College based on the principles of academic excellence 
and nonconformity, themes that have been retained to the present day (Clark, 1972).  Though from the 
Northeast, Foster founded Reed in the Northwest so that Reed would not be “corrupted” by established 
institutions.   
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liberal arts colleges possessing a strong organizational saga will be unlikely to change 
organizational templates.  Becoming a university undermines an organizational saga 
because continuity between the contemporary organization and its founding myth is the 
basis of an organizational saga.   
I argue that the strength of an organizational saga is positively correlated with 
organizational age because organizational saga is, by definition, rooted in past deeds.  
Furthermore, organizational age is itself an important component of organizational saga, 
independent of mythical deeds accumulated over time; colleges and universities market 
themselves based on founding dates and even question the veracity of colleges claiming 
to have an earlier founding date (Thelin, 2004).  Building on these ideas, I hypothesize 
that:  
H3: Older liberal arts colleges will be less likely to become universities. 
 Geographic Region.  Culture varies by geographic region.  Elazar (1972) locates 
inter-regional cultural variation in the historical migratory patterns of different ethnic and 
religious groups.  Regional cultural variation, in turn, affects organizational behavior.  
The geographic region of corporate headquarters affects whether corporations donate to 
liberal or conservative political action committees (Burris, 1987). Geographic region also 
affects the extent to which non-profit organizations form networks with one another 
(Hall, 1992) and the growth rate in the number of non-profit organizations (Marquis, 
Davis, & Glynn, 2011). 
 I argue that the probability a liberal arts college becomes a university differs by 
geographic region.  The Northeast contains a high density of liberal arts colleges, many 
with rich organizational histories.  I argue that the concentration of Northeastern liberal 
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arts colleges contributes to a greater appreciation amongst the local population of the 
distinctiveness of liberal arts colleges.  Therefore, becoming a university may undermine 
brand identity, independent of the organization‟s own organizational saga.  In regions 
with a low density of liberal arts colleges (e.g., Southwest) the population may have less 
appreciation for the distinctive mission of liberal colleges.  Therefore, a change in 
organizational template is likely to have minimal effects on organizational identity.   
H4: Liberal arts colleges in the Northeast will be less likely to become universities than 
liberal arts colleges in other regions. 
 Prior illegitimate acts.  Analyzing the emergence of stock-option pay in German 
corporations, Sanders and Tuschke (2007, p. 37) argue that “experience dealing with 
stakeholders in the institutional environments that oppose certain practices…allows a 
firm to learn how to deal with these obstacles, and knowledge and experience gained 
from past situations give the firm adroitness when dealing with similar hotly contested 
situations in the present or the future.”  Two potential mechanisms exist for this 
argument.  First, prior success adopting controversial behaviors increases confidence that 
future controversial practices can be adopted successfully.  Second, the adoption of 
behaviors linked to a new organizational template increases the likelihood that the 
organization will complete the transition to the new template.   
 I argue that colleges are more likely to become universities if they have 
previously engaged in practices perceived as illegitimate with respect to the liberal arts 
college template.  Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 156) state that a dramatic change in 
university curricula is an illegitimate act because the curriculum “represents the core of 
the university‟s organizational identity.”  Kraatz and Zajac (1996) define adoption of 
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professional bachelor‟s degrees as an illegitimate act for liberal arts colleges.  I 
hypothesize that: 
H5: Liberal arts colleges that have previously adopted “illegitimate” curricular practices 
in the past are more likely to become universities. 
 I define illegitimate curricular practices as prior adoption of professional 
bachelor‟s degrees and an increase in the proportion of total bachelor‟s degrees awarded 
in professional fields.  However, the adoption and production of professional bachelor‟s 
degrees by liberal arts colleges was quite high even in 1966, implying that professional 
baccalaureate degrees may be consistent with the liberal arts template.
44
  Professional 
master‟s degrees, however, are clearly inconsistent with the liberal arts college template. 
Therefore, prior adoption of professional liberal arts degrees is a third measure of 
illegitimate curricular change. 
Network Factors Affecting Divergent Change 
Changing the organizational name to include the word “university” can be likened 
to the adoption of an innovation (Rogers, 2003).  Innovations diffuse from prior to 
potential adopters through social networks.  Network ties – tangible communication links 
between prior and potential adopters (Mizruchi, 1994) – are often conduits for diffusion. 
The nature of an innovation may affect the extent to which it diffuses through network 
ties.  Innovations that are consistent with the organizational template may diffuse rapidly 
throughout the organizational field (Strang & Meyer, 1993).  When an innovation is 
inconsistent with the organizational template, network ties between organizations in a 
population may impede diffusion.  
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 Author‟s calculations. 
 241 
 
In this section I first hypothesize network ties as a source of constraint, impeding 
adoption.  Second, I hypothesize network ties as a source of diffusion that contributes to 
adoption depending on whether the relationship between network contacts is cohesive or 
competitive.  I study the effect of two network ties – geographic proximity and time-
varying membership in inter-organizational consortia (e.g., Great Lakes College 
Association) – on the dependent variable, becoming a university. 
Network ties as a source of constraint.  Early contributions to neo-institutional 
theory stress field-level pressures for conformity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Repetitive 
interactions between actors in the organizational field create the set of rules that define an 
organizational template.  Network ties are potential channels by which these repetitive 
interactions occur.  Network ties enable network contacts to sanction or signal 
disapproval when a focal organization behaves contrary to the organizational template.  
Conversely, the focal organization is relatively free to engage in prohibited practices in 
the absence of network ties to other organizations in the field.  Therefore, I argue that 
when an innovation breaks the rules of an organizational template, the presence of 
network ties decreases the probability of adoption. 
Following Kraatz (1998), I use membership in inter-organizational consortia as a 
network tie linking liberal arts colleges.  Individual liberal arts colleges exist within the 
population of liberal arts colleges and are beholden to the rules of the liberal arts 
template.  Becoming a university represents a transition from the liberal arts template to 
the comprehensive university template, an action that runs contrary to the rules of the 
liberal arts template.  I hypothesize that network contacts retaining the liberal arts college 
organizational template will discourage – through persuasion or sanction – focal 
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organizations from changing organizational templates.  Colleges with no network ties 
enjoy more autonomy in their decision to change organizational templates or not. 
H6: Liberal arts colleges that are never members of an inter-organizational consortium 
will be more likely to become universities. 
 H6 implies that the network ties impede colleges from engaging in divergent 
change. I hypothesize colleges may dissolve network ties in order to gain sufficient 
autonomy to change organizational templates. In other words, membership in the network 
may be so constraining that the focal organization leaves the network in order to engage 
in divergent change. 
H7: Departure from a network increases the probability that a liberal arts college will 
become a university. 
 Network ties as a source of diffusion.  In most studies of adoption network ties 
contribute to, rather than impede, the diffusion of a practice.  I develop hypotheses about 
the diffusion of organizational name changes via network ties, drawing primarily on Rao, 
Davis, and Ward (2000) and Greve (1995).   
 Rao, et al. (2000) study whether corporations leave NASDAQ for the NYSE, 
which I liken to becoming a university.  Rao, et al. (2000) build their theoretical 
framework on social identity theory (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
Actors construct a social identity by categorizing themselves as belonging to a certain 
group and by comparing their group (the in-group) to other groups (out-groups).  
Favorable comparisons increase social identity.  A member departure from the in-group 
(e.g., NASDAQ) to an out-group (e.g., NYSE) is an “identity discrepant cue,” negatively 
affecting social identity.  As the number of identity-discrepant cues accumulates, actors 
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find it difficult to maintain a positive social identity and may defect to an out-group.  For 
example, the departure of a high-profile faculty member from a department may compel 
other faculty members to depart.  
 Rao, et al. (2000) define the defection of a network contact – based on corporate 
board interlocks – from NASDAQ to NYSE as an identity-discrepant cue.  They 
hypothesize that the larger the number of ties that a focal organization has with prior 
defectors, the more likely it is that the focal organization will defect to the out-group.  
Similarly, I define becoming a university as an identity discrepant cue.  I hypothesize that 
the probability a college becomes a university increases as the number network contacts 
that become universities increases.  
 Greve (1995) studies the diffusion of strategy abandonment in the radio industry, 
specifically the abandonment of the Easy Listening radio format.  Abandonment may be 
jointly driven by forces of contagion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and competition 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977).  The concept of contagion implies that a focal organization 
will mimic the decisions of a socially proximate other.  Under contagion, strategy 
abandonment by network contacts suggests that peers have formed a negative opinion of 
the strategy, leading to strategy abandonment by focal organizations. 
 Competition also affects the diffusion of strategy abandonment.  Organizations 
compete when they use a common, scarce resource.  In the radio industry, stations 
compete for listeners within a geographic region.  From 1984 to 1993 the number of Easy 
Listening listeners declined, leading to widespread strategy abandonment because the 
market could not support so many competitors.  However, even as a market-segment 
declines, strategy abandonment by a direct competitor may increase the attractiveness of 
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strategy retention for remaining organizations; “the focal organization will have more 
room in its niche, so abandonment by a same-strategy competitor can be seen as winning 
a war of attrition” (Greve, 1996, p. 451).  Similarly, in their study of divergent change 
amongst rural hospitals, D‟Aunno, et al. (2000) argue that organizations are unlikely to 
mimic direct competitors who engage in divergent change. 
 I apply ideas about contagion and competition to the case of liberal arts colleges.  
Becoming a university can be viewed as a defection (Rao, et al., 2000), the abandonment 
of strategy (Greve, 1995), or a divergent change (D'Aunno, et al., 2000).  Previous 
adoption by network contacts affects adoption by a focal organization.  I posit two 
network ties: (1) membership in inter-organizational consortia and (2) geographic 
proximity.  Members of inter-organizational consortia typically meet on a regular basis to 
discuss issues of strategic importance (Patterson, 1979), potentially including decisions 
about organizational name-changes.  Geographically proximate organizations compete in 
the same market, observe the behaviors of one another, and may meet informally to 
discuss strategic actions (Strang & Soule, 1998). 
 From a contagion – or social cohesion – perspective, focal organizations mimic 
the adoption decision of network contacts.  From a competition perspective, 
geographically proximate adopters decrease the probability of adoption by a focal 
organization because defections by competitors leave more market space for remaining 
organizations.
45
  I present contagion and competition hypotheses:  
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 I am assuming that liberal arts colleges and comprehensive universities are substitutes for some students, 
but there are some students (e.g., those desiring a small college,  low student-to-faculty ratios) that will 
only consider attending liberal arts colleges. 
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H8: A liberal arts college is more likely to become a university when (a) fellow 
consortium members become universities and (b) geographically proximate colleges 
become universities. 
H9: A liberal arts college is less likely to become a university when geographically 
proximate colleges become universities. 
 Note the conflict between H8b and H9.  Geographically proximate prior adopters 
may increases the probability of adoption, lending support to contagion (H8b), or may 
decrease the probability of adoption, lending support to competition (H9). 
The concept of social learning implies that actors learn from the experiences of 
their peers (Rogers, 2003).  When a network contact improves performance as the result 
of adoption, focal organizations are likely to follow suit.  Furthermore, network ties can 
facilitate the communication of “know-how,” such that successful previous adopters can 
help potential adopters adopt successfully (Weber, et al., 2009).  Kraatz (1998) finds that 
liberal arts colleges were more likely to mimic the curricular adoptions of their network 
contacts if previous adopters increased enrollments as the result of adoption.  Similarly, I 
hypothesize that:  
H10: A liberal arts college is more likely to become a university when (a) fellow 
consortium members improve performance after becoming a university and (b) 
geographically proximate colleges improve performance after becoming a university. 
The Effects of Divergent Change 
 While the preceding hypotheses have all focused on the causes of divergent 
change, the final hypothesis focuses on the effects of divergent change.  When liberal arts 
colleges began losing enrollments as the result of adverse market conditions, the liberal 
 246 
 
arts college template hindered the ability of organizations to generate enrollments 
necessary for organizational survival.  I argue that liberal arts colleges adopt the 
comprehensive university template to engage in behaviors that increase organizational 
stability.  I hypothesize that becoming a university affects organizational outcomes. 
H11: Liberal arts colleges that become universities will be more likely to increase total 
enrollments, adopt professional bachelor‟s and master‟s degrees, and increase the 
percentage of part-time students. 
I test H11 by modeling the effect of becoming a university on organizational 
outcomes that, according to Breneman (1990), distinguish liberal arts colleges from 
comprehensive universities.  These outcomes include: total enrollments (all levels), 
adoption and production of professional bachelor‟s degrees, adoption and production of 
professional master‟s degrees, and part-time students as a percent of all students.  The 
comprehensive university template identifies with larger values of on these outcomes. If 
becoming a university does not affect organizational outcomes then becoming a 
university is merely a ceremonial change.  If becoming a university affects organizational 
outcomes then analyzing why colleges become universities can contribute important 
knowledge about change over time in the system of higher education. 
 
Data and Methods 
Sample and Analysis Period 
 The initial sample includes all 704 liberal arts colleges identified by the 1970 
Carnegie Classification.  The 1970 Carnegie Classification, based on data from the 1970-
71 Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS), places 2,827 organizations 
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into the following categories: research universities; doctoral granting universities; 
comprehensive universities and colleges; liberal arts colleges; two-year institutions; and 
professional schools and other specialized institutions.  Organizations are placed into 
categories based on enrollment size and the scope and level of degree programs.  
However, the attributes distinguishing comprehensive from liberal arts institutions are not 
clear cut.
46
    
 I eliminated all 28 public institutions from the analysis sample for two reasons.  
First, some public organizations – for example, UC Santa Cruz, UMass Boston, and the 
University of Michigan at Dearborn – fulfilled the liberal arts college criteria because 
they had been recently founded as of 1971.  Second, whereas private organizations have 
discretion about becoming a university, the decision may be determined by state-level 
political factors at public institutions.  Of the remaining 676 private liberal arts colleges, 
52 were “left censored” from the analysis sample because their name included the word 
“university” in 1971.  Therefore, 624 organizations are included in the 1971 analysis 
sample. 
 The analysis period depends on data availability.  HEGIS and its successor the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) provide the core data.  Data on 
degree completions and organizational name are available beginning in 1965-66 (1966).  
Data on enrollments, finances, and institutional characteristics are generally available 
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 According to the Carnegie Foundation (1973, p. 2): Comprehensive Universities and Colleges 
1…includes institutions that offered a liberal arts program as well as several other programs, such as 
engineering and business administration. Many of them offered master‟s degrees, but all lacked a doctoral 
program or had an extremely limited doctoral program….Comprehensive universities and colleges II… 
offered a liberal arts program and at least one professional or occupational program such as teacher training 
or nursing….Private institutions with fewer than 1,500 students…are not included even though they may 
offer a selection of programs, because they were not regarded as comprehensive with such small 
enrollments.  Such institutions are classified as liberal arts colleges…..The distinction between a liberal arts 
college and a comprehensive college is not clear-cut.  Some of the institutions in this group have modest 
occupational programs but a strong liberal arts tradition. 
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beginning in 1968-69 (1969).  However, key variables (e.g., freshman enrollments) are 
unavailable until 1974.  Therefore, although the dependent variable is available beginning 
in 1966, the analysis period is 1974 to 2009.  Furthermore, because time-varying 
independent variables are lagged two years, the analysis period becomes 1976-2009. I 
discuss lags in the variables section.  Finally, consortia data are intermittently available 
from 1971-2000. Therefore, models using consortia variables, with lagged variables, are 
based on an analysis period of 1976-2000. 
Variables 
 Dependent variable.  The dependent variable, becoming a university, is a time-
varying, dichotomous measure indicating that the organization deleted the word “college” 
and added the word “university” to its name.  For example, Oglethorpe College in 
Atlanta, GA changed its name to Oglethorpe University in 1976.  The dependent variable 
was created by applying word search functions to the organizational name variable 
included in annual HEGIS and IPEDS surveys.  I manually checked the dependent 
variable for accuracy.   
Figure 4.1 shows change over time in the dependent variable from 1966 to 2010 
for the population of private liberal arts colleges.  In 1966 HEGIS included 625 private 
liberal arts colleges, but 44 were already universities, meaning that 581 organizations 
were at risk of becoming a university.  In 1971 – the data year used to create the 1970 
Carnegie Classification – a total of 676 private liberal arts colleges existed, with 624 at 
risk of adoption.  From 1966 to 2010, 172 organizations adopted, not including the 44 
that had already adopted by 1966.   
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Organizational death is another reason organizations leave the analysis sample. I 
define mergers, when one organization eats another, as death.  Figure 4.1 shows death 
rates of liberal arts colleges from 1966 to 2010.
47
  Many scholars predicted high death 
rates for liberal arts colleges in the 1980s (e.g., Mayhew, 1979), but extant scholarship 
finds that only a handful of colleges died (Breneman, 1994; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996).  I 
find much higher death rates.  From 1966 to 2010, 124 out of 676 colleges died, 
representing 18% of the population of 676 colleges.   
I summarize the trends for adoption and death from 1966 to 2010.  Of the total 
population of 676 private liberal arts colleges, 44 were universities in 1966, 172 colleges 
became universities, and 124 died.  Therefore, as of 2010, 336 liberal arts colleges remain 
and 340 are either universities or have died. 
Independent variables.  Independent variables were created for each hypothesis.  
I assume that past experiences affect the decision to become a university in the current 
period. All time varying measures were lagged two years, implying that changes in 
independent variables influence the decision to become a university two years later.  I 
obtained similar results for models with one and three year lags (results available upon 
request), implying the results are robust.    Some variables (e.g., total undergraduate 
enrollments) are right-skewed and exhibit high levels of kurtosis, meaning that more of 
the variance is the result of infrequent extreme deviations, as opposed to frequent 
modestly sized deviations.  I apply a natural log transformation to variables with high 
skew/kurtoses, so that inferences are not based on outliers. 
H1 states that declines in freshman enrollments increase the probability of 
adoption.  I use logged FTE freshman enrollments, lagged two years.  Freshman 
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 I manually checked each instance of organizational death. 
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enrollments are available beginning in 1974, meaning that the lagged measure is 
available beginning in 1976.  Note that total undergraduate enrollments are included as a 
control variable. 
H2 states that colleges with strong organizational resources and a strong market 
position will be less likely to engage in radical change.  I include organizational resources 
and market position in the same hypothesis because neither the underlying concepts nor 
the available measures are mutually exclusive.  Non-tuition revenue as a percent of total 
revenue is a measure of organizational resources because colleges less reliant on tuition 
revenue – typically due to high endowment and private grant revenue – are buffered from 
market forces (Kraatz, et al., 2010; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001).  Other potential measures of 
organizational resources include endowment revenue per student, private grant revenue 
per student, or total revenue per student.  However, accounting changes initiated in 1997 
render measures of endowment revenue, private grants revenue, and therefore total 
revenue incomparable before and after accounting changes.  Accounting changes have a 
more modest effect on the percent of non-tuition revenue measure. 
I use selectivity, tuition price, and in-state freshmen as a percentage of all 
freshmen as measures of market position.  The selectivity measure, based on the 1972 
iteration of Barron‟s Profiles of American Colleges (Barron's, 1971), is a categorical 
variable ranging from 1=unranked to 6=most competitive.  Unfortunately, the measure of 
selectivity is too predictive. No colleges in selectivity category 5 or 6 became 
universities, so these categories are dropped from the model.  In the future I hope to find 
a continuous measure of selectivity (e.g., average SAT score).   
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The measure of in-state freshmen was dropped from the final model.  This 
measure is available in intermittent years.  Using data imputations to fill in missing years 
results suspect within-panel variation.  Furthermore, percent of in-state students is not a 
reliable measure of market position because variation is affected by the size of the state 
(e.g., Rhode Island vs. Texas).  Model results with the in-state measure are included in 
Appendix Table 4.3 and Appendix Table 4.4. 
 H3 states the older colleges will be less likely to become universities. I calculate 
age as the number of years since the organization was founded, as opposed to a time-
constant measure of the year the organization was founded.  H4 states that colleges in the 
Northeast will be less likely to adopt.  I consider two measures of region.  The six-
category measure includes Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, South, Midwest, Southwest, and 
West.  The four-category measure includes Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.  
 H5 states that colleges that have previously adopted “illegitimate” curricular 
practices are more likely to adopt. I use three measures of “illegitimate” curricular 
practices: the total number of professional bachelor‟s degrees adopted since 1966; the 
total number of professional master‟s degrees adopted since 1966; and the proportion of 
bachelor‟s degrees in professional majors.   
HEGIS/IPEDS data classify degrees according to the Classification of 
Instructional Programs (CIP).  The degree adoption measures are based on 2-digit CIP 
codes (e.g., 13=education, 52=business) as opposed to 4-digit CIP codes (e.g., 
13.04=educational administration, 52.09=Hospitality Administration/Management) or 6-
digit CIP codes (e.g., 13.406= higher education administration, 52.0904= Hotel/Motel 
Administration/Management).  Therefore, the adoption measures identify when a college 
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first begins awarding degrees in a broad curriculum area.  I consulted relevant empirical 
literature prior to categorizing degrees as liberal arts vs. professional (e.g., Breneman, 
1990; Turner & Bowen, 1990).
48
 
 Hypotheses 6-10 utilize consortium data.  Data on inter-organizational consortia 
were collected in 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1996, and 2000 
by the Association for Consortium Leadership.
49
 There were 276 unique consortia from 
1971 to 2000.   When a particular consortium spanned two consecutive years of data 
collection (e.g., 1991 and 1996), I assumed the consortium existed in intervening years.  
H6 states that liberal arts colleges that are never members of inter-organizational 
consortia will be less likely to adopt.  Of the 624 colleges in the analysis sample, 77% are 
members of a consortium at some point. 
 H7 states that departure from a network increases the probability that a college 
will become a university.  When a college was a member of a particular consortium in 
consecutive years of consortium data collection (e.g., 1983, 1989, 1991), I assumed the 
college was a member of the consortium during intervening years.  Departure from a 
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 Although I use the duality of liberal arts versus professional degrees, a more accurate duality is liberal 
arts versus non-liberal arts degrees.  Degrees granted in the following 2-digit CIP programs are categorized 
as liberal arts degrees: 16=foreign languages, literatures, and linguistics; 23=English language and 
literature/letters; 24=liberal arts and sciences, general studies, and humanities; 26=library science; 
27=mathematics and statistics; 38= philosophy and religious studies (academic); 40= physical sciences; 
42=psychology; 45= social sciences; 50= visual and performing arts; 54=history.  Degrees granted in the 
following 2-digit CIP programs are categorized as non-liberal arts degrees: 1=Agriculture, agriculture 
operations, and related sciences; 3=Natural resources and conservation; 4=architecture and related services; 
5=Area, ethnic, cultural, and gender studies; 9=communication, journalism, and related programs; 
10=communication technologies/technicians and support services; 11=computer and information sciences 
and support services; 12=personal and culinary services; 13=education; 14=engineering; 15=engineering 
technologies/technicians; 19=family and consumer sciences/human sciences; 21=technology 
education/industrial arts; 22=legal professions and studies; 25=library science; 30=multi/interdisciplinary 
studies; 31=parks, recreation, leisure and fitness studies; 39=theology and religious vocations;  41=science 
technologies/technicians; 43=security and protective services; 44=public administration and social service 
professions; 46=construction trades; 47=mechanic and repair technologies/technicians; 48=precision 
production; 49=transportation and materials moving; 51=health professions and related clinical sciences; 
and 52=business, management, marketing, and related support services. 
49
 Consortium data were also collected in 2004, but I have not had time to code these data yet. 
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consortium is defined as a college ceasing to be a member of a consortium that still 
exists.  For example, if Consortium A exists in 1983, 1989, 1991, and 1996, and College 
Y is in Consortium A in 1983 and 1989, then I define 1990 as the year of consortium 
departure.  I test H7 using a time-varying measure that indicates whether the college has 
ever previously departed from a consortium.   
 H8 states that colleges are more likely to adopt when (a) fellow consortium 
members adopt and (b) geographically proximate colleges adopt.  I test H8a using a 
measure of the percent of colleges in the consortium that have previously become 
universities, lagged two years.  Models testing H8a only include those organizations that 
have ever been in a consortium and only include the years 1971 to 2000, during which 
consortium data were available.
50
  I test H8b using a measure of the percent of colleges 
located within 100 miles of the focal college that have previously become universities, 
lagged two years.  I will test different definitions of geographic proximity (e.g., 50 miles, 
75 miles, and 125 miles) in future iterations of the paper.  H9 uses the same measure as 
H8b, but with a different predicted direction of the coefficient.   
 H10 states that a focal college is more likely to become a university when (a) 
fellow consortium members have increased performance after becoming a university and 
(b) geographically proximate colleges have increased performance after becoming a 
university.  I test H10a using a lagged measure of the average percent change in total 
enrollments, relative to the year of adoption, for previously adopting colleges in the 
consortium.  I test H10b using a lagged measure of the average percent change in total 
                                                 
50
 Testing H8a requires the inclusion of an indicator of whether the college is in a consortium in that year. 
 254 
 
enrollments, relative to year of adoption, for previously geographically proximate prior 
adopters.
51
 
 Control variables.  I include the same set of control variables in all models: total 
undergraduate FTE enrollments, lagged two years; a dichotomous indicator of religious 
affiliation; the cumulative number of adopters up to the present year, a standard measure 
in diffusion studies; a measure of the time in years since 1966 and also a square of this 
measure; and a categorical measure of city-size.  Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics 
and the first year of data availability for each variable.  Time constant variables (e.g., 
ever member of a consortium) are available beginning in 1966 even if the measure was 
derived from a later year of data.   
It is important to note, however, that the analyses may be missing important 
controls.  In particular, Kraatz and Zajac (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996) include a budget deficit 
measure and Kraatz et al. (2010) include measures of college president characteristics, 
the number of tenure-track faculty.  I have not yet added these variables to my panel 
dataset.  To the extent that the missing variables are correlated with both the included 
covariates and the dependent variable, the analyses may suffer from omitted variable 
bias. 
Method 
I test hypotheses 1-10 using random effects logit panel models.  Logit panel 
models are equivalent to discrete-time event history models, in which the analyst knows 
whether an event happened during a particular interval (e.g., year), but not the exact 
                                                 
51
 Testing H10 requires a lagged indicator of whether previously adopting colleges exist in the network in 
that year. 
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timing of the event (DesJardins, 2003).
52
  Allison (1982) shows that discrete-time hazard 
models can be estimated using logit panel models where all post-adoption observations 
are removed from the analysis sample.   
 Equation (1) shows a general logit panel model for the probability that institution 
i  becomes a university in year t.       is a matrix of time-invariant and lagged time-
varying variables;   is the associated vector of coefficients;    is the “individual-specific 
error term,” which varies across units but not over time; and     – not shown in Equation 
(1) – is the “idiosyncratic error term,” which varies across units and over time.53  
 
  [     |          
       
  
(         
  )
 (1) 
 
 [   |                             (2) (Strict exogeneity assumption) 
 
 [  |          [                  (3) (Random effects assumption) 
 
 Drawing inferences from Equation (1) depends on assumptions. Equation (2) 
shows the strict exogeneity assumption that the idiosyncratic error term is unrelated to the 
individual specific error term,   , and the regressors,    , in all time periods.  Equation (3) 
shows the random effects assumption that the individual-specific effect,  , is 
uncorrelated with independent variables     .  If we believe the random effects 
                                                 
52
 The exact equivalent to a discrete-time hazard models is a binary panel model assuming a 
complementary log-log distribution.  In the models to follow, I assume a logistic distribution.  There is no 
reason to prefer the complementary log-log distribution over the logistic distribution, or vice-versa. 
53
 For non-linear panel models, as opposed to linear panel models, there is less motivation for introducing 
the error term     because it is more natural to directly model the conditional density or the conditional 
mean.  Nevertheless, inferences depend on assumptions about    . 
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assumption then we can model    as part of the error term because it is not correlated 
with the regressors. If we do not believe the random effects assumption, then we must 
find some sufficient statistic, such that Equation (3) becomes true after conditioning on 
this sufficient statistic (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).   
The most common method of eliminating the potential correlation between    and 
    is to use a fixed-effects estimator, which eliminates    through a mean-differenced 
transformation of the data.  The fixed effect transformation for logit panel models 
requires within-panel variation in both the dependent and independent variables.  In other 
words, colleges that never become universities are dropped from the analyses.  Fixed 
effects estimators are problematic because I am interested in both the causes of adoption 
and non-adoption.  Therefore, the model results to follow are based on random effects 
estimators and make the random effects assumption shown in Equation (3). 
 Random effects estimators using continuous dependent variables allow analysts to 
account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  However, cluster robust standard 
errors are unavailable in random effects logit panel models.  Instead, Cameron and 
Travedi (2005) recommend that users calculate bootstrap standard errors.  A general rule 
of thumb states that 50-200 replications are adequate for estimates of standard errors.  I 
perform 100 replications.   
Limitations 
 The analyses have several limitations.  First, I argue that liberal arts colleges 
become universities because adverse market conditions prevent colleges using the liberal 
arts template from generating sufficient enrollments.  I posit three changes in the external 
environment contributing to adverse market conditions: a change in student preferences; 
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a decline in the college-age population; and increased competition from public 
institutions.  At present, these adverse market conditions are factors in my conceptual 
argument, but do not enter actual analyses.  In future iterations of this paper, I hope to 
include adverse market conditions in the analyses by modeling their effect on enrollments 
which, in turn, affects the probability of becoming a university.   
From the perspective of the individual liberal arts college, changes in student 
preferences represent an important environmental change.  This paper largely assumes 
that organizations change mission because of financial resource scarcity.  Another reason 
an organization changes mission is because society no longer values what the 
organization produces (Clark, 1956).  A change in student preferences away from liberal 
arts education and towards professional education implies that society no longer values 
the traditional mission of liberal arts colleges.  From this perspective, organizational 
values depend simultaneously on cultural support for the mission from broader society, 
which in turn affects financial resources (Parsons, 1956).  Therefore, future versions of 
this chapter may include measures of change over time in student preferences using data 
from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP).   
 Second, models of the effect of becoming a university (H11) must account for 
non-random selection into the treatment.  Colleges are not randomly selected to become 
universities.  Rather, the treatment is a pure choice variable.  Therefore, it is likely that 
the coefficient on becoming a university is biased by unobserved variables that are 
correlated with both becoming a university and organizational outcomes (e.g., total 
enrollments).   
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In many cases, multiple events happen at once.  For example, a newly hired 
president may implement a strategic plan that calls for the expansion of graduate degree 
programs, aggressive marketing to older and part-time students in order to increase total 
enrollments, and a name-change from “college” to “university.”  Regression models 
categorize one of these events – e.g., total enrollments, adoption of professional master‟s 
degrees – as the dependent variable and another of these events – becoming a university – 
as an independent variable. The regression results may suggest that becoming a 
university positively affects the dependent variable, when in fact both the dependent and 
independent variables move together as part of a larger process (e.g., a strategic plan).  
Failure to account for multiple events happening at once may lead to upwardly biased 
coefficients for becoming a university on organizational outcomes. 
Given problems of omitted variables and multiple events happening at once, 
models of the effect of becoming a university should attempt to isolate exogenous 
variation in becoming a university.  One approach is to jointly model becoming a 
university and the effect of becoming a university.  At present these behaviors are 
modeled separately.  However, joint modeling is unlikely to control for all unobservable 
variables.  Isolating exogenous variation in the treatment – for example, by finding an 
instrument – will be difficult because becoming a university is a pure choice variable for 
private institutions. 
 Third, a related issue is that the changes in enrollments may be due more to 
changes in demographics than changes in organizational behavior.  Figure 4.2 shows that 
the U.S. population of 18-19 year olds declined dramatically from 1979-1992 and 
increased dramatically from 1992-2009.  When the college-age population increases, 
 259 
 
institutions enjoy stronger enrollment demand.  Many colleges became universities in the 
1990s, a period of growth in the traditional college-age population.  Therefore, in models 
where the dependent variable is total enrollments (or undergraduate enrollments) the 
coefficient on becoming a university may be correlated with increases in the population, 
which are not included in the model.  Therefore, models of the effect of becoming a 
university – and models where becoming a university is the dependent variable – should 
include measures of demographic change. 
 Fourth, random effects logit panel models can incorporate a very finite number of 
categorical variables.  The models fail to converge when there is no variation in the 
dependent variable for a given cell.  For example, one cell could be the number of highly 
selective liberal arts colleges in the Southwest.  Therefore, random effects logit panel 
models must be parsimonious.  Calculating bootstrap standard errors require greater 
parsimony because each replication is based on a smaller sample than the analysis 
sample.  Calculating bootstrap standard errors in models with consortium variables – 
which utilize a smaller sample and a shorter analysis period – require even greater 
parsimony. 
 Due to the parsimony required by random effects logit panel models with 
bootstrap standard errors I have excluded the following categorical variables from the 
final models: the six category measure of selectivity; the six-category measure of city 
size; and the six-category measure of geographic region (a four-category measure was 
used instead).  Model results that include these categorical variables, but calculate 
conventional standard errors, are shown in Appendix Tables 3 and 4. 
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 Fifth, random effects logit panel models are calculated using quadrature, an 
approximation whose accuracy depends on the number of integration points used 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  I compared my results, using the default 12 points of 
quadrature, to models using 8 and 16 points of quadrature (models not shown).  
Coefficients in some models were somewhat sensitive to the number of integration points 
used.  I believe that the number of integration points does not affect whether coefficients 
are significant.  However, I must perform additional checks. 
 A sixth limitation concerns measurement error in consortium variables.  Data on 
consortium membership were collected in 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1986, 
1989, 1991, 1996, and 2000.  Departure from a consortium is defined as a college ceasing 
to be a member of a consortium that still exists.  For example, if Consortium A exists in 
1983, 1989, 1991, and 1996, and College Y is in Consortium A in 1983 and 1989, then I 
define 1990 as the year of consortium departure.  However, departure could have 
occurred in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, or 1995.  Given this measurement error, it is difficult 
to isolate the relationship between the timing of consortium departure and the timing of 
becoming a university.  Therefore, models of adoption use a measure of “previous 
departure from a consortium” rather than the measure of departure from a consortium.54  
The previous departure measure is also problematic if, for example, departure from a 
consortium occurs in 1973 but the college becomes a university in 2003.  In summary, 
coefficients on consortium measures should be viewed with some skepticism because of 
measurement error. 
                                                 
54
 I also tested the measure of departure from consortium (models not shown). The associated coefficient 
was not significant. 
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 Another problem related to consortium data is that consortia are quite diverse.  
Some consortia – e.g., The North Carolina Association of Independent Colleges and 
Universities – may provide an opportunity for college presidents to discuss strategic 
issues.  Some consortia focus on a particular issue – e.g., The Association of Colleges 
and Universities for International Intercultural Studies.  Other consortia are merely 
purchasing groups – e.g., The Connecticut Colleges Purchasing Groups.  Consortia led by 
presidents and focusing on strategic issues are likely to influence the dependent variable 
more than a purchasing group consortium.  At present, the analyses do not differentiate 
between types of consortia, which may dampen the effect of consortia variables. 
 
Results 
Causes of Adoption  
Table 4.2 shows the results for random effects logit panel models of adoption 
(becoming a university), with market, institutional, and geographic proximity variables.  I 
calculated bootstrap standard errors using 100 replications.  Appendix Table 4.1 shows 
results for the same models, but with conventional standard errors.  Appendix Table 4.3 
shows model results with conventional standard errors and additional covariates, 
specifically percent of in-state freshmen, a six-category measure of region (as opposed to 
the four-category measure included in Table 4.1), religious affiliation, and cumulative 
number of adopters. 
 Model (1) of Table 4.2 includes “market” variables and controls.  As expected, 
gains in undergraduate FTE enrollments increase the probability of becoming a 
university.  After controlling for total undergraduate enrollments, gains in freshman 
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enrollments decrease the probability with becoming a university, consistent with H1.  
Higher proportions of non-tuition revenue decrease the likelihood of adoption. This result 
is consistent with H2 that colleges with strong organizational resources are less likely to 
become universities.  H2 also states that organizations with strong market position are 
less likely to become universities.  The associated measure of tuition price is on the cusp 
of significance.  Another measure of market position, the percent of in-state freshman 
(shown in Appendix Table 4.3), is not significantly related to adoption.   
Results for Barron‟s 1972 measure of selectivity are not shown in Table 4.2 or the 
appendices, but are available upon request.  However, Figure 4.3 shows rates of adoption 
and death by selectivity.  Note that only 23% of unselective/unranked colleges 
(selectivity=1) are currently alive as colleges; 20% adopted and 57% died.  Rates of 
adoption are highest for less selective colleges (selectivity=2), with 39% adopting, 18% 
dying, and 43% remain living non-adopters.  Rates of adoption are lower for competitive 
colleges (selectivity=3) and lower still for very competitive colleges (selectivity=4).  No 
highly or most selective colleges (categories 5 or 6) adopt, which is why these selectivity 
categories are dropped from models of adoption.  Although my current measure of 
selectivity is not well suited for regression models, it is clear that selectivity affects 
adoption decisions, and also the survival, of liberal arts colleges. 
Institutional variables are added in model (2) of Table 4.2.  The significantly 
negative coefficient on age supports H3, that colleges with longer organizational histories 
are less likely to adopt.  The significantly positive coefficients on the region variables 
support H4, that colleges located in the Northeast will be less likely to adopt.  Rates of 
adoption are particularly high for colleges in the South and the West. 
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H5 states that colleges that have previously adopted illegitimate curricular 
practices in the past are more likely to become universities.  I use three measures of 
illegitimate curricular practices.  First, the cumulative count of professional bachelor‟s 
degrees (e.g., education, business, engineering) ever adopted is not significantly related to 
probability of becoming a university.  Second, the cumulative count of the number of 
professional master‟s degrees ever adopted is strongly related to the probability of 
becoming a university.  Third, the annual proportion of professional bachelor‟s degrees 
awarded is strongly related to the probability of becoming a university.  These results 
imply that adopting professional bachelor‟s degrees is consistent with shifts in the liberal 
arts college template, as discussed by Kraatz and Zajac (1996).  However, increases in 
the proportion of professional bachelor‟s degrees awarded and the adoption of 
professional master‟s degrees are linked with the comprehensive university template. 
The inclusion of curriculum variables in model (2) decreases the coefficients on 
market variables, relative to the model (1), which does not include curriculum variables.  
These results imply that variation in curricular practices accounts for a large proportion 
of variation in the dependent variable.  Additionally, market variables, such as declines in 
freshman enrollments, may affect becoming a university through their effect on curricular 
practices, an idea that is consistent with research on the adoption of professional 
bachelor‟s degrees (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996) and master‟s degrees (Jaquette, 2010). 
 The literature implies conflicting hypotheses on the effect of geographic 
proximity (Burt, 1987; Coleman, Katz, & Menzel, 1966; D'Aunno, et al., 2000).  
Drawing from the literature on contagion and social cohesion, geographically proximate 
prior adopters are an observable model to mimic during periods of uncertainty; H8b 
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states that prior adoption by geographically proximate colleges increases the likelihood of 
adoption by focal colleges. Drawing from the literature on competition, prior adoption by 
geographically proximate colleges increases the market share for colleges retaining their 
current strategy; H9 states that prior adoption by geographically proximate colleges 
decreases the likelihood of adoption by focal colleges.  Model (3) of Table 4.2 shows 
support for H8b, a finding that persists even after adding institutional factors in model 
(4).   
H10b states that focal colleges are more likely to adopt when geographically 
proximate prior adopters increase performance after adoption.  I measure performance as 
the average percent change in total enrollments for prior adopters, relative to the year of 
adoption.  This coefficient is insignificant in model (5), with market factors, and in model 
(6), with institutional factors.  To summarize, geographic proximity to a large number of 
prior adopters increases the likelihood of adoption, but the enrollment performance of 
those prior adopters does not increase the likelihood of adoption. 
I test hypotheses relating to membership in inter-organizational consortia.  
Drawing from the perspective that network ties are mechanisms for isomorphism within 
an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), H6 states that liberal arts colleges 
are more likely to adopt when they are never members of a consortium.   The coefficient 
is on the cusp of significance in model (1) of Table 4.2, but not when institutional 
variables are added in model (2).  I also test H6 in Table 4.3, using a time-varying 
indicator of presence in a consortium.  The hypothesis is not supported. 
 Table 4.3 shows the results for the remaining consortia hypotheses, with models 
1-4 including consortium measures and models 5-8 including both consortia and 
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geographic proximity measures.  The models in Table 4.3 are run only for those colleges 
that were ever members of a consortium and only for 1971-2000, the years when 
consortia data are available.  Therefore, the analysis samples in Table 4.3 are smaller than 
those in Table 4.2.   
Membership in consortia may constrain organizational behavior to the extent that 
organizations dissolve network ties in order to adopt.  Drawing on this idea, H7 states 
that departure from a network increases the probability of adoption.  This hypothesis is 
not supported. 
 Contagion hypothesis H8a states that prior adoption by consortia members 
increases the probability of adoption.  This hypothesis is supported in models with market 
variables (model 1) and in models with market and institutional variables (model 2).  
H10a states that strong enrollment performance by previously adopting consortium 
members increases the likelihood of adoption.  This hypothesis receives strong support in 
model (3), which includes market variables only, but support dissipates once institutional 
variables are included in model (4). 
 Models 5-8 of Table 4.3 include both consortium and geographic proximity 
measures.  These models use show conventional standard errors.  The smaller sample size 
of consortium models, coupled with the additional geographic proximity variables, led to 
convergence problems when attempting to calculate bootstrap standard errors.  Prior 
adoption by consortia members (H8a) retains its significance in model (5), the market 
model, and when institutional variables are added in model (6).  Geographic proximity to 
previous adopters is significant in the market model (5), but not in the institutional model 
(6).   It is unclear whether the insignificance of geographically proximate prior adopters 
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in institutional model (6) is due to the presence of consortium variables or the smaller 
sample size in the consortium models.   
Finally, the enrollment performance of previously adopting consortium members 
(H10a)  significantly increases the probability of adoption in both market model (7) and 
institutional model (8).  Note that this coefficient was not significant in institutional 
model (4), which did not contain geographic proximity variables.  On the whole, the 
results suggest support, albeit tentative, for H10a. 
Effects of Adoption 
Analyzing the determinants of becoming a university is a worthwhile exercise 
only if becoming a university affects important organizational outcomes (H11).  I model 
the effect of becoming a university on organizational outcomes, identified by Breneman 
(1990), that distinguish liberal arts colleges from comprehensive universities: total FTE 
enrollments; graduate FTE enrollments; annual master‟s degrees production; 
undergraduate FTE enrollments; annual bachelor‟s degree production; the proportion of 
professional bachelor‟s degrees; the percent of part-time students; adoption of 
professional master‟s degrees; and adoption of professional bachelor‟s degrees. I also 
model gross tuition revenue and total current revenue, which are outcomes of importance 
to administrators. 
Table 4.4 presents, for each outcome, the coefficient on two variables: (1) the 
organization becomes a university, where the variable equals one only in the year of 
adoption; and (2) previously becoming a university, where the variable equals one in the 
year of adoption and all subsequent years. The adoption variable isolates short-run effects 
whereas the previous adoption variable isolates lasting effects.  I assume that becoming a 
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university affects subsequent outcomes.  I use two-year lags for both adoption variables, 
but found similar results for one-year and three-year lags (results available upon request).   
All dependent variables, except master‟s degree and bachelor‟s degree adoption, 
are based on fixed effect linear panel models with cluster, robust standard errors.  
Coefficients for random effects models, available upon request, were virtually identical 
due to the large number of time periods for each panel (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  The 
dependent variables in all linear panel models are logged to normalize their distributions.  
All models use a very strong set of covariates, including dummies for time, listed on the 
bottom of Table 4.4.  For example, the model of total FTE enrollments includes 
covariates measuring prior adoption of master‟s and bachelor‟s degrees, which are 
variables that could be affected by becoming a university; therefore, to be significant, 
becoming a university must affect total FTE enrollments even after controlling for prior 
degree adoption. 
In general, the results lend strong support to H11, that becoming a university 
leads to an increase in behaviors associated with the comprehensive university template.  
In column (1), both adoption and previous adoption have a significant, positive 
relationship with total enrollments.  Becoming a university, lagged two years, is 
associated with a 5.4% increase in total enrollments.  Previously becoming a university, 
lagged two years, is associated with an 11.1% increase in total enrollments.  In column 
(2), becoming a university is associated with a 33.3% increase in graduate enrollments 
and previously becoming a university is associated with a 30.8% increase in graduate 
enrollments.  In column (3), becoming a university does not significantly affect the 
annual production of master‟s degrees, but previously becoming a university is associated 
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with a 32.0% increase in master‟s degree production.  Both becoming a university and 
previously becoming a university have positive, significant effect on undergraduate 
enrollments and bachelor‟s degree production.   
Breneman (1990) states that a high proportion of professional bachelor‟s degrees 
(column 6) and having a high proportion of part-time students (column 7) are 
characteristics linked with the comprehensive university template. However, neither 
becoming a university nor previously becoming a university has a significant effect on 
these outcomes.  Table 4.2 shows that increases in the proportion of professional 
bachelor‟s degrees awarded increase the probability of becoming a university, but column 
(6) of Table 4.4 shows that becoming a university does not increase the proportion of 
professional bachelor‟s degrees awarded. 
The adoption of professional master‟s degrees and bachelor‟s degrees was 
modeled using random effects Poisson panel models, with bootstrap standard errors 
calculated using 100 replications.
55
   In column 8, becoming a university and previously 
becoming a university increases the adoption of professional master‟s degrees.  
Interestingly, in column 9, becoming a university has a significantly negative affect on 
the adoption of professional bachelor‟s degrees.  This result implies that liberal arts 
colleges become universities after the scope of baccalaureate curricula broadens to 
mature levels. 
Columns (10) and (11) present results for revenue outcomes.  Liberal arts college 
revenues are driven by enrollments.  I previously argued that liberal arts colleges become 
universities because adverse market conditions undermined their ability to generate 
                                                 
55
 Fixed effects Poisson panel models are undesirable because non-adoption is of substantive interest but 
the fixed effect transformation drops all panels without variation in the dependent variable. 
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sufficient enrollments using the liberal arts template.  Therefore, I argue that the decision 
to become a university is principally motivated by the desire to increase tuition revenue.  
Column (10) shows that becoming a university is associated with a 5.0% increase in 
gross tuition revenue and previously becoming a university is associated with an 11.8% 
increase in gross tuition revenue.  Similarly, column (11) shows that becoming a 
university is associated with a 4.9% increase in total current revenues and previously 
becoming a university is associated with an 11.1% increase in total current revenues.  
These results indicate that becoming a university is a wise decision for colleges 
concerned with financial stability.  Note that coefficients for the effect on tuition revenue 
(column 10) are nearly identical to coefficients for the effect on total current revenues, 
implying that effect of becoming a university on total current revenues is driven by its 
effect on tuition revenues.
56
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Summary 
 I argue that becoming a university symbolizes the abandonment of the liberal arts 
college template in favor of the comprehensive university template.   Liberal arts colleges 
make this decision against a backdrop of market conditions unfavorable to the liberal arts 
college template: a shift in student preferences away from liberal arts curricula; increased 
competition from low-price public organizations; and a decline in the traditional college 
population.   
                                                 
56
 Note that the measure of total current revenues excludes private grant and endowment revenue due to 
changes in accounting standards (see notes in Table 4).  However, endowment and private grant revenues 
are modest for liberal arts colleges that become universities. 
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 Results from panel models of adoption show strong support for the hypotheses.  
Colleges are more likely to become universities following declines in freshman 
enrollments (H1), a leading indicator of enrollment problems.  Colleges with a high 
proportion of non-tuition revenue and a strong market position (high tuition price, highly 
selective) can generate sufficient revenue from multiple sources in order to survive 
without abandoning the liberal arts template (H2).   
Organizational age is a strong predictor of non-adoption (H3), implying that a 
historically grounded organizational saga makes colleges resistant to external pressures 
(Clark, 1972) and that a historically grounded mission is a valued source of competitive 
advantage (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001).  Rates of adoption differ dramatically by region (H4) 
implying that regional culture affects the attractiveness of the liberal arts versus the 
comprehensive university template.   
Curriculum plays a central role in the process of becoming a university (H5).  
Prior adoption of professional bachelor‟s degrees does not increase the probability of 
becoming a university, which is consistent with the finding that professional 
baccalaureate curricula have become part of the liberal arts template (Kraatz & Zajac, 
1996).  However, the proportion of professional bachelor‟s degrees awarded does 
increase the probability of becoming a university, as does prior adoption of professional 
master‟s degrees.  Collectively, the findings on curricula imply that becoming a 
university is an evolutionary process rather than a revolutionary process (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996), where colleges transition through several stages of curriculum change 
before becoming a university. 
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Becoming a university is affected by the behavior of peer organizations.  Theories 
of institutional constraint argue that networks provide mechanisms for peer organizations 
to prohibit divergent change (H6)(H7).  These hypotheses are not supported.  I also find 
no support for H9, that colleges do not mimic geographically proximate prior adopters 
because competitors avoid occupying the same market space at the same time.  In support 
of contagion, focal organizations are more likely to become universities when they have 
share consortium membership (H8a) and geographic proximity (H8b) with prior 
adopters.   
The enrollment performance of previously adopting network contacts has a mixed 
relationship with adoption by focal organizations.  Colleges are significantly more likely 
to adopt when prior adopting consortium members increased total enrollments after 
adoption.  However, enrollment growth of geographically proximate prior adopters has 
no effect.  One potential explanation for these findings is that whereas focal organizations 
can ask consortium members whether adoption increased enrollments, focal organizations 
only observe adoption but not subsequent enrollment growth of geographically proximate 
colleges. 
Finally, consistent with H11, becoming a university has important effects on 
organizational outcomes, resulting in higher total enrollments, higher production of 
master‟s degrees and bachelor‟s degrees, subsequent adoption of professional master‟s 
degrees, higher tuition revenue, and higher total revenue.  In short, becoming a university 
creates an organizational trajectory of growth and diversification. 
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Discussion 
Viewed holistically, the results show that liberal arts colleges change 
organizational templates to increase enrollments.  The positive significant coefficient on 
total undergraduate enrollments indicates that colleges become universities after the 
initiation of an enrollment growth strategy.  Yet the negative significant coefficient on 
freshman enrollments indicates that colleges are especially likely to become universities 
when enrollments from their traditional customer base decline.  Colleges that rely heavily 
on tuition funding are more likely to become universities, implying that the decision is 
motivated by the desire to increase tuition revenue by increasing enrollments.  Indeed, the 
models for H11 show that two effects of becoming a university are growth in total 
enrollments and tuition revenue.   
Scholars argue that mission drift is motivated by the desire to increase prestige 
(Aldersley, 1995; Toma, 2009).  I find that selective colleges do not become universities.  
For already prestigious institutions, becoming a university will actually decrease prestige, 
since it involves sacrificing the distinctive resource of organizational saga (Clark, 1972; 
Kraatz & Zajac, 2001).  For non-selective institutions, becoming a university may be 
motivated by the pursuit of prestige.  However, I interpret the results differently.  
Contrary to extant scholarship (Breneman, 1994; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996), I show that the 
possibility of organizational death was quite real, especially for non-selective colleges.  
These non-selective colleges faced weak demand from their core constituency of 
traditional college-age students, but the liberal arts template discouraged several 
enrollment growth strategies.   
 273 
 
Rather than pursue prestige, the coefficients on curriculum measures imply that 
colleges become universities in order to engage in behaviors that grow enrollments and 
diversify clientele.  At an early stage of template change, colleges adopt professional 
bachelor‟s degrees to grow enrollments (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996).  At a later stage of 
template change, growth in the proportion of professional bachelor‟s degrees awarded 
increases the probability of becoming a university.  Finally, colleges are more likely to 
become universities after adopting professional master‟s degrees.  The adoption of 
professional master‟s degrees enables colleges to pursue enrollment growth from non-
traditional customer bases.  Indeed, the models for H11 show that becoming a university 
leads to higher graduate student enrollments, higher production of master‟s degrees, and 
the subsequent adoption of professional master‟s degrees.  In summary, the results are 
consistent with the idea that colleges become universities to increase brand identity with 
new customer bases (Morphew, 2002), but the primary goal is to increase enrollments 
rather than pursue prestige.   
Colleges that become universities are successful in growing enrollments, as 
shown in Figure 4.4b.
57
  Breneman (1990, p. 6) states that liberal arts colleges are 
“becoming something else – for want of a better term, a small professional college,” in 
that they are not large enough to be comprehensive universities.  Figure 4.4b highlights 
Breneman‟s failure to predict that the “small professional college” was merely a 
transitional period during which liberal arts colleges were became comprehensive 
universities. 
If growing enrollments is the motivation behind organizational change, how have 
liberal arts colleges changed their behavior to increase enrollments?  Kraatz and Zajac 
                                                 
57
 Figures 4 and 5 exclude the 44 liberal arts colleges that had the word university in their name in 1966. 
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(1996) study the adoption of professional bachelor‟s degrees.  Figure 4.4c shows that the 
proportion of professional bachelor‟s degrees increased from 35% in 1970 to 66% in 
1987, but has gradually declined since then.  Colleges that became universities award a 
higher proportion of professional degrees, but the proportion has declined since 1988 for 
these organizations too.  Another growth strategy is to increase enrollments from part 
time students.  Figure 4.4d shows that the proportion of part-time enrollments at all 
colleges (based on headcounts from all-degree levels), increased from 6% in 1969 to 20% 
in 1992 but has declined since then, even – albeit erratically – for colleges that became 
universities.  Finally, Figure 4.5 shows (a) the median ratio of master‟s degrees awarded 
to bachelor‟s degrees and (b) median graduate FTE enrollments as a proportion of total 
FTE enrollments.  Reliance on master‟s degrees and graduate enrollments increases 
dramatically for colleges that become universities, but modestly for liberal arts colleges 
Taken as a whole, Figures 4 and 5 paint a picture of increased reliance on 
professional bachelor‟s degrees from 1969-1987, increased reliance on part-time students 
from 1969 to 1992, and increased reliance on graduate education – master‟s degrees in 
particular – in the 1990s and 2000s.  Liberal arts colleges and those that became 
universities differ modestly with respect to the proportion of professional baccalaureate 
degrees and part-time enrollments.  They differ dramatically with respect to graduate 
enrollments.  Professional bachelor‟s degrees and part-time students became 
institutionalized as part of the liberal arts template, but colleges attempting to grow 
enrollments through graduate education leave the liberal arts template to become 
universities.   
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Conclusion: Rise of the Enrollment Economy 
 Clark‟s (1956) analysis of California adult education shows that when an 
organization has (a) precarious values and (b) lacks dependable resources, it will adjust 
its mission to one that maximizes the probability of survival.  Whereas Clark (1956) 
studies a population with precarious values, the case of liberal arts colleges shows that 
resource scarcity causes value adaptation even when values are deeply held.  The Catch-
22 facing liberal arts colleges in the 1970s and 1980s was that low enrollments threatened 
organizational survival, but important enrollment growth strategies (e.g., graduate 
education) were prohibited by the values associated with the liberal arts template.  
Colleges responded by adopting an organizational template with more flexible values. 
In the case of adult education, organizations rationalized the transformation from 
education to customer-service in terms of populist ideals; “it is `the public‟ and not the 
professional ruling by fiat, that should decide what is to be done” (Clark, 1956, p. 335).  
In the case of liberal arts colleges, adopting the comprehensive university template is 
rationalized in terms of the “access and equity” paradigm that dominates higher education 
research and policy.   
The comprehensive university template has several advantages over the liberal 
arts template, especially during periods of adverse and uncertain market conditions.  
First, whereas the liberal arts template eschews the goal of enrollment growth, the 
comprehensive university template encourages enrollment growth.  Second, all 
enrollment growth strategies (e.g., part-time students, professional degrees, graduate 
degrees, etc.) are acceptable under the comprehensive university template.  Third, 
reliance on full-time traditional-college-age students and private donations leaves 
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traditional liberal arts colleges in a state of vulnerability should one resource falter 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  By contrast, the comprehensive university template 
encourages resource diversification such the organization is not overly reliant on a single 
resource. 
The ascendance of the comprehensive university template symbolizes the 
dominance of the “enrollment economy” (Clark, 1956) over historically institutionalized 
organizational values.  Increasingly, the enrollment economy dominates all divisions and 
levels of the university.  Kraatz (2010) argues that the adoption of enrollment 
management offices subvert the values of liberal arts colleges because the core processes 
of admissions, financial aid, and the registrar are reorganized under the service of 
growing enrollments from the right students. The adoption of responsibility centered 
management offices creates internal markets where academic units are allocated funds on 
the basis of enrollments in the unit (Priest, Becker, Hossler, & St. John, 2002).  Within 
units, deans allocate tenure lines on the basis of whether the department can generate 
sufficient enrollment revenues to pay for the faculty member.  Increasingly, enrollment 
management software flags professors with consistently low course enrollments. 
What is lost when the enrollment economy overruns the historic organizational 
values of liberal arts colleges?  Flag bearers of the old institutionalism state that while 
organizations cannot survive without resources from society, societal values require 
nurture from specialized organizations (Clark, 1956; Kraatz, et al., 2010; Selznick, 1957).  
When organizational values are replaced by a customer service ideology, organizations 
cease to contribute those values to society.  Breneman (1990) describes the unique 
contributions of liberal arts colleges: a setting that rewards good teaching; the education 
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of future scholars; the promotion of religious and moral values; and small enrollments 
and small class sizes, which create a sense of community amongst students, faculty, and 
staff.  The liberal arts template assumes that educators, not students determine the 
curricula.  In the comprehensive university template, as in the case of adult education, 
students determine the curricula by voting with their feet and the unique contributions of 
liberal arts colleges become faint. 
The coming decades will likely bring continued value erosion as the enrollment 
economy remains ascendant.  Comprehensive universities will continue to grow graduate 
enrollments and liberal arts colleges will continue to become comprehensive universities 
in order to grow graduate enrollments.  Yet, there is probably a limit to the enrollments 
that can be generated through graduate education at private, non-selective institutions.  
Therefore, I expect organizations will increase efforts in distance education, the 
recruitment of foreign students, and the creation of satellite campuses abroad.  The 
significant findings on network tie variables suggest that these new strategies to increase 
enrollments will diffuse from prior to potential adopters. 
Paradoxically, the pursuit of prestige provides a check against value erosion.  
Prestige is largely determined by the academic characteristics of enrolled students.  
Prestigious colleges and universities pursue prestige by competing with one another for 
the best students (Winston, 1999).  Prestigious institutions remain cautious about 
enrollment growth.  Enrollment growth leads to a decline in academic profile, which 
causes prestige to decline, leading to a decline in student demand (Bowman & Bastedo, 
2009).   
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A more recent phenomenon is that non-prestigious institutions increasingly use 
enrollment management strategies – primarily the strategic use of institutional aid – to 
increase their academic profile (Doyle, 2010; Kraatz, et al., 2010).  Institutions desiring 
to raise their academic profile will be cautious about who they admit, thereby slowing 
enrollment growth.  However, organization level prestige is typically determined by the 
academic profile of undergraduate students (Bastedo & Bowman, 2010; Winston, 1999).  
Therefore, institutions may increasingly pursue enrollment growth in graduate education 
and prestige in undergraduate education. 
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Tables 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics
a
 
 
1st year Mean Std. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Become a university 1967 0.008 0.091 1.00 
             
2. Undergrad FTE (000s) 1969 1.160 0.792 0.03 1.00 
            
3. Freshmen FTE (000s) 1974 0.276 0.185 0.01 0.85 1.00 
           
4. Pct. Non-tuition 
revenue 
1969 0.468 0.351 -0.02 -0.16 -0.09 1.00 
          
5. Tuition price ($000s) 1969 13.457 6.978 0.00 0.31 0.32 -0.12 1.00 
         
6. Pct. Freshmen in-state 1972 0.611 0.252 0.02 -0.03 -0.14 -0.11 -0.27 1.00 
        
7. Organization Age 1966 102 44 -0.02 0.09 0.16 0.04 0.35 -0.08 1.00 
       
8. Cum total adoption of 
professional BA degrees 
1966 5.379 2.901 0.05 0.30 0.20 -0.14 0.26 0.07 0.05 1.00 
      
9. Cum total adoption of 
professional MA degrees 
1966 1.182 1.890 0.07 0.31 0.13 -0.18 0.24 0.09 -0.08 0.34 1.00 
     
10. Pct of BA degrees in 
professional majors 
1966 0.548 0.258 0.06 0.01 -0.13 -0.12 -0.31 0.35 -0.27 0.28 0.17 1.00 
    
11. Ever member of a 
consortium 
1966 0.850 0.357 -0.01 0.08 0.11 -0.03 0.12 -0.04 0.10 0.14 -0.06 -0.01 1.00 
   
12. Pct of geographically 
proximate adopters 
1966 0.112 0.169 0.04 0.17 0.11 -0.06 0.26 0.03 0.07 0.29 0.21 0.10 -0.11 1.00 
  
13. Enrollment perf of 
local adopters 
1970 0.207 0.592 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.29 -0.11 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.27 1.00 
 
14. Religious affiliation 1966 0.662 0.473 0.03 -0.10 -0.14 0.00 -0.27 0.21 -0.07 0.07 0.03 0.32 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 1.00 
a
 Some variables not included because they would not fit on a single page without decreasing font too much. 
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Table 4.2 Basic adoption model with market, institutional, and geographic proximity variables, bootstrap standard errors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln Undergrad FTE enroll 1.711*** 1.341*** 1.724*** 1.259*** 1.743*** 1.319*** 
  (0.320) (0.325) (0.347) (0.276) (0.349) (0.334) 
Ln Freshmen FTE enroll (H1) -0.729*** -0.305 -0.723*** -0.295 -0.743*** -0.310 
  (0.174) (0.163) (0.181) (0.155) (0.182) (0.160) 
Pct non-tuition revenue (H2) -1.347*** 0.046 -1.379*** -0.082 -1.351*** 0.082 
  (0.290) (0.533) (0.362) (0.638) (0.300) (0.525) 
Ln Tuition price (H2) -0.762 -0.300 -0.676 -0.238 -0.768 -0.291 
  (0.404) (0.354) (0.369) (0.213) (0.432) (0.352) 
Age (H3)   -0.011**   -0.009**   -0.011** 
    (0.004)   (0.003)   (0.004) 
Region=Midwest (H4)   1.752**   1.483**   1.718** 
    (0.578)   (0.520)   (0.603) 
Region=South (H4)   2.144***   1.862***   2.083** 
    (0.604)   (0.493)   (0.642) 
Region=West (H4)   2.351***   1.973***   2.400*** 
    (0.683)   (0.524)   (0.707) 
Total professional BA adopted (H5)   0.055   0.055   0.056 
    (0.058)   (0.052)   (0.058) 
Total professional MA adopted (H5)   0.424**   0.420***   0.420** 
    (0.137)   (0.128)   (0.140) 
Pct professional BA awarded (H5)   3.779***   3.864***   3.848*** 
    (0.711)   (0.643)   (0.729) 
Ever in consortium (H6) -0.562 -0.081 -0.601 -0.089 -0.597 -0.070 
  (0.331) (0.421) (0.355) (0.352) (0.346) (0.427) 
Previous adopters in region (H8b) (H9)     2.044** 1.771**     
      (0.627) (0.636)     
# of Prev adopters in region > 0         0.320 0.551* 
          (0.258) (0.276) 
FTE chg of prev adopt in region (H10b)         -0.119 -0.228 
          (0.139) (0.201) 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Time (years) 0.235** 0.191 0.234** 0.180 0.220* 0.160 
  (0.090) (0.098) (0.082) (0.104) (0.092) (0.097) 
Time squared (years) -0.002 -0.002 -0.003* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of panels 596 583 587 574 596 583 
Number of observations 16,484 16,325 16,167 16,008 16,484 16,325 
Max number of time periods 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Avg number of time periods 27.66 28.00 27.54 27.89 27.66 28.00 
chi2 67.80 57.50 69.64 82.25 61.84 56.33 
Log likelihood -850.73 -765.39 -829.93 -748.13 -849.61 -762.50 
std dev of v_i 1.14 1.13 1.17 1.04 1.19 1.09 
Pct of variance contributed by v_i 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.30 0.26 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.3 Basic adoption model with market, institutional, consortium, and geographic proximity variables 
 Bootstrap SE (100 replications) Non-Bootstrap SE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln Undergrad FTE enroll 1.196** 1.005* 1.130** 1.082* 1.068** 0.869** 1.052** 1.033*** 
  (0.417) (0.491) (0.395) (0.449) (0.404) (0.283) (0.361) (0.274) 
Ln Freshmen FTE enroll (H1) -0.617** -0.266 -0.613** -0.326 -0.560** -0.247 -0.597*** -0.332 
  (0.222) (0.242) (0.213) (0.224) (0.207) (0.174) (0.178) (0.171) 
Pct non-tuition revenue (H2) -3.488** -0.012 -3.443** 0.130 -3.944** -0.340 -3.379** 0.151 
  (1.286) (1.553) (1.252) (1.460) (1.327) (1.270) (1.173) (0.988) 
Ln Tuition price (H2) -1.136* -0.367 -1.049* -0.383 -0.968** -0.311 -0.938** -0.358 
  (0.540) (0.491) (0.519) (0.502) (0.370) (0.276) (0.312) (0.280) 
Age (H3)   -0.013   -0.012   -0.011**   -0.012*** 
    (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.004)   (0.003) 
Region=Midwest (H4)   2.486   2.431   2.374***   2.425*** 
    (1.686)   (1.421)   (0.600)   (0.610) 
Region=South (H4)   2.622   2.517   2.412***   2.384*** 
    (1.842)   (1.497)   (0.609)   (0.615) 
Region=West (H4)   2.993   2.908*   2.839***   2.905*** 
    (1.532)   (1.328)   (0.654)   (0.648) 
Total professional BA adopted (H5)   0.033   0.019   0.044   0.029 
    (0.141)   (0.131)   (0.048)   (0.049) 
Total professional MA adopted (H5)   0.360   0.376*   0.353***   0.377*** 
    (0.245)   (0.179)   (0.053)   (0.053) 
Pct professional BA awarded (H5)   2.473**   2.515**   2.507**   2.510** 
    (0.879)   (0.869)   (0.814)   (0.803) 
In a consortium (time varying) (H6) -0.008 -0.092     -0.046 -0.099     
  (0.316) (0.369)     (0.323) (0.311)     
Prev depart from consortium (H7) 0.159 0.364 0.295 0.401         
  (0.387) (0.359) (0.364) (0.345)         
Pct of consort members adopting (H8a) 6.492** 5.026*     6.162*** 5.082***     
  (2.150) (2.524)     (1.779) (1.489)     
# of consort members adopting > 0     0.615 0.395     0.671* 0.352 
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 Bootstrap SE (100 replications) Non-Bootstrap SE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      (0.358) (0.319)     (0.339) (0.338) 
FTE chg of prev adopt in consort (H10a)     2.230** 1.861     2.112** 2.052** 
      (0.823) (1.068)     (0.725) (0.669) 
Previous adopters in region (H8b) (H9)         2.486* 1.117     
          (1.157) (0.858)     
# of Prev adopters in region > 0             -0.320 0.193 
              (0.270) (0.281) 
FTE chg of prev adopt in region (H10b)             -0.035 -0.234 
              (0.283) (0.393) 
Time (years) 0.419* 0.392 0.411* 0.366 0.413* 0.364* 0.411* 0.335 
  (0.181) (0.378) (0.172) (0.371) (0.178) (0.175) (0.174) (0.175) 
Time squared (years) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of panels 483 481 483 481 477 475 483 481 
Number of observations 10,830 10,760 10,830 10,760 10,679 10,609 10,830 10,760 
Max number of time periods 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Avg number of time periods 22.42 22.37 22.42 22.37 22.39 22.33 22.42 22.37 
chi2 46.82 41.30 66.18 53.89 28.13 143.33 46.29 151.54 
Log likelihood -410.47 -364.87 -406.31 -361.34 -399.49 -357.72 -405.94 -361.81 
std dev of v_i 1.36 0.01 1.10 0.00 1.28 0.01 0.76 0.00 
Pct of variance contributed by v_i 0.36 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.15 0.00 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.4 The effect of becoming a university on organizational outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Tot FTE
a
 
Grad 
FTE
b
 
Tot 
MA
c
 
UG 
FTE
d
 
Tot 
BA
e
 
% 
Nonlib 
BA
f
 
Pct 
Part
g
 
Adopt 
Nonlib 
MA
h
 
Adopt 
Nonlib 
BA
i
 
Gross 
Tuit Rev
j
 
Current 
Rev
k
 
L2 col-
to-univ 
0.054* 0.333** 0.092 0.056** 0.047* 0.006 -0.005 0.972** -0.168* 0.050* 0.049* 
 (0.022) (0.107) (0.091) (0.020) (0.024) (0.006) (0.007) (0.352) (0.070) (0.022) (0.020) 
L2 prev 
col-to-
univ 
0.111*** 0.308* 0.320* 0.059* 0.082* -0.011 -0.003 0.414* -0.256 0.118*** 0.111** 
 (0.033) (0.152) (0.136) (0.029) (0.036) (0.010) (0.010) (0.205) (0.245) (0.035) (0.035) 
 
a
 Fixed effects linear panel regression of logged total FTE enrollments. Covariates: tuition price; % in-state freshmen; # of lib arts colleges within 100 
miles; total professional BA degrees previously adopted; total professional MA degrees previously adopted; proportion of professional BA degrees; 
federal revenue; auxiliary revenue; endow/investment revenue; state revenue; age; urbanization; selectivity; region (e.g., Northeast); religious; time 
(dummies) 
 
b
 Fixed effects linear panel regression of logged total graduate FTE enrollments.  Covariates: undergraduate FTE enrollments; tuition price; % in-state 
freshmen; # of lib arts colleges within 100 miles; total professional BA degrees previously adopted; total professional MA degrees previously adopted; 
proportion of professional BA degrees; federal revenue; auxiliary revenue; endow/investment revenue; state revenue; age; urbanization; selectivity; 
region (e.g., Northeast); religious; time (dummies) 
 
c 
Fixed effects linear panel regression of logged total MA degrees produced. Covariates: undergraduate FTE enrollments; tuition price; % in-state 
freshmen; # of lib arts colleges within 100 miles; total professional BA degrees previously adopted; total professional MA degrees previously adopted; 
proportion of professional BA degrees; federal revenue; auxiliary revenue; endow/investment revenue; state revenue; age; urbanization; selectivity; 
region (e.g., Northeast); religious; time (dummies) 
 
d 
Fixed effects linear panel regression of logged total undergraduate FTE enrollments. Covariates: graduate FTE enrollments; tuition price; % in-state 
freshmen; # of lib arts colleges within 100 miles; total professional BA degrees previously adopted; total professional MA degrees previously adopted; 
proportion of professional BA degrees; federal revenue; auxiliary revenue; endow/investment revenue; state revenue; age; urbanization; selectivity; 
region (e.g., Northeast); religious; time (dummies) 
 
e 
Fixed effects linear panel regression of logged total BA degrees produced. Covariates: graduate FTE enrollments; tuition price; % in-state freshmen; # 
of lib arts colleges within 100 miles; total professional BA degrees previously adopted; total professional MA degrees previously adopted; proportion of 
professional BA degrees; federal revenue; auxiliary revenue; endow/investment revenue; state revenue; age; urbanization; selectivity; region (e.g., 
Northeast); religious; time (dummies) 
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f 
Fixed effects linear panel regression of proportion of professional BA degrees produced. Covariates: total FTE enrollments; tuition price; % in-state 
freshmen; # of lib arts colleges within 100 miles; federal revenue; auxiliary revenue; endow/investment revenue; state revenue; age; urbanization; 
selectivity; region (e.g., Northeast); religious; time (dummies) 
 
g 
Fixed effects linear panel regression of part time student headcount as a proportion of total headcount. Covariates: total FTE enrollments; tuition price; 
% in-state freshmen; # of lib arts colleges within 100 miles; total professional BA degrees previously adopted; total professional MA degrees previously 
adopted; proportion of professional BA degrees; federal revenue; auxiliary revenue; endow/investment revenue; state revenue; age; urbanization; 
selectivity; region (e.g., Northeast); religious; time (dummies). 
 
h 
Random effects Poisson panel regression of number of professional MA degrees adopted in the year, bootstrap standard errors based on 100 
replications.  Covariates: undergraduate FTE enrollments; undergraduate freshman enrollments; tuition price; % in-state freshmen; % part-time 
undergraduate students; # of lib arts colleges within 100 miles; total professional BA degrees previously adopted; proportion of professional BA 
degrees; federal revenue; auxiliary revenue; endow/investment revenue; state revenue; age; urbanization; selectivity; region (e.g., Northeast); religious; 
time (dummies). 
 
i 
 Random effects Poisson panel regression of number of professional BA degrees adopted in the year, bootstrap standard errors based on 100 
replications. Covariates: undergraduate FTE enrollments; undergraduate freshman enrollments; tuition price; % in-state freshmen; % part-time 
undergraduate students; # of lib arts colleges within 100 miles; total professional MA degrees previously adopted; proportion of professional BA 
degrees; federal revenue; auxiliary revenue; endow/investment revenue; state revenue; age; urbanization; selectivity; region (e.g., Northeast); religious; 
time (dummies). 
 
j 
 Fixed effects linear panel regression of logged gross tuition revenue. Covariates: tuition price; % in-state freshmen; % part-time undergraduate 
students; # of lib arts colleges within 100 miles; total professional BA degrees previously adopted; total professional MA degrees previously adopted; 
proportion of professional BA degrees; federal revenue; auxiliary revenue; endow/investment revenue; state revenue; age; urbanization; selectivity; 
region (e.g., Northeast); religious; time (dummies). 
 
k 
Fixed effects linear panel regression of logged total current revenue, excluding endowment and private giving revenue.
58
 Covariates: tuition price; % 
in-state freshmen; % part-time undergraduate students; # of lib arts colleges within 100 miles; total professional BA degrees previously adopted; total 
professional MA degrees previously adopted; proportion of professional BA degrees; age; urbanization; selectivity; region (e.g., Northeast); religious; 
time (dummies).
 
  
                                                 
58
 The total current revenues variable does not include endowment revenue or private grants revenue because these measures are incomparable before 
and after 1997 FASB accounting changes.  Specifically, reported endowment and private grants revenue increased dramatically after 1997 accounting 
changes.  To the extent that organizations are colleges in early years (prior to accounting changes) and become universities in later years (after 
accounting changes), the inclusion of endowment revenue and private grants revenue may upwardly bias the coefficient on the college-to-university 
independent variable. 
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Figures 
Figure 4.1 Becoming a university and organizational death, 1966-2010 
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Figure 4.2 U.S. Population of 18-19 year-olds (millions) from 1970 to 2009 
 
Source: NCES (2010, Table 15)  
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Figure 4.3 Rates of adoption and death by 1972 Carnegie Classification 
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Figure 4.4 Organizational change in the population of liberal arts colleges 
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Figure 4.5 Organizational change in the population of liberal arts colleges 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 4.1 Basic adoption model with market, institutional, and geographic proximity variables, conventional 
standard errors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln Undergrad FTE enroll 1.711*** 1.341*** 1.724*** 1.259*** 1.743*** 1.319*** 
  (0.319) (0.293) (0.329) (0.287) (0.332) (0.289) 
Ln Freshmen FTE enroll (H1) -0.729*** -0.305 -0.723*** -0.295 -0.743*** -0.310 
  (0.151) (0.172) (0.154) (0.167) (0.154) (0.169) 
Pct non-tuition revenue (H2) -1.347** 0.046 -1.379*** -0.082 -1.351** 0.082 
  (0.414) (0.725) (0.410) (0.747) (0.419) (0.702) 
Ln Tuition price (H2) -0.762*** -0.300 -0.676*** -0.238 -0.768*** -0.291 
  (0.190) (0.213) (0.188) (0.216) (0.196) (0.208) 
Age (H3)   -0.011**   -0.009**   -0.011** 
    (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003) 
Region=Midwest (H4)   1.752***   1.483***   1.718*** 
    (0.450)   (0.434)   (0.451) 
Region=South (H4)   2.144***   1.862***   2.083*** 
    (0.491)   (0.470)   (0.490) 
Region=West (H4)   2.351***   1.973***   2.400*** 
    (0.519)   (0.522)   (0.518) 
Total professional BA adopted (H5)   0.055   0.055   0.056 
    (0.043)   (0.042)   (0.043) 
Total professional MA adopted (H5)   0.424***   0.420***   0.420*** 
    (0.087)   (0.090)   (0.087) 
Pct professional BA awarded (H5)   3.779***   3.864***   3.848*** 
    (0.675)   (0.670)   (0.677) 
Ever in consortium (H6) -0.562 -0.081 -0.601 -0.089 -0.597 -0.070 
  (0.304) (0.312) (0.310) (0.306) (0.311) (0.308) 
  
 
2
9
2
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Previous adopters in region (H8b) (H9)     2.044** 1.771**     
      (0.651) (0.668)     
# of Prev adopters in region > 0         0.320 0.551* 
          (0.228) (0.239) 
FTE chg of prev adopt in region (H10b)         -0.119 -0.228 
          (0.184) (0.230) 
Time (years) 0.235*** 0.191* 0.234*** 0.180* 0.220** 0.160* 
  (0.069) (0.076) (0.070) (0.075) (0.070) (0.075) 
Time squared (years) -0.002* -0.002 -0.003* -0.002 -0.002* -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of panels 596 583 587 574 596 583 
Number of observations 16,484 16,325 16,167 16,008 16,484 16,325 
Max number of time periods 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Avg number of time periods 27.66 28.00 27.54 27.89 27.66 28.00 
chi2 51.74 66.29 51.08 66.13 49.92 68.64 
Log likelihood -850.73 -765.39 -829.93 -748.13 -849.61 -762.50 
std dev of v_i 1.14 1.13 1.17 1.04 1.19 1.09 
Pct of variance contributed by v_i 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.30 0.26 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix Table 4.2 Basic adoption model with market, institutional, consortium, and geographic proximity variables, 
conventional standard errors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln Undergrad FTE enroll 1.196** 1.005*** 1.071** 1.056*** 1.068** 0.869** 1.052** 1.033*** 
  (0.411) (0.278) (0.384) (0.273) (0.404) (0.283) (0.361) (0.274) 
Ln Freshmen FTE enroll (H1) -0.617** -0.266 -0.602*** -0.337* -0.560** -0.247 -0.597*** -0.332 
  (0.211) (0.177) (0.182) (0.171) (0.207) (0.174) (0.178) (0.171) 
Pct non-tuition revenue (H2) -3.488** -0.012 -3.426** 0.116 -3.944** -0.340 -3.379** 0.151 
  (1.301) (1.163) (1.209) (1.033) (1.327) (1.270) (1.173) (0.988) 
Ln Tuition price (H2) -1.136** -0.367 -0.965** -0.367 -0.968** -0.311 -0.938** -0.358 
  (0.381) (0.279) (0.346) (0.284) (0.370) (0.276) (0.312) (0.280) 
Age (H3)   -0.013***   -0.012***   -0.011**   -0.012*** 
    (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.003) 
Region=Midwest (H4)   2.486***   2.395***   2.374***   2.425*** 
    (0.608)   (0.611)   (0.600)   (0.610) 
Region=South (H4)   2.622***   2.378***   2.412***   2.384*** 
    (0.625)   (0.620)   (0.609)   (0.615) 
Region=West (H4)   2.993***   2.852***   2.839***   2.905*** 
    (0.644)   (0.644)   (0.654)   (0.648) 
Total professional BA adopted (H5)   0.033   0.027   0.044   0.029 
    (0.048)   (0.048)   (0.048)   (0.049) 
Total professional MA adopted (H5)   0.360***   0.374***   0.353***   0.377*** 
    (0.053)   (0.053)   (0.053)   (0.053) 
Pct professional BA awarded (H5)   2.473**   2.452**   2.507**   2.510** 
    (0.796)   (0.798)   (0.814)   (0.803) 
In a consortium (time varying) (H6) -0.008 -0.092     -0.046 -0.099     
  (0.323) (0.307)     (0.323) (0.311)     
Prev depart from consortium (H7) 0.159 0.364             
  (0.368) (0.322)             
Pct of consort members adopting (H8a) 6.492*** 5.026***     6.162*** 5.082***     
  (1.805) (1.490)     (1.779) (1.489)     
# of consort members adopting > 0     0.625 0.407     0.671* 0.352 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      (0.343) (0.330)     (0.339) (0.338) 
FTE chg of prev adopt in consort (H10a)     2.161** 1.966**     2.112** 2.052** 
      (0.766) (0.658)     (0.725) (0.669) 
Previous adopters in region (H8b) (H9)         2.486* 1.117     
          (1.157) (0.858)     
# of Prev adopters in region > 0             -0.320 0.193 
              (0.270) (0.281) 
FTE chg of prev adopt in region (H10b)             -0.035 -0.234 
              (0.283) (0.393) 
Time (years) 0.419* 0.392* 0.396* 0.338 0.413* 0.364* 0.411* 0.335 
  (0.180) (0.176) (0.173) (0.175) (0.178) (0.175) (0.174) (0.175) 
Time squared (years) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of panels 483 481 483 481 477 475 483 481 
Number of observations 10,830 10,760 10,830 10,760 10,679 10,609 10,830 10,760 
Max number of time periods 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Avg number of time periods 22.42 22.37 22.42 22.37 22.39 22.33 22.42 22.37 
chi2 28.24 144.65 38.57 150.95 28.13 143.33 46.29 151.54 
Log likelihood -410.47 -364.87 -406.68 -362.13 -399.49 -357.72 -405.94 -361.81 
std dev of v_i 1.36 0.01 0.88 0.00 1.28 0.01 0.76 0.00 
Pct of variance contributed by v_i 0.36 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.15 0.00 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix Table 4.3 Extended adoption model with market, institutional, and geographic proximity variables, conventional 
standard errors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln Undergrad FTE enroll 1.618*** 1.297*** 1.558*** 1.169*** 1.605*** 1.217*** 
  (0.290) (0.288) (0.279) (0.277) (0.292) (0.276) 
Ln Freshmen FTE enroll (H1) -0.682*** -0.277 -0.652*** -0.265 -0.681*** -0.270 
  (0.141) (0.166) (0.137) (0.156) (0.140) (0.157) 
Pct non-tuition revenue (H2) -1.352** -0.285 -1.414*** -0.441 -1.348** -0.327 
  (0.422) (0.807) (0.397) (0.787) (0.416) (0.777) 
Ln Tuition price (H2) -0.642*** -0.314 -0.539*** -0.253 -0.632*** -0.285 
  (0.162) (0.212) (0.151) (0.206) (0.162) (0.199) 
Pct freshman in-state (H2) 0.348 -0.440 0.337 -0.489 0.333 -0.489 
  (0.400) (0.464) (0.388) (0.442) (0.397) (0.437) 
Age (H3)   -0.009**   -0.008**   -0.009*** 
    (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003) 
Region= Mid-Atlantic (H4)   1.003   1.077   0.867 
    (0.655)   (0.626)   (0.653) 
Region= South (H4)   2.324***   2.070**   2.123** 
    (0.692)   (0.658)   (0.651) 
Region= Midwest (H4)   2.211**   1.935**   1.992** 
    (0.681)   (0.653)   (0.643) 
Region= Southwest (H4)   3.751***   3.244***   3.488*** 
    (0.861)   (0.810)   (0.797) 
Region= West (H4)   2.849***   2.487***   2.719*** 
    (0.712)   (0.691)   (0.664) 
Total professional BA adopted (H5)   0.036   0.035   0.033 
    (0.041)   (0.038)   (0.037) 
Total professional MA adopted (H5)   0.432***   0.403***   0.400*** 
    (0.085)   (0.084)   (0.081) 
Pct professional BA awarded (H5)   3.393***   3.438***   3.370*** 
    (0.658)   (0.632)   (0.632) 
Ever in consortium (H6) -0.548* -0.138 -0.539* -0.135 -0.570* -0.130 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  (0.272) (0.290) (0.259) (0.271) (0.268) (0.266) 
Previous adopters in region (H8b) (H9)     1.927*** 1.547**     
      (0.533) (0.595)     
# of Prev adopters in region > 0         0.313 0.636** 
          (0.210) (0.223) 
FTE chg of prev adopt in region (H10b)         -0.032 -0.148 
          (0.168) (0.237) 
Religious institution 1.064*** 0.465 1.056*** 0.502 1.059*** 0.466 
  (0.243) (0.271) (0.235) (0.256) (0.240) (0.253) 
Cumulative # of adopters -0.017 -0.003 -0.022 -0.009 -0.019 -0.008 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
Time (years) 0.207** 0.199** 0.201** 0.179* 0.189** 0.161* 
  (0.066) (0.074) (0.066) (0.073) (0.066) (0.072) 
Time squared (years) -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of panels 595 583 586 574 595 583 
Number of observations 16,482 16,325 16,165 16,008 16,482 16,325 
Max number of time periods 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Avg number of time periods 27.70 28.00 27.59 27.89 27.70 28.00 
chi2 65.93 76.91 73.33 83.66 66.70 89.43 
Log likelihood -837.04 -757.81 -815.97 -740.98 -835.91 -753.79 
std dev of v_i 0.75 0.98 0.61 0.74 0.70 0.73 
Pct of variance contributed by v_i 0.15 0.23 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.14 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix Table 4.4 Extended adoption model with market, institutional, consortium, and geographic proximity, conventional 
standard errors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln Undergrad FTE enroll 1.180** 0.914** 1.031** 0.997*** 1.041** 0.821** 1.043** 0.988*** 
  (0.397) (0.283) (0.351) (0.279) (0.387) (0.287) (0.342) (0.280) 
Ln Freshmen FTE enroll (H1) -0.613** -0.168 -0.586*** -0.220 -0.558** -0.164 -0.587*** -0.219 
  (0.200) (0.178) (0.172) (0.175) (0.192) (0.178) (0.174) (0.175) 
Pct non-tuition revenue (H2) -3.296* -0.576 -3.077* -0.321 -3.809** -0.939 -3.111* -0.329 
  (1.325) (1.312) (1.223) (1.302) (1.334) (1.347) (1.217) (1.314) 
Ln Tuition price (H2) -1.064** -0.371 -0.871** -0.377 -0.892* -0.347 -0.884** -0.370 
  (0.366) (0.270) (0.288) (0.275) (0.353) (0.270) (0.281) (0.276) 
Pct freshman in-state (H2) -0.075 -0.328 0.066 -0.293 -0.165 -0.456 0.076 -0.276 
  (0.618) (0.586) (0.543) (0.580) (0.609) (0.595) (0.549) (0.581) 
Age (H3)   -0.012***   -0.012***   -0.011**   -0.011** 
    (0.004)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
Region= Mid-Atlantic (H4)   -0.431   -0.430   -0.344   -0.819 
    (1.102)   (1.079)   (1.090)   (1.146) 
Region= South (H4)   2.103*   1.787*   2.045*   1.553 
    (0.887)   (0.874)   (0.867)   (0.906) 
Region= Midwest (H4)   2.311**   2.197**   2.302**   2.007* 
    (0.864)   (0.851)   (0.850)   (0.875) 
Region= Southwest (H4)   3.262***   3.088***   3.161***   2.886** 
    (0.938)   (0.923)   (0.930)   (0.945) 
Region= West (H4)   2.707**   2.560**   2.645**   2.380** 
    (0.863)   (0.852)   (0.855)   (0.878) 
Total professional BA adopted (H5)   0.020   0.009   0.023   0.006 
    (0.050)   (0.049)   (0.050)   (0.050) 
Total professional MA adopted (H5)   0.345***   0.356***   0.343***   0.352*** 
    (0.056)   (0.057)   (0.057)   (0.057) 
Pct professional BA awarded (H5)   2.688***   2.635**   2.666**   2.757*** 
    (0.804)   (0.808)   (0.817)   (0.820) 
In a consortium (time varying) (H6) -0.019 -0.043     -0.059 -0.072     
  
 
2
9
8
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  (0.313) (0.314)     (0.311) (0.317)     
Prev depart from consortium (H7) 0.165 0.200             
  (0.355) (0.328)             
Pct of consort members adopting (H8a) 5.988*** 5.590***     5.609** 5.587***     
  (1.740) (1.520)     (1.719) (1.495)     
# of consort members adopting > 0     0.560 0.467     0.613 0.416 
      (0.332) (0.336)     (0.336) (0.343) 
FTE chg of prev adopt in consort (H10a)     2.076** 2.071**     2.066** 2.185** 
      (0.686) (0.680)     (0.684) (0.687) 
Previous adopters in region (H8b) (H9)         2.402* 0.755     
          (1.086) (0.893)     
# of Prev adopters in region > 0             -0.286 0.211 
              (0.266) (0.288) 
FTE chg of prev adopt in region (H10b)             -0.020 -0.489 
              (0.272) (0.452) 
Religious institution 0.322 -0.474 0.339 -0.477 0.352 -0.418 0.296 -0.484 
  (0.337) (0.319) (0.295) (0.318) (0.331) (0.324) (0.299) (0.325) 
Cumulative # of adopters 0.015 0.018 0.009 0.014 -0.003 0.004 0.010 0.014 
  (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.056) (0.057) 
Time (years) 0.455 0.458 0.428 0.399 0.389 0.393 0.446 0.392 
  (0.253) (0.261) (0.252) (0.258) (0.251) (0.260) (0.253) (0.258) 
Time squared (years) -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Number of panels 483 481 483 481 477 475 483 481 
Number of observations 10,830 10,760 10,830 10,760 10,679 10,609 10,830 10,760 
Max number of time periods 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Avg number of time periods 22.42 22.37 22.42 22.37 22.39 22.33 22.42 22.37 
chi2 31.81 147.52 54.27 154.12 32.79 144.57 56.71 154.10 
Log likelihood -410.01 -362.04 -406.01 -359.04 -398.94 -355.05 -405.40 -358.32 
std dev of v_i 1.17 0.00 0.53 0.00 1.04 0.00 0.56 0.00 
Pct of variance contributed by v_i 0.29 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.09 0.00 
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Chapter 5 : 
 Conclusion 
 
 This concluding chapter summarizes empirical findings, draws implications for 
research and practice, and proposes future research.  First, I summarize and synthesize 
the results from Chapters 3 and 4.  In particular, I discuss the results for total 
undergraduate enrollments versus freshmen enrollments. I also discuss the pursuit of 
resources versus the pursuit of prestige.  Second, I discuss implications for higher 
education.  I argue that organizational theory can help resolve questions that are 
important to the field of higher education.  However, resolving these questions depends 
on appropriate use of theory and on developing appropriate datasets.  Finally, I discuss 
implications for practice and policy.  The research results point to some general strategies 
that can be adopted by administrators pursuing the individually rational goals of resource 
and prestige maximization.  The implications for policy are based on the idea that, in 
aggregate, individually rational pursuits do not necessarily contribute to societal goals. 
 
Summary and Synthesis 
Summary 
 Adoption and production of master’s degrees. Chapter 3 analyzes the adoption 
and production of master‟s degrees.  Drawing on resource dependence theory, I 
hypothesize that institutions will increase the adoption and production of master‟s 
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degrees in response to declines in undergraduate enrollments and state appropriations.  
Contrary to this hypothesis, results show that both the adoption and production of 
master‟s degrees is positively related to growth in total undergraduates.  Similarly, for the 
entire sample, the production of master‟s degrees is positively related to growth in 
freshman enrollments. However, freshman enrollments have a strong negative 
relationship to the production of master‟s degrees at liberal arts colleges and non-
selective universities, consistent with resource dependence theory.   
 Also drawing on resource dependence theory, I hypothesize that institutions 
increase the adoption and production of master‟s degrees when non-tuition revenues are 
weak.  In support of this hypothesis, endowment and grant revenues have a negative 
relationship with the production of master‟s degrees for the sample of all institutions and 
in particular for the sample of public institutions, the sample of liberal arts colleges, and 
the sample of highly selective universities (but not the sample of research universities).   I 
find similar, though weaker, results for revenue from auxiliary enterprises.   
For liberal arts colleges, endowment and grant revenues have a significantly 
negative relationship with the adoption of master‟s degrees in business, education, health, 
education administration, and psychology but not with computer science, or biology.  
These results imply that liberal arts colleges adopt revenue-generating, professional 
master‟s degrees when alternative revenues are weak, but not master‟s degrees in the 
sciences, which generate few enrollments and may be expensive to develop (Middaugh, 
Graham, Shahid, Carroll, & National Center for Education Statistics., 2003). 
 The hypotheses about prestige are generally supported.  Prestigious universities 
produce more master‟s degrees than non-prestigious universities, but prestige is 
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negatively related to the production of master‟s degrees at liberal arts colleges.  Bowen 
(1980) argues that a university is an organization that makes as much money as it can and 
spends all the money it makes on becoming more prestigious, implying that revenue from 
master‟s degrees subsidizes the pursuit of prestige.  I find this statement to be true for 
research universities. Prestigious liberal arts colleges, however, are unwilling to generate 
revenues through master‟s degrees because doing so would damage status in their core 
market of undergraduate education (Podolny, 1993).   
The relationship between prestige and alternative revenues differs for selective 
non-research universities (e.g., Lehigh, Brown) versus research universities.  The 
production of master‟s degrees is negatively related to endowment and grant income at 
selective non-research universities but not at research universities. These results imply 
that selective non-research universities view master‟s degrees as a substitute for 
endowment revenue, but prefer to maintain a brand identity focused on undergraduate 
education.  Research universities, by contrast, maximize revenues from all sources, 
consistent with Bowen (1980). 
 Finally, policymakers want institutions to focus on degrees demanded by the labor 
market (U.S. Department of Education, 2006).  I analyze whether changes in 
occupational earnings and employment affect the adoption of related master‟s degree 
programs by liberal arts colleges.  I find that earnings growth is associated with the 
adoption of master‟s degrees in business, education, and computer science.  However, 
employment growth in related occupations does not have a significantly positive effect on 
the adoption specific master‟s degree programs.  In fact, employment growth has a 
significantly negative relationship with the adoption of master‟s degrees in educational 
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administration.  A potential mechanism for this finding is that when fewer jobs exist, 
individuals have a stronger incentive to obtain credentials to compete for those 
increasingly scarce jobs (Boudon, 1974). 
 Mission drift in liberal arts colleges.  Chapter 4 analyzes mission drift in liberal 
arts colleges.  I define “becoming a university” as changing the organizational name to 
include the word “university.”  Drawing on Greenwood and Hinings (1996), I argue that 
becoming a university symbolizes the abandonment of the liberal arts college 
organizational template and the adoption of the comprehensive university template.  I 
integrate research from the field of higher education (e.g., Aldersley, 1995; Morphew, 
2002) by defining “mission drift” as a change in organizational template.   
The liberal arts template admonishes colleges to focus on undergraduate, liberal 
arts majors, to focus on “traditional” college students, and to maintain small enrollments 
(Breneman, 1990).  In contrast, the comprehensive university template permits all 
enrollment growth strategies.  I argue that many colleges adopted the comprehensive 
university template when changes in the external environment made the liberal arts 
template unsuitable to the goals of organizational survival and stability.   
 I hypothesize that becoming a university is caused by market, institutional, and 
network factors.  I find that growth in total undergraduate enrollments is positively 
related to becoming a university, but growth in freshman enrollments is negatively 
related to becoming a university. Colleges are less likely to become universities when 
they have a strong market position (tuition price and selectivity), strong organizational 
resources (non-tuition revenues), a strong historical tradition (organizational age), and 
when they are located in a region that values the liberal arts template (the Northeast).   
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The proportion of bachelor‟s degrees in professional fields, and the prior adoption 
of professional master‟s degrees increase the probability of becoming a university.  
Colleges are more likely to become universities when socially proximate colleges 
(geographic proximity and membership inter-organizational consortia) have previously 
become universities.  I also find that colleges are more likely to become universities 
when fellow consortium members increase enrollments after becoming a university.  
Finally, I show that becoming a university has a positive effect on total enrollments, the 
production of bachelor‟s and master‟s degrees, the subsequent adoption of professional 
master‟s degrees, total tuition revenue, and total current revenues. 
I argue that the primary rationale for becoming a university is to diversify 
clientele through the expansion of master‟s degree programs.  Therefore, Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 complement one another nicely: liberal arts colleges adopt master‟s degrees in 
order to grow enrollments and diversify their customer base (Chapter 3); liberal arts 
colleges become universities in order to expand the production of master‟s degrees 
(Chapter 4). 
Synthesis 
 Total undergraduate enrollments versus freshmen enrollments.  The results 
for total undergraduate enrollments and freshmen enrollments in Chapter 3 appear 
contradictory.  Total undergraduate enrollments have a positive relationship with the 
production of master‟s degrees for all organizational types.  Freshman enrollments, 
however, have a positive relationship with production for the sample of all institutions, 
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but a negative relationship with production for liberal arts colleges and unselective 
private universities.
59
   
For liberal arts colleges and non-selective private universities, I argue that 
declining freshmen enrollments are ultimately the driver of master‟s degree expansion.  
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show that many liberal arts colleges and non-selective universities 
experienced dramatic declines in their freshmen enrollments – a leading indicator of 
enrollment decline – during the 1970s and 1980s.  However, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show 
that few institutions experienced declines in total enrollments.  Rather, most institutions 
experienced dramatic enrollment expansions that continued into the 21
st
 century.   
I argue that total undergraduate enrollments expanded, despite declining freshmen 
enrollments, because these institutions pursued new customer bases – part-time students, 
older students, etc. – in response to declines in their core constituency of full-time, 
“college-age” students.  At a later stage, these institutions continued to diversify their 
clientele by expanding master‟s degree enrollments.  By the time these institutions began 
expanding master‟s degree programs, total undergraduate enrollments were increasing 
(hence the positive coefficient) but freshmen enrollments remained stagnant (hence the 
negative coefficient).  Note that one potential problem with my interpretation of the 
results, is that total undergraduate enrollments may have increased due to a rebound in 
the size of the college-age cohort in the 1990s (NCES, 2010), rather than because of 
changes in organizational behavior.  Therefore, future research should integrate 
demographic change into the model. 
                                                 
59
 Note that no contradiction exists for the production of master‟s degrees by public institutions and 
selective universities; enrollment growth occurs simultaneously at all levels as part of a general expansion 
strategy. 
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Results for Chapter 4 support my interpretation of Chapter 3 findings.  For liberal 
arts colleges, becoming a university is positively related to total undergraduate 
enrollments but negatively related to freshmen enrollments.  Kraatz and Zajac (1996) 
show that liberal arts colleges adopted professional bachelor‟s degrees in the 1970s and 
1980s.  I show that in the 1980s and 1990s, many liberal arts colleges became 
universities.  Colleges that became universities were concerned about declining freshmen 
enrollments (hence the negative coefficient) but were already on a path of overall 
enrollment growth, with a growing emphasis on part-time students and professional 
bachelor‟s degree programs (hence the positive coefficient).   
Pursuit of revenue versus the pursuit of prestige.  Important theoretical 
contributions argue that the pursuits of resources and prestige cannot be studied in 
isolation (Bowen, 1980; Podolny, 1993; Winston, 1999); the institutions with the most 
resources win the competition for prestige and prestige enables institutions to generate 
more resources.  How do the pursuits of resources and prestige differ across the prestige 
spectrum?  Winston states that (1999, pp. 29-30): 
Competition among schools appears to be limited to overlapping “bands” or 
segments of similarly wealthy schools within the hierarchy (with the further 
separation by geography and ideology)…. Competition at the top and bottom of 
the hierarchy takes place in markets for very different things. At the bottom, it is 
competition in the product market for customers who will buy the output; at the 
top, it is competition in the input market for scarce student (and faculty) quality 
that will improve a school‟s educational quality and position. 
 
 For institutions on the upper end of the prestige distribution, organizational 
prestige depends largely on the academic profile of undergraduate students.  All 
prestigious institutions will be selective about enrolling undergraduate students, meaning 
that these institutions do not maximize short-term undergraduate tuition revenue.  
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Additionally, all prestigious institutions will attempt to maximize “donative resources” 
(Winston, 1999) – investment revenue and private grant revenue – to subsidize the 
pursuit of prestige of prestige.  For research universities, master‟s degree students do not 
affect overall college rankings (U.S. News & World Report, 2010).  Therefore, research 
universities might attempt to maximize revenues from master‟s degrees in order to 
subsidize the pursuit of prestige in undergraduate and doctoral education (Ehrenberg, 
2000).  However, prestigious academic units (e.g., a business school) concerned with 
their long-term reputation may prefer to be selective about master‟s degree enrollments.   
For prestigious liberal arts colleges, master‟s degree programs undermine brand 
identities that have been built over hundreds of years.  Therefore, prestigious liberal arts 
colleges do not seek revenues from master‟s degrees, nor do they consider becoming a 
university in order to grow overall tuition revenues.  Selective non-research universities 
(e.g., Brown, Dartmouth) lie somewhere between research universities and selective 
liberal arts colleges, not avoiding master‟s degrees entirely but maintaining a focus on 
undergraduate education. 
 For institutions at the lower end of the prestige distribution, organizational 
stability is an important concern and national prestige is not a realistic objective.  Results 
from Chapters 3 and 4 are consistent with Winston (1999); these organizations do not 
have access to “donative” resources so they pursue organizational stability by 
maximizing tuition revenue from both undergraduate enrollments and from graduate 
enrollments.  Whereas expanding undergraduate enrollments undermines brand-identity 
for prestigious institutions, non-prestigious institutions can expand undergraduate 
enrollments with relative impunity.   
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 Doyle (2010) finds that from 1992 to 2003 non-prestigious institutions increased 
spending on institutional “merit” aid designed to raise academic profile.  This finding is 
inconsistent with the argument (Winston, 1999) that non-prestigious institutions attempt 
to maximize undergraduate enrollments and care little about the academic profile of 
enrolled students.  If the findings of Doyle (2010) are indicative of long-term trends, then 
non-prestigious institutions may increasingly behave like research universities, becoming 
selective about undergraduate enrollments but maximizing revenue from master‟s degree 
students.   
Studies of prestige in higher education often assume that stark differentiation 
exists between the relatively few prestigious institutions (e.g., Harvard vs. George 
Washington University) but that little differentiation exists amongst the thousands of 
non-prestigious institutions (Bastedo & Jaquette, 2011).  Perhaps this assumption is false.  
Future research should analyze behavioral differences between non-prestigious 
institutions striving to increase academic profile (Doyle, 2010) and non-prestigious 
institutions willing to accept any student (Winston, 1999). 
Another area for future research is the motivation for the high production of 
master‟s degrees at prestigious universities.  Drawing on Bowen (1980), I have argued 
that prestigious universities expand the production of master‟s degrees to subsidize the 
pursuit of prestige in undergraduate education.  For example, Brandeis University was 
ranked 34
th
 in the 2011 USNWR rankings, but offers master‟s degree programs that do 
not require GRE or GMAT test scores (Brandeis University, 2011). This argument 
assumes that organization-level decision makers promote the expansion of master‟s 
degrees.  An alternative argument is that the high production of master‟s degrees at 
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prestigious universities is not the result of organization-level decision-making, but is the 
aggregate effect of individual academic units (e.g., the school of social work) desiring to 
increase enrollment revenue through the expansion of master‟s degrees.  This argument 
seems especially plausible in large universities (e.g., University of Michigan) where 
academic units are responsible for generating revenues to match their costs. 
 
Implications for Higher Education Research 
A Research Program on Enrollments 
Chapter 1 reviewed historical studies of U.S. higher education, arguing that 
important organizational changes in postsecondary organizations were motivated by the 
desire to increase enrollments.  Contemporary research increasingly argues that 
postsecondary institutions attempt to increase prestige by attracting students with high 
academic profiles.  Building on these ideas, Chapter 1 proposed a research program 
focusing on how postsecondary institutions change organizational behavior in order to 
generate enrollments from desired student populations. Chapters 3 and 4 are two studies 
that fit within the research program.  I suggest several additional studies. 
First, several studies document increased expenditure on institutional financial aid 
to students (Doyle, 2010; McPherson & Schapiro, 1998).  The panel dataset described in 
Chapter 2 can be used to provide descriptive analyses of change over time in 
organization-level spending on institutional aid, across organizational types.  Second, 
panel analyses could examine whether increased spending on institutional aid results in 
higher academic profile (e.g., standardized test scores), higher yield rates, or higher 
USNWR rankings.  When institutional aid is allocated on the basis of “merit” – to attract 
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high achieving students – less aid is allocated for students with financial “need” (Heller 
& Marin, 2004).  Therefore, organization-level research on institutional aid should also 
examine the extent to which the increase in institutional aid negatively affects access for 
low-income and minority students. 
A second topic is the recruitment of out-of-state students by public institutions 
(Curs, 2010).  Out-of-state students are desirable for public institutions because they pay 
higher tuition and may have stronger academic profiles than in-state students.  Do public 
institutions increase enrollments of out-of-state students in response to declines in state 
appropriations or in response to volatility in state appropriations?  Prestigious public 
institutions (e.g., University of Michigan) enjoy stronger demand from out-of-state 
students but not prestigious institutions do not.  Therefore, analyses should examine 
whether the effect of declining or volatile state appropriations differs by institutional 
prestige.   
International students represent another opportunity to increase enrollment 
revenue and academic profile.  However, empirical research has not analyzes trends over 
time and across institutional type in the enrollment of international students.  I find that 
the growth in international enrollments differs dramatically across institutional types.
60
  
Using categories from the 1976 Carnegie Classification, the percent of freshmen from 
foreign countries increased from 3.5% in 1973 to 7.3% in 2009 for private research 
universities, from 1.2% to 3.1% for public research universities, from 2.8% to 6.2% for 
private doctoral institutions, from 1.0% to 1.3% for public doctoral institutions, from 
2.1% to 7.2% for selective private liberal arts colleges, and from 2.3% to 2.7% for non-
selective private liberal arts colleges.    
                                                 
60
 Author‟s calculations. 
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Another fruitful area of research is the adoption and effects of responsibility 
centered management (RCM) budgeting systems (Hearn, Lewis, Kallsen, Holdsworth, & 
Jones, 2006; Priest, Becker, Hossler, & St. John, 2002).  RCM systems generally require 
that each unit generate revenues to match their costs.  The rationale for RCM systems is 
similar to that of “quasi markets” and “the new public management” (Jaquette, 2009; 
Walsh, 1995), in which government “steers the boat, but does not row.”  Especially in 
large organizations, RCM systems devolve decision-making to the unit level but compel 
units to behave in ways congruent with overall organizational goals.  The incentives 
created by an RCM system depend on the specific policy details (Hearn, et al., 2006), but 
in general RCM systems provide academic units with the incentive to become more 
entrepreneurial in generating tuition revenue (Ehrenberg, 2000).  For example, 
professional schools at prestigious universities (e.g., social work, education) have limited 
undergraduate enrollments when the organization does not allow undergraduate 
professional majors.  Therefore, the adoption of RCM creates strong incentives to expand 
graduate education.  Research papers on RCM could examine how the adoption of RCM 
systems diffuses across organizations and could examine the effects of RCM policies on 
organizational outcomes.  
Other potential research topics include the following: 
 The effect of the stock market on applications and yield 
 The effect of federal loan policies on tuition prices (Curs & Dar, 2010; 
McPherson & Schapiro, 1993) 
 The growth of for-profit education; federal student loans and grants as a 
percentage of for-profit revenues 
 The effect of accreditation and losing accreditation on enrollments 
 The adoption and effect of “student learning assessment plans” (Ewell, 2001; 
Middle States Commission on Higher Education, 2006) 
 The causes of institutional closures and mergers 
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 Change over time in age composition and attendance-status in postsecondary 
education  
 The growing use of adjunct professors 
 The effect of state appropriations volatility on organizational revenue strategies 
(Doyle & Delaney, 2009) 
 The relationship between degree production and skill shortages in the labor 
market 
 
Research Design 
 I argue that insights from organizational studies can make unique contributions to 
scholarship on the behavior of colleges and universities.  Over the last decade, 
organizational studies has moved away from a paradigm-driven approach, where cases 
are used to prove theory, to a problem-driven approach, where theory is used to develop 
insights about cases (G. F. Davis & Marquis, 2005).  Organizational scholars in the field 
of higher often adopt a paradigm-driven approach, testing alternative theoretical 
perspectives to identify which one offers the best explanation of a real-world problem 
(e.g., Jaquette, 2010).  I argue that problem-driven research designs will offer deeper 
insights about college and university behavior than paradigm-driven research designs.  
 Problem-driven work in organizational studies is increasingly based on the 
concept of the organizational field.  The field consists of actors – focal organizations, key 
suppliers, customers, and regulators – and the relationships between actors as they pursue 
goals amidst a changing external environment.  The field is not defined a priori. Rather, 
the scholar sketches the organizational field relevant to the explanation of a particular 
problem (G. F. Davis & Marquis, 2005).  After outlining the organizational field, 
organizational behavior is a contingent outcome that depends on market position, 
interactions with other actors in the field, and changes in the external environment 
(McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001).  Paradigm-driven research forces messy cases to fit 
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into neat theories. In contrast, research based on the field provides more realistic 
predictions by identifying the mechanisms at work in a specific empirical context. 
 This dissertation shows the utility of problem-driven research designs over 
paradigm-driven research designs.  In Chapter 3, I developed alternative hypotheses 
based on human capital theory, resource dependence theory, and the pursuit of prestige 
(economics/sociology).  The resource dependence hypotheses focused on diversification, 
which is one element of the theory.  At the same time, the hypotheses about prestige were 
not mutually exclusive from the resource dependence hypotheses.  In Chapter 4, I made a 
conceptual contribution by defining “mission drift” as the change from one 
organizational template to another (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).  I argued that adding 
the word “university” to an organizational name symbolized the adoption of a new 
organizational template.  Next, I integrated several literatures within a single theoretical 
tradition – institutional theory – into a cohesive conceptual framework to study the causes 
of adopting a new organizational template.  In comparison to the paradigm-driven 
research in Chapter 3, I believe that the problem-driven research in Chapter 4 created a 
more engaging argument and resulted in deeper insights about a real-world problem. 
 Therefore, I argue that future research on organizational change in higher 
education will benefit from using a problem-based, field-based research design.  Higher 
education is an applied research field, so it makes sense that scholars should use theory to 
develop insights about real-world problems (Peterson, 1985).  Like in economics, most 
organizational theorists view actors in the field as goal-oriented.   However, whereas 
empirical contributions from economics often model behavior based an individual utility 
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functions, the field concept compels scholars to view organizational behavior in relation 
to the behavior of other organizations. 
Data Requirements 
 The study of organizational behavior poses strong data requirements.  By 
definition, the study of behavioral change requires panel data.  Furthermore, empirical 
contributions to organizational scholarship often use data on focal organizations (e.g., 
colleges), the relationships between focal organizations (i.e., network ties), and data on 
the external environment (e.g., demographic change, regulatory change).  These intensive 
data requirements can be a barrier to entry for scholars desiring to study organizational 
behavior.  Therefore, by creating a panel dataset of colleges and universities and by 
providing these data to the public, I hope to catalyze future research on organizational 
behavior.  In the future, I hope to increase the utility of the dataset by adding variables on 
faculty, administrators, and institutional expenditures.  Eventually, the panel dataset will 
include a comprehensive set of organization-level variables, to which researchers can 
merge additional data sources (e.g., Brint, 2002). 
 
Implications for Practice 
Administrators 
 Non-prestigious institutions. The research findings from Chapters 3 and 4 have 
implications for administrators.  I suggest separate implications for non-prestigious and 
prestigious institutions.  Non-prestigious institutions are primarily concerned with long-
term organizational stability and enhancing prestige at the regional level.  These 
institutions generate the majority of their revenues from student enrollments.  My results 
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indicate that aggressively reorganizing the curricula to attract a diverse customer base is a 
sound strategy for organizational stability.  Institutions can increase enrollments by 
offering professional baccalaureate degrees and professional master‟s degrees.  
Enrollment growth can be further enhanced by targeting part-time and older students and 
by offering programs in both brick-and-mortar and online settings.   
 The credentialism literatures suggests that enrollment revenues can be maximized 
by focus on master‟s degrees related to occupations where credentials are required or de 
facto requisite for career advancement.  MBAs provide strong enrollment revenues for 
many institutions(Khurana, 2007). Collins (1974) finds that educational requirements are 
highest in the social services professions, implying that institutions should adopt 
professional master‟s degrees in education (e.g., educational administration, curriculum 
design, subject-specific teaching, etc), social work, nursing, psychology, public 
administration.   
The results from Chapter 3 suggest that non-prestigious institutions seeking 
enrollment growth should avoid master‟s degrees with intensive pre-requisite skills, (e.g. 
statistics, biology).  Non-prestigious institutions draw enrollments primarily from local 
students (Manski & Wise, 1983), but few prospective students possess the prerequisite 
skills, leading to low enrollments.  In contrast, inter-disciplinary professional master‟s 
degrees (e.g., social work, educational administration) can generate strong enrollments 
while drawing on the local population because these degrees require few prerequisite 
skills. 
 I suggest that non-prestigious universities seeking to maximize net tuition income 
should offer a few master‟s degree programs, each with strong enrollments, rather than 
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many master‟s degree programs, each with few students.  The latter option has poor 
economies of scale in that it requires high expenditure on administration and requires 
many different instructors.  However, Chapter 3 suggests that institutions may generate 
strong enrollments by offering short courses, post-baccalaureate certificates, and industry 
certifications in subjects where degree programs already exist.   
The long-term success of any professional degree program depends on cultivating 
relationships with employers, seeking employer advice on curriculum design, and using 
former students as a network to help current students find employment.  Finally, adopting 
an incentive-based budgeting system may be a way to devolve enrollment growth 
incentives to the unit-level (Priest, et al., 2002) and can provide a convenient rationale for 
cutting unprofitable degree programs. 
 Prestigious institutions. I assume that administrators at prestigious institutions 
attempt to maximize prestige.  Institutions attempting to maximize prestige should 
maintain selective undergraduate admissions (Winston, 1999). The strategic use of 
institutional aid can increase the academic profile of enrolled students.  For example, the 
adoption of a “university honors program” – coupled with an “honors program 
scholarship” – enables institutions to attract students that would otherwise attend more 
prestigious institutions.  
The competition for prestige depends on maximizing revenues, without engaging 
behaviors that undermine brand identity (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001).  For both prestigious 
universities and liberal arts colleges, revenues from donations and investments (e.g., 
endowment) generate substantial revenues without undermining brand.  Although 
master‟s degrees undermine brand identity as prestigious liberal arts colleges, prestigious 
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research universities can generate substantial enrollment revenue from master‟s degrees 
without undermining brand identity.  For example, both Harvard University and Oxford 
University couple very-selective undergraduate programs with less-selective graduate 
programs.  Prestigious universities enjoy strong demand for their master‟s programs, 
leading to cohort sizes that are typically much larger than those at non-prestigious 
institutions.   
At research universities, academic units are often responsible for generating 
revenues to match costs.  This creates an incentive for academic units to increase 
master‟s degree enrollments, especially in professional schools that have few 
undergraduate students (e.g., social work, education).  Deans in these units may be 
tempted to grow master‟s enrollments aggressively.  However, the expansion of cohort 
sizes may negatively affect the academic profile of enrolled students.  Therefore, 
enrollment growth can negatively affect USNWR rankings if it is coupled with declines 
in academic profile.  In turn, lower USNWR rankings leads to lower student demand 
(Bowman & Bastedo, 2009).  Therefore, a better strategy may be to pursue enrollment 
growth only when it does not negatively affect academic profile.  Additionally, academic 
units may temporarily decrease cohort size to generate a positive shock to academic 
profile.   
Policymakers 
 The research findings from Chapters 3 and 4 also have implications for 
policymakers.  Frank (2008) argues that one goal of public policy is to discourage 
behaviors that are individually rational but socially harmful.  The pursuit of prestige is a 
zero-sum game; no matter how many billions of dollars are spent on the pursuit of 
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prestige, only 25 institutions “get on the front page” of USNWR rankings (Bowman & 
Bastedo, 2009).  Winston (1999) argues that institutions are engaged in a socially 
wasteful arms-race for educational prestige, spending vast sums on luxury dorms and 
recreation centers in order to attract the best students.  The spending is wasteful in the 
sense that it drives tuition prices upwards without contributing to a higher quality 
education.  Increasingly, institutions attempt to increase their academic profile by 
devoting institutional aid to “merit” rather than “need” (Doyle, 2010), a phenomenon that 
may result in reduced access to prestigious institutions for low-income students.   
 Policy prescriptions for problems associated with the pursuit of prestige are 
unclear.  In theory, wasteful competition can be curbed by placing a ceiling on the 
amount of money spent (Frank, 2008).  Decreasing maximum loan amounts, especially 
for affluent households, could ultimately result in lower tuition prices and lower spending 
per student, perhaps making educational spending more efficient. However, this solution 
is politically unfeasible in that it undermines access to prestigious institutions for middle 
class families.  Similarly, state policymakers could set lower ceilings on tuition, making it 
more difficult for prestigious public universities to compete with prestigious private 
universities.  However, maintaining prestigious public universities is one way states 
retain their most talented students and poach the most talented students from other states.  
Furthermore, policymaking is moving away from tuition ceilings, with several states 
relinquishing regulatory control as compensation for lower state appropriations 
(Breneman, 2004). 
 Another policy concern is that degrees that are profitable for institutions may not 
provide skills that are scarce in the labor market.  For example, Chapter 3 shows that the 
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adoption of master‟s degrees in educational administration is negatively related to the 
number of jobs in educational administration.  The policy prescription is to modify 
incentives so that organizations pursue social policy goals through the pursuit of their 
own self-interest.  While performance funding in U.S. postsecondary education has been 
widely viewed as ineffectual (Burke & Minassians, 2003; Dougherty & Hong, 2005), 
other countries have been successful in creating funding policies that incentivize 
organizations to pursue policy goals (DfES, 2003). 
For U.S. policymakers, the “carrot” option may be for governments to provide 
supplemental payments for the production of desired degrees – e.g., psychometrics, 
STEM fields, potentially by embedding these incentives in funding formulae (Jaquette, 
2009).  However, funding such policies could be difficult politically.  Multiple “stick” 
options exist.  First, the federal government could require institutions to prominently 
display program-specific information on graduation rates, the percent of graduates who 
find related employment, and the percent of graduates who pay back student loans.  A 
more extreme policy solution would refuse Title IV funding eligibility for degree 
programs with low-rates of job-placement and high rates of student loan default. 
 
Conclusion: Equity and Efficiency Implications 
Labaree (1997) describes three competing views on the goal of education.  First, 
the democratic equity goal argues that all individuals should have equal access to 
education, both because a flourishing democracy requires an educated citizenry (Bloom, 
1987) and because unequal access to education violates democratic principles of equity 
(Kezar, Chambers, & Burkhardt, 2005).  Second, the social efficiency goal argues that 
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different individuals require different levels of education in order to fulfill their 
appropriate role in the hierarchical labor market.  The social efficiency goal is associated 
with human capital theory in economics (Becker, 1964; Goldin & Katz, 2008), 
functionalism in sociology (K. Davis & Moore, 1944; Parsons, 1959), and is exemplified 
by hierarchical state systems of postsecondary education, such as the California “Master 
Plan” (California State Department of Education, 1960).   
Third, the status attainment goal argues that education is a private good that helps 
individuals obtain a competitive advantage in the competition for scarce jobs. The status 
attainment goal is associated with signaling theory in economics (Spence, 1973) and the 
credentialism literature in sociology (Berg, 1970; Collins, 1979).  Under the social 
efficiency goal, total spending on education should not exceed that which is required to 
fulfill the skill demands of the labor market. Under the status attainment goal, total 
spending on education surpasses the amount required to fulfill the skill demands of the 
labor market because individuals attain career advancement by acquiring more 
credentials than competitors, creating an “arms race of educational attainment” (Frank & 
Cook, 1995). 
Two reasons explain why the status attainment goal has become the dominant 
goal of education.  First, competition intensifies when the number of desirable jobs is 
surpassed by the number of people competing for those jobs (Blau, 1994; Boudon, 1974).  
In the mid-twentieth century, social mobility increased because low-skill agricultural jobs 
were replaced by high-skill blue-collar and white-collar jobs (Blau & Duncan, 1967).  
Growth in the supply of high-skill occupations required investments in training so that 
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individuals could perform job responsibilities (Clark, 1962), an explanation consistent 
with the social efficiency goal of education.   
In the late-twentieth century, however, the number of high-skill job opportunities 
declined relative to the supply of highly-educated labor (Blau, 1994).  The proportion of 
25-29 year-olds with a baccalaureate degree increased from 26% in 1980, to 32% in 
2000, to 35% in 2009 (NCES, 2010).  By contrast, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006) 
states that only 20% of jobs “required” (according to job-skill requirements) at least a 
baccalaureate degree in 2004 and projects that 21% jobs will require at least a 
baccalaureate degree in 2014.  As the number of job opportunities to decline relative to 
the number of job-seekers, individuals have an incentive to seek education in excess of 
job-skill requirements in order to compete for increasingly scarce jobs. 
The second reason for the dominance of the status attainment goal relates to the 
adage “he who pays the piper calls the tune.”  Both the democratic equity goal and the 
social efficiency goal view education as a public good (Labaree, 1997).  During the 
“golden era” of higher education (Thelin, 2004) institutions largely pursued the social 
efficiency goal because government revenue comprised a large percentage of total 
revenue.
61
  In recent decades, tuition revenue from paying customers has increased and 
government revenue has declined, implying that institutions increasingly serve the status 
attainment goal of education, which views education as a private good. 
The dominance of the status attainment goal is lucrative for postsecondary 
institutions.  As supply of baccalaureate degrees increases relative to number of jobs 
“requiring” a baccalaureate, it becomes harder for employers to distinguish between job 
applicants purely on the basis of the baccalaureate (Hershbein, 2010).  Paradoxically, 
                                                 
61
 Author‟s calculations. 
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demand for master‟s degrees increases because the supply of college-educated labor 
exceeds the demand for college-educated labor. As I argued previously, most 
postsecondary institutions depend predominantly on enrollment-related revenue.  
Therefore, institutions can grow graduate enrollments by capitalizing on the competition 
for credentials that is inherent in the status attainment goal.  In addition to master‟s 
degrees, institutions may offer post-baccalaureate certificates and industry certifications 
that promise a competitive advantage in the competition for career advancement.   
A recent New York times article “The Master‟s as the New Bachelor‟s” 
(Pappano, 2011) describe the growth of the professional science master‟s (PSM) degree, 
which combines “job-specific training with business skills.”  Institutional administrators 
and the Council of Graduate Schools rationalize these degrees in terms of the social 
efficiency goal of education; they provide skills that are required due to technological and 
economic change. 
“There are several million job vacancies in the country right now, but they don‟t 
line up with skills,” says [David King, dean of graduate studies and research at the 
State University of New York at Oswego]. Each P.S.M. degree, he says, is 
developed with advisers from the very companies where students may someday 
work. “We are bringing the curriculum to the market, instead of expecting the 
market to come to us,” he says.  
 
It is unsurprising that the actors who benefit most from the growth of master‟s degrees 
describe master‟s degrees as necessary for society, rather than as a means of generating 
tuition revenue.  In contrast, employers, students, and scholars describe the growth of 
master‟s degrees in terms of the status attainment goal; master‟s degrees become 
necessary to get a job when employers – faced with hundreds of applications – discard all 
applicants without a master‟s degree (Pappano, 2011). 
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 What are the implications for equity and efficiency (DesJardins, 2002) when the 
goal of education becomes acquiring more credentials than the next person?  First, the 
dominance of the status attainment goal undermines the social efficiency goal.  In 
aggregate, society devotes excess money to education because individuals acquire 
education in excess of job-skill requirements in order to compete for scarce jobs 
(Labaree, 1997).  It is important to note that postsecondary institutions are the primary 
beneficiaries of this system; when some individuals gain a competitive advantage in the 
labor market by enrolling in a master‟s program, it becomes more rational for other 
individuals to follow suit, or else get left behind (Boudon, 1974).  Furthermore, 
postsecondary institutions receive tuition funding on the front-end, but students must 
repay loans on the back-end, regardless of whether the credential leads to a job.   
 Second, the status attainment goal of  undermines the democratic equity goal of 
equal opportunity (Labaree, 1997).  When postsecondary institutions adopt degrees for 
the purpose of generating tuition revenue, they implicitly value only those students that 
can afford the tuition.  When master‟s degrees become prerequisite for entry-level jobs, 
social mobility is likely to decrease because low-income students cannot afford master‟s 
degree tuition without incurring significant debt.   
Postsecondary institutions are kingmakers in the sense that degree-granting 
authority enables institutions to bestow individuals with legitimacy in labor and social 
markets.  Because most institutions depend predominantly on tuition funding, institutions 
will disproportionately bestow legitimacy on the paying customer, while prospects 
diminish for the capable self-learner.  These ideas can be found in the prescient words of 
Max Weber (1948, pp. 242-243): 
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When we hear from all sides the demand for an introduction of regular curricula 
and special examinations, the reason behind it is, of course, not a suddenly 
awakened „thirst for education‟ but the desire for restricting the supply for these 
positions and their monopolization by the owners of educational certificates….As 
the education prerequisite to the acquisition of the educational certificate requires 
considerable expense and a period of waiting for full remuneration, this striving 
means a setback for talent (charisma) in favor of property. For the „intellectual‟ 
costs of educational certificates are always low, and with the increasing volume of 
such certificates, their intellectual costs do not increase, but rather decrease. 
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